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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis outlines the creation of a secure, real time, system independent, 
Internet based auctioning application. The system has been developed to meet the 
needs of today's stringent reqUirements on secure Internet based applications. To 
attain this goal, the latest cryptographic algorithms and development platforms 
have been used. The result is a JAVA based server and client auctioning application. 
The client application is designed to run In any common web browser, and the 
server to execute on any JAVA enabled operating system with a web server and 
Internet connection. The real time system uses a relatively secure hybrid 
cryptosystem for communication. This involves the use of RSA for secure key 
exchange, and RC6 and MARS for secure communication. 
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1) Introduction 
The Internet thus far has made a significant impact on the world we currently live 
in and will undoubtedly form an integral part of the future of the entire planet. In a 
day and age when information is the key to many fortunes, it is imperative to 
control and distribute this commodity effectively, The Internet has provided the 
basis of this information sharing, from a simple email to inter corporation co-
operation, 
Over the past ten years the growth has been nothing short of astounding, with 
millions of new users joining each month, This is the beginning of a borderless 
global economy, 
However, with the advent of the most resource intensive tool on the planet, comes 
a number of problems. The Internet has been plagued by the disparity of systems 
utilized. This includes the non -adherence to specifications of applications and 
formats. The result is a complex integration of architectures, operating systems and 
protocols. This constant state of flux is argued as one of the strengths of the 
Internet, but also, its greatest inhibitor. 
Another problem with this sharing of information, is not the means of 
communication, but the actual information concerned. With such vast amounts of 
sensitive information available, it becomes a crucial resource to protect. The 
"Digital Age" has been entered; all and most forms of information have made the 
conversion to some form of digital format. However there has been little 
forethought to the securing and protection of this digital information. The safety 
deposit box of the twentieth century needs to be replaced by the secure server of 
the twenty-first century. 
Currently wherever one looks, there are articles, adverts and programs expressing 
the promise that the Internet holds. Over the last two years there has been a wild 
rush to become net ready, opening the doors to web shoppers and commercial 
success. The Internet has levelled the commercial playing fields and allowed the 
average company to parade their wares on an international stage. This e-buslness 
as it has come to be known, generated about two billion U.S dollars in 1999. It is 
estimated that the amount spent on line will increase to twenty billion V.S dollars by 
the year 2002. The ease at which business can be conducted online will push more 
and more corporations into the fray, any of whom that ignore the biggest new 
market in over four hundred years, do so at their own peril. 
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1.1) Proposed project 
The proposed project is as follows: 
To create a real time, auctioning application. The application must have no 
preference to any architecture and operating system . The aim was for a single item 
to be auctioned at a time, with the possibility of extending the application at a later 
date for multiple items. The server application controls all aspects of the auction, 
Including details, finish times and the client handling elements. This includes any 
administration tasks associated with the application. The entire system is aimed at 
working over a network, specifically the Internet. 
The bidding on auctioned items is to be orchestrated by the client application. This 
cl ient application will communicate with the auction server over the Internet. The 
client application notifies the client, concerning all changes in the current auction. 
The client application allows the client to place bids. Similarly no client type or 
operating system has been targeted. This requires an application able to operate on 
any of the wide scope of systems available on the Internet today. 
The application is also designed to take advantages of the future in secure 
communications and so affording the clients peace of mind when participating in 
the auctions. The security of the application is not exclusive to secure 
communication , but rather as an aspect of the entire application. This security 
feature incorporates, design techniques, secure communication and secure 
programming. 
The language used to develop this application must take advantage of the Internet, 
and be able to support the wide range of features available. However it must not 
limit or target any platform available on the web. It should be a robust, secure and 
mu ltithreaded development tool to prevent any l imitations to the application. 
The project wi ll attempt to create a marketable application that wou ld match real 
world demands. The application is designed to harness the power of the Internet, 
without limiting the clients to any hardware or software requirements, thereby 
obtaining a wider range of clients. Not only that, but the application is designed to 
meet the requirements of secure Internet based communications, allowing 
commercial transactions to take place without threat. 
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1.2) The Internet 
A Brief History 
The Internet is now over thirty years of age. Admittedly it has changed 
dramatically, but its roots lie shrouded in the co ld war. In the 1960's nuclear threat 
was a real possibi lity, and the American government developed a communications 
scheme that would be capable of withstandi ng such a strike. The result was a 
network of computers that had multiple transmission routes to anywhere else on 
the network 
The communication protocol that was designed to take advantage of this was 
TCP/IP. This enhanced the system by adding re liability to the way in which 
messages were processed. In the late sixties the defence depa rtment connected to 
a number of universities around the States. This was the beginning of the ARPANET 
(Advanced Research Projects Agency Network). In the early seventies the ARPANET 
hosted more than fifty universities and defence departments. This network allowed 
academics to quickly and easi ly share information amongst col leagues. 
However in the early eighties the ARPANET has out grown itself, and the defence 
department wanted to limit access to this network . This resu lted in the two 
networks spl itting up. The main problem was that t here was no real support for this 
network in most operating systems. This resu lted in a free operati ng system being 
developed called UNIX, by the University of California. This o/s had natural support 
for TCP/IP and allowed anyone to connect to the available networks. The Internet 
was born. 
However th is network was still primarily an academ ic tool. It was not until the late 
eighties and early nineties that the Internet started to become the fo rce that we 
know it today. The reason for its huge success was the development on a new 
mark-up language called HTML. This was developed by the CERN (Collective of 
Eu ropean high-energy physics researchers) orga nization. The result was met with 
immediate support and applications were developed to support this fantastic new 
medium of data. These included the likes of Mosaic, Netscape and later Internet 
Explorer. However the Internet was very firmly separated, and by mid nineties no 
company or operating system enforced any dominance over the Internet. 
Growth and Opportunities 
The Internet started out with ten hosts in the early seventies, and has now grown 
to astronomical proportions. I n the earl y eighties the number of hosts was as little 
as 1000, by the late eighties that figure was over 100 000 hosts. Ten years later 
that figure has grown to over fifty million hosts world -wide [R.Zakon, 1999, onl ine). 
This dramatic increase serves to demonstrate the popularity of the I nternet. 
However it was primarily the introduction of the World Wide Web (WWW) that lead 
to this huge explosion . In fact, by 1993 web traff ic had increased annua lly by over 
three hundred thousand percent. As can be seen by the d iagram, the number of 
sites on the I nternet is growing at an exponential rate. 
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Fig 1.2.1 Growth of WWW sites . [R. ZakonJ 
It is a difficult to estimate the amount of people on - l ine, and the figures have been 
contentiously debated, However most statistics show that there wi l l be over one 
hundred and fifty million web users in the year 2000 . The likes of such a huge 
target audience have never been seen before and with this amount of potential, it 
cannot be ignored as a new medium of distribution for retailers . 
The Internet was widely considered as an academic and g lorified public relations 
effort by most companies in the early nineties, However a few insightful people 
managed to start making fortunes, and lead the charge of Internet based 
companies, The likes of Amazon,com and Yahoo,com (Both been valued over one 
mill ion U,S dollars) have shown what is capable of been achieved. It is not only the 
public retailers that will benefit, but also business to business transactions. The 
Internet has been transformed into a data network that facilitates inter business 
communication [S .M.Bellovin 1998] . 
Dell computers has reported earnings of over one million U.S dollars a day from its 
corporate market share. The average corporate ord er in the U.S takes fifty odd u.s 
dollars to process. Using the Internet as a distribution medium, that average 
corporate Internet order is now below five u.s dollars. This resu lt s in cost 
reduction, qu icker order processing and improved customer services. 
The Players 
The fight for dominance or contro l of the Internet is an ongoing struggle and will 
li kely never be resolved. The two major players are Microsoft and Unix . A discuss ion 
of the pros and cons has been highlighted in the media on numerous occasions. 
Ultimately it will not come down to the operating system that one uses, but rather 
the application that al lows people to enjoy the benefits of the Internet. 
Thus far the web browser is a distinctive winner, However the war between web 
browsers is an ongoing affa ir, Netscape, Internet Explorer (Microsoft) and a number 
of other upstarts are what it all boils down to, As the Internet can undergo enti re 
changes in a matter of months, the outcome of this battle is not yet settled. 
One of the major problems associated with this battle is the complete disregard fo r 
international specifications. The various players have implemented HTML, DHTML 
and XML in different manners. This leads to confUSion and difficulty in the 
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maintenance of most web sites. However once standards are met, the web browser 
will be nothing more than a name brand facilitating the Internet experience. 
The Future 
Although the Internet has been heralded as the new digital age, it will still take 
awhile for all these benefits to be seen. Some of the fantastic new features that will 
impact the world are the connection of personal data assistants (POA's), cellphones 
and other electronic goods to the Internet. This will allow one to buy groceries, do 
banking and other Internet related services, while travelling at home or sitting in an 
armchair. The potential markets are enormous. 
The Internet promises enormous amounts, however there are a number of issues 
that need to be surmounted. The primary issue is the dominance of operating 
systems and web browsers. The Internet is divided by this issue, not only on 
opinion but actual usage. The result is a target market that is divided , and hence 
difficult to entice. The solution is a common standard and format that will alleviate 
the interoperability problems of the past. 
1.3) Security 
Secrets have been part of history, whenever there has been sensitive information, 
secrecy follows. Since the Roman times different methods have been used to 
ensure the secrecy of messages. For example placing messages on messenger's 
body parts, which are then subsequently hidden from view. Fortunately these 
techniques are not used in today 's digital world, however crucial information still 
needs to be protected to maintain a competitive edge. The capitalists of today have 
replaced the dictators of yesteryear, but both have a need for secrecy and 
protection of their vital information. 
The question is asked why has the Internet not taken over all monetary 
transactions? If it is so useful and geared for digital communication what is the 
hold-up? Thus far one of the contributing factors to slow growth of Internet based 
transactions Is the security factor. The awareness of problems involved w ith 
sensitive data communication has been intensive. People will happily give credit 
card numbers over the telephone, or to waiters in restaurants, but very few wi ll do 
so on the Internet even though there is a reasonable security set- up in place. This 
psychological barrier is going to be harder to break than the actual security systems 
in place. 
Today, there are millions of packets of information travelling around the Internet. 
Not only are the chances slim that an undesirable will obtain the information 
required, but the opportunity cost of actually breaking the encoded message is 
invariably not even profitable. However this opinion must not lead to an apathetic 
attitude about security. Until the early nineties there was very little secure 
communication, however there are a number of reasonab le frameworks In place 
today. These include Secure Socket Layers (SSL) and Secure Electronic 
Transactions (SET) . The problem, is really the fact that security of e-commerce is 
not only based on secure communications, but trustworthy parties, applications and 
procedures as well. Due to the anonymity of the Internet, a few problems are 
posed: 
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Can I trust this party? 
Is the party I am dealing with who they cla im to be. Currently the use of 
digital certificates rectifies this problem. A digital certificate Is issued by a 
Central Authority (CA), and wi ll certify the authenticity of the party involved, 
Is our communication secure? 
The like of SSL takes care of secure communication between a cl ient web 
browser and a server. It is certai nly not an optima l solution as it is based on 
dated algorithms and was meant to be a temporary solution. 
The major problem here is a small term called "computational security". This means 
that it wi ll be infeasible, in monetary and time constraints, fo r an undesi rable to 
break the crypto-system with today's resources, One must bear in mi nd that 
according to Moore's law, the power of comput ing doubles every eighteen months. 
With such exponential growth, crypto-systems will have to adapt as quickly as the 
hardware used to implement them. A brie f example of this Is the DES crypto-
system. Its inception in the seventies, and support by most banking institutions 
world-wide, has lead to it being a standard . Less than thirty years later the system 
has been broken on a one hundred thousand U.S dollar machine, and yet it st ill 
remains a banking security standard, A little worryi ng to say the least, 
These issues are the driving factor for the continuous development and modification 
of new crypto-systems. Until a superior and unbreakable crypto-system is created, 
if ever !, it is still a necessi ty to escalate the quality of security. Due to the vast 
amount of money dealt with in e-commerce, this conti nuos re-assessment and 
progress in the crypto world wi ll con ti nue. In the light of this it is important to 
study, analyse and f inally approve or disapprove the new algorithms, 
It must be stressed though that securi ty is not just the algorithm used to encrypt or 
decrypt information. Security is also depend ent on the implementation of the 
algorithm. It ta kes only one weak link in the final application to potentia lly open up 
the system to an intruder. The worst must be expected to happen, and when it 
does, t he product must be extended to overcome any difficu lties or weakness. 
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1.4) Conclusion 
One could easily be mislead into thinking that the Internet will control all aspects of 
our lives very soon. This could be a reality, but extensive amounts of integration 
and development is still required. Undoubtedly though the Internet will Impact on 
any digital forms of communication and transactions. The possibilities are endless, 
the Infrastructure is set-u p and the cost effectiveness of this resource cannot be 
ignored. Profitable business is abundant due to the huge target market afforded by 
the Internet. 
There are a few problems that need to be resolved to make the entire process run 
more efficiently; Addressing the interoperability barriers caused by the diversity of 
the Internet systems. Overcoming the security issues involved with the transferring 
of sensitive Information over this medium, as well as other security issues 
regarding implementation. Once these have been addressed it will allow the full 
potential of the Internet and its benefits will be attained. 
The following section wi ll examine the criteria laid out for the thesis. 
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2) The Application Criteria 
2.1) Overview 
As has been previously stated the goal of this thesis is to create a "real time, 
system independent, secure, Internet based auctioning application" i.e. an 
application that uses the Internet, which everyone can access and ensures secrecy. 
It is easiest to discuss each of these criteria and give a clear picture of what each 
requirement entails. 
2.2) A Real Time System 
A real time system is one in which communication and action takes places 
immediately. A good example of a real time system is an ATM bank teller machine. 
Commands are issued and responded to almost immediately. The goal is to devise 
an application that user's could use and see the results of, as the application Is 
executed. 
2.3) Internet Based Application 
As some form of client/server real world application is to be used, a 
communications type is required. There are a number of networks available, 
however none have quite made the impact the Internet has. The application 
therefore is required to use the most dynamic network available on the planet. The 
reason for using the Internet, is that it has huge fiscal potential and an enormous 
client base. 
2.4) System Independent 
As the application is to work over the Internet it will expose itself to the widest 
range of operating systems, hardware and software. This diversity thereFore makes 
It rather difficult to target a particular audience or user. Many applications are 
designed and targeted For specific operating systems (Le. Microsoft, UNIX), and 
insisting that the application is system independent ones target audience increases 
dramatically. 
2.5) Security 
The importance of security has increased dramatically over the last few years, 
especially with a number of incidents being profiled by the media. As there is 
communication between the client and the server application, the very nature of 
the information exchanged it makes it necessary to provide security. 
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This security has to incorporate two aspects: 
• Secure communica tion 
• Applicat ion security 
Each of these cannot be academically viewed, but must be practically implemented 
within the confines of the application. The security model implemented must 
minimise network bandwidth , and hardware resources (CPU usage, Memory Usage), 
and must prevent any risks to the client. All of these are reasonable real world 
application criteria. 
Above all, the security must not hamper the performance or practicality of the 
application. The secure communication has to be handled in such a way that it is 
effective and actually workable in a real world environment. Secure communication 
is not all that's required, rather it is a part of the overall security. A secu re 
communications channel is useless if the applications communicating are 
vulnerable. Hence the requirement that the appl ication itself must be relatively 
secure, thereby ensuring a global security. 
2.6) Auction Application 
The application created needed to reso lve a rea l world issue, thereby giving it some 
credibility. Recently, Auctioni ng sites on the Internet have come into their own 
(Ebay.com and bidorbuy.co.za), but they are plagued with numerous problems. The 
first is that there are large amounts of fraudulent happenings and secondly many 
auctioning applications are not of a real time nature. The application needs to 
adhere to the latest trends, such as object orientated programming, thereby 
making it reusab le and scalable. 
This thesis will attempt to resolve these problems and in dOing so create a v iable 
real world auctioning application. 
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2.7) Conclusion 
By defining the requirements and scope of the thesis, a v iable and practical solution 
can be worked on. The remainder of this thesis will examine the proposed 
application and the implemented solution that meets the criteria discussed above. 
The following section examines Java and explains why it was chosen as the 
implementation vehicle. 
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3) Java 
To tackle the auctioning problem it was decided from the very outset that a unique 
programming environment would be needed. It would have to be a stable, 
multithreaded , networked and most importantly a cross platform environment. 
Fortunately Java has all those features and more. A number of the benefits of the 
language will be highlighted and discussed to enlighten the reader as to why Java 
was chosen to accomplish the job. 
3.1 ) What is Java? 
"Java--an architecture-neutral and portable programming language-- provides an 
attractive and simple solution to the problem of distributing your applications 
across heterogeneous network-based computing platforms. In addition, the 
Simplicity and robustness of the underlying Java language results in higher quality, 
reliable applications In which users can have a high level of confidence" 
Sun Microsystems, java. sun. com 
Java is essentially a C/C++ like language, and in fact draws a lot of its strengths 
from C/C++. However there are some fundamental differences, which shall be 
revealed. 
3.2) How does lava work? 
It is important to understand how the Java system operates. As indicated earlier 
Java is hardware and operating system Independent. As the creators claim, it is 
architecturally neutral. However the system executing the application must have 
the Java Platform , which Is known as the Java runtime environment (Jre). This is 
made up of two basic parts, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and the Java 
Application Programming Interface (Java API). The JVM is where all applications 
execute, ob livious to their underlying operating system. The Java API are the core 
libraries that wi ll be avai lable to any Java based application. These give the 
applications their functionality. Thereafter any program developed In pu re Java wi ll 
run anywhere. No special exception, and no specia l compilers. 
When an application is compiled in most languages, it is usually compi led to the 
machine code of the current operating system. This means that the application will 
only work on that system. However Java works In a slightly different manner 
compared to that of C(C++ or other languages. A program is complied Into 
bytecode. Bytecode is almost an intermediate compilation step. This bytecode is 
Interpreted at run-time by the Java interpreter for the current system. Alternatively 
Java uses a jusHn time (JIT) compiler, that compiles the Java bytecode into native 
machine code on execution. Any libraries are loaded as they are required from the 
core Java API. 
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Fig 3.2.2 The Java Runtime Environment 
3.3) Object Orientated Programming (OOP) 
As the digital age has matured, so have the structures used to create it. Originally 
the classical programmIng techniques were sufficient to meet most requirements. 
However as the computing industry progressed, it needed to simu late more 
complex real world environments, which classical (procedural or Top down) 
programming cou ld not support. This brought about the advent of oap. 
"Object-orientated technology is a study of behaviour, how to organize or classify 
behaviour, and how to assign those behaviours to groups of objects" 
Ade/e Go/dBerg 
OOP attempts to break the environment down into separate objects, and emu late 
the Interactions between objects; as opposed to classical programming, which 
attempts to Imitate the flow of an environment, from beginning to end. Each object 
has characteristics and actions. These are the actual properties that each object has 
in the environment. Each object is a self-contained unit of information and work. 
The beauty about this modular approach is that code can be re-used. As an 
example think of a torch. It is made up of the following simple objects: batteries, a 
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switch and light bulb. The batteries have a property determining the electrical 
charge. Similarly fo r the switch, its state is either ON or OFF. If al l the separate 
objects are combined and all requirements met by the light bulb object, It will 
change its own state to display light. The strength of this modular approach al lows 
one to divide and conquer the problem into its tiniest individual elements. 
Java uses this idea not only as a programming concept but also, as the construction 
of the entire language. Everything in Java is an object. To be a truly OOP language, 
4 features must be supported, Encapsulation, Polymorphism, Inheritance and 
Dynamic binding. Encapsu lation essentia lly hides all the inner workings of the 
objects. Polymorphism is the method by which different object wi ll react d ifferently 
to the same command or action. Inheritance is the way in which classes can inherit 
methods and properties from other classes, thereby al lowing code reusability. 
DynamiC Binding allows for object creation to be obl ivious to type and position of 
the object. 
3.4) Garbage Collector 
The use of al l these objects would seem to be quite complicated and so wou ld any 
form of memory management. However, Java has a feature cal led the Garbage 
Col lector. It runs inside the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) when the program is 
executing. When an object is used it will be referenced by some variable. When the 
variables goes out of scope, or points to another object, the current reference to 
the object is lost and the object is no longer accessible. This is where the Garbage 
Collector is ca ll ed into action. It realises that an object that can no longer be 
utilised is talsing up memory, so it destroys the unneeded object. The Garbage 
Collector then releases the memory back to the program, which can t hen be 
reallocated. 
The programmer therefore need not worry about memory management and 
whether it's safe or not to release objects. The Garbage col lector will not destroy 
objects that still ha ve references to it. This helps eliminate the problem of memory 
leaks and makes the program more efficient and robust. 
3.5) Distributed Computing 
Another huge advantage with Java is its seamless integration with a networked 
environment. Java has integral support for Internet based applications. Not on ly 
that but a natural multithreaded ability enhances these capabilities even further. 
The reason that Java is splendid for distributed computing is the fact that there is 
no li nking of classes at compilation. Java is dynamiC, and only at run time are the 
class references resolved. The class need not reside on the local machine, but can 
be pulled off of a server, as and when it 's requ ired. App lets are a special fo rm of 
Java applications. They are designed to run with in other applications specifical ly 
Java enabled web-browsers. These programs are down loaded from a web server 
and t hen t he bytecode is executed on the client's machine, inside the web-
browsers . The ability of this fea ture is limited severely for security reasons . 
However it is a powerful mechanism for running applications over the Internet. 
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3.6) Security 
As Java is designed for a distributed computi ng environment, it was essential to 
Incorporate security mechanisms into the language. This is needed to protect the 
client machine from malicious applications. Most of Java's intrinsic securit ies apply 
to its network and file streams. 
The Java security model is made up of four levels, the Compiler, the Bytecode 
verifier, the Classloader and the Security Manager. 
The Compiler 
The reason that Java is a secure language starts with the compiler. It has already 
been shown that the user need not worry about memory management. Java does 
not have pointers, which solves many memory and security related problems . 
Each class and hence object has a strict access contro l associated with it. This is 
Important for object creation, usage, and inheritance. The compiler checks all of 
this before the Java code will be converted to bytecode. 
Added to that the Java compiler is extremely strict on syntax, casting and other 
features of programming. This eliminates run time bugs and makes the language 
more secu re and robust . 
The bytecode verifier 
The bytecode verifier is the second line of defence in the security model. As the 
Java runtime environment (Jre) may receive bytecode from anywhere it does not 
assume that the bytecode is trustworthy. It is not beyond the realms of possibility 
that a tweaked Compiler was used to produce dangerous bytecode. Therefore all 
bytecode used is always verified. 
The bytecode verifier follows a fourMpass process. The verification process firstly 
verifies the standard format of the bytecode (Checks first four bytes which are 
OxCAFEBABE) . In pass two it checks classes and objects. In pass three proper 
bytecode verification takes place making sure there are no disallowed operations. 
For instance it checks methods arguments to make su re they are correct. It's 
interesting to note that pass four is not performed until a method is ca lled. Pass 
four deals with access restrictions and member accesses. So if a method is not 
called, it will never be checked. 
Then the verifier checks to ensure that there is no vio lation of access restrictions, 
illegal type conversions, or uncontrolled memory access and usage. An important 
fact to note here is that because object linking is dynamic and the verifier confirms 
memory access, no forged pointers can be created, and hence securing the 
language is ensu red. Once the bytecode has been verified, it is assured to all other 
parts on the Jre that the code is secure and usable. This also speeds up 
Interpretation or compilation as none of these checks need to takes place at these 
stages. 
By default only files coming in from a network are verified, and all local files in the 
classpath are ignored. However one can force the runtime environment to check 
these files with the parameter -Xverify:all . 
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The Classloader 
The classloader loads classes into their own namespaces. The reason for this is 
simple. Each class has a name or reference and it would not be desirable to have a 
class coming in off the Internet that replaces system classes on the cl ient's 
machine. For that reason, the classloader separates classes from different network 
locations as wel l as the local classes. The classloader attempts to find the class 
being referenced in the local system, this is specified by the classpath attribute on 
the local system. If it does not exist on the local system, it will then attempt to get 
the class from some network source. 
The classloader essentially enforces policies and rules on class usage, preventing 
any replacement of the system or Java API classes. The integrity of the system is 
maintained. The Classloader w ill not load any classes over a network in the java. * 
package as this wou ld comprise the securi t y model by overriding the core Java API. 
Runtime checking 
As Java is a late binding language (It resolves class names and object at ru ntime), 
ru ntime checking Is done to validate links these files. It also checks dynamic array 
bounds here, and if there are any problems at this level it will throw an error. This 
on ly occurs once the program is execut ing . 
The Security Manager 
The previous th ree features are the intrinsic security of the Java system. The 
developer has no control over it and need not worry about it. However the security 
manager is a resource level security mechanism. The developer must understand 
what and how it operates to be able to control the Java environment to its fullest 
extent. 
Once the security manger obtains the bytecode it is sti ll not guaranteed that the 
bytecode is safe for use. Thus far all that is ensured is that t he bytecode conforms 
to all syntax and format regulations. The security manager prevents unauthori sed 
stream manipulations. The most dangerous streams that may be manipulated are 
those of network and files. It determines the level of access that is allowed for t he 
current runtime environment and enforces those policies on all commands issued. 
If for instance the application wanted to destroy the kernel of the operating system 
or any other protected fil e, the security manager would check the level of 
authori sation for the current object, based on th is level the operation will succeed 
or fai l. 









Fig 3.6. I The Java Security Model 
3.7) Applets and security restrictions 
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An applet is a Java program that is usually dawnlaaded off a web site, and executed 
within a Java enabled web browser. The ability to download and execute on the fly 
is a fantastic feature . However the darker side of the Internet com munity would 
have abused this open invitation had it not been for the restrictive security 
mechanisms that are currently in place. 
These restrictions are not placed on standalone Java applications, as one knowingly 
executes the program oneself, as opposed to a Java applet that cou ld execute 
unbeknownst to the user when visiting a web page. 
The browser that executes the applet in imposes most of these restrictions. Due to 
the fact there are a number af different web browsers available, the strictness of 
these restrictions va ries as wel l. Essentially the applet is secured by the Security 
Manager, which is also known as the sandbox. The applet runs within the sandbox 
and has no access outside of it. The following important restrictions are placed on 
applets 
Network restrictions 
The restrictions are quite simple. All communication with the applet may on ly be to 
and from the orig inating web server. This is the server that the applet was 
originally down loaded from. No other network connection whatsoever may be 
created or used. This is because most cl ient systems hide behind firewal ls and It 
would be a security breach to send information out to anywhere in the wor ld about 
the machines behind firewall s. 
File restrictions 
The restri ctions on files are total. There is no reading or writing to any files 
whatsoever on the client's machine. This prevents sensitive information from being 
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read and sent out into the Internet vo id. No files may be damaged or tampered 
with, thereby preventi ng v irus's or mal icious attacks on the cl ients system. 
Miscellaneous restrictions 
There are a few other restrictions that should be discussed . For instance, only a 
number of system properties are avai lable (as read only) to an Applet, and no 
syst em properties may be modi f ied. However it is interesti ng to note if one 
executes a local applet with " File: :/Iapplet.class" , instead of the web address it 
allows one to read and write the system properties. The manipulation of these 
system properties may potentially open up the system to intruders. 
An Applet may not modify any threads not owned by itself, and in some web 
browsers, not even manipulate its own threads. 
Al1 frames that the applet opens up have a warning message at the bottom, so t he 
user rea lises that it has been generated by the Applet, and is not another prog ram 
or part of another application. 
Appiets may not execute loca l commands on the cl ient 's machine, as th is wou ld 
open a huge security hole in the system. The reason bei ng t hat an undesirable 
could wreak havoc if file system cont rol was made ava i lable. 
Applets my not override predefined package names, such as the 
Java . <Iibraryname > or Netscape. <Iibraryname > packages, as these are the names 
of the local system packages. This prevents any sort of system breach. 
Opera ting System 
We b Browser 
Java Virtual 
MachIne 
Java Sandbox W eb 
Internet • Ser ver 
E 
Fig 1.7. 1 The Java Sandbox 
3 .8) Just in Time (lIT) Compiler & Java HotSpot lM 
The JIT is a now a defunct feature in Java, and it is designed to increase the speed 
of applications. The main reason that people find Java slow is t he fact t hat t he 
bytecode is interpreted at run -time, and one is not execut ing standard nati ve code. 
With the advent of JIT, Java bytecode is actually compiled into native machine 
language for that operating system . 
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The advent of Java HotSpotTM replaces the JIT in newer versions of Java. HotSpot 
uses adaptive optimisation and improved garbage collection. Adaptive optimisation 
finds the code that is the most frequently used code in the application. This is then 
compiled to native machine code and cached. This compi les to native machine 
code, the code that is used most frequently, instead of the entire application. 
Thereby speeding up code that is commonly executed. The Garbage col lector has 
been improved and speeded up which assists in memory usage. 
3.9) Java Vs C++ 
It is a well-known fact that Java's syntax is based on c++. However there are some 
critical factors that differentiate the two languages. 
Pointers 
The are no pointers whatsoever in the Java language. As previously stated, 
everything Is treated as objects, and one uses references to those objects. This 
gives all the versatility of pointers without all the problems. Arrays, which are also 
objects, have automatic boundary limit checks, unlike C++. Java has built in 
support for objects such as strings and arrays. 
Data types 
Variables can only be one of two types in Java, an object or a primitive data type 
(int, float, etc). C++ has many types, from primitive data types all the way through 
to pOinters. All Java primitives are fixed in length, and are based on Unicode. C++ 
has varying sizes of data types that are based on ASCII. In Java all variables are 
initialised on creation. C++ has no default initialization. 
OOP 
The Java language is intrinsically object orientated. C++ is a mix of OOP and 
classical procedural programming. Java cannot have more than one class being 
inherited by a new class. C++ can have a new class Inheriting many classes. There 
is no overloading of Java operators whatsoever. 
General 
Java is developed to Interact with networks and has a special affinity to the 
Internet. It is system independent and supports multithreading. As Java is compiled 
and Interpreted it tends to be slower. C++ has no natural support for networks. It 
is system dependent and is not a multithreaded language. Due to the fact that it is 
compiled to native code it tends to be quicker than Java. 
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3.10) Java Programming Security Techniques 
A language is only as secure as the programmer makes it. As has been pOinted out 
{G. McGraw & E. Felten, 1999] there are a number of rules to ensure that Java 
code is a secure and sa fe as possible. 
Don 't depend on initialisation 
This ru le ho lds true for all objects and variables. To use an object, one usual ly has 
to initialise the object. However there are ways of avoiding this, which can lead to 
uncontrolled resu lts and va lues in the application. Some suggestions are to firstly 
make all variables private, and use get/set methods to ed it them. Secondly have a 
private vari able to check that the initlalizer has been called. If It has not been called 
methods and properties shou ld not respond to any requests. 
Control access 
Wherever possible have absolute control over the class, methods and variables. 
Make sure variables are not public, and hence publicly editable. Classes and 
methods should be private, unless there Is a need fo r them to be public. Anything 
exposed is potentially a hole into the system. 
Final everything 
Using the Final cons tructor wil l prevent any fUrther inheritance of the class, and 
therefore make it unavailable to prying eyes. 
No Inner classes 
The general consensus is that an inner class can only be accessed by the class its 
enclosed by. This is incorrect, as once the classes are converted to bytecode, there 
is no concept of inner and outer classes. Second ly al l variables that are private in 
the outer class are treated as public to the inner class. This is a potentially serious 
loophole, as by using inner class, one would have access to all the variables and 
methods of the outer class. 
No signing 
This is a bone of contention, as most people will not run serious applications unless 
they have been digitally Signed to prove that it has not been tampered with. 
However a problem arises because sig ned Java applets are allowed special 
privileges. These privileges can t hen be used to man ipulate files or networks. 
No cloning 
The cloning object allows one to make copies of class objects residing in memory. 
This means that someone ca n get an instance of you r class without actua lly 
initia lising the class. This is potentially dangerous. However the cloning feature can 
be disabled for classes, and this shou ld be Implemented. 
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No serialisation 
Serialisation is the abil ity of the class's Internal state to be copied. This Is a useful 
feature , but it means t hat one can copy the current state of an object. Thus finding 
out all the information residing in private variables and methods. 
Obfuscate 
Once a Java application Is compiled to bytecode, it is still possible to reverse 
engineer the bytecode with a Java disassembler. That m eans any hard coded 
values, such as cryptographic keys can be compromised. Rather generate values on 
the fly. Using long variable names can be easy for programming, but It makes the 
reverse engi neered java code easier to read. After the final version is complete it is 
recommended that variab les such as, New_game_sta rting_value, be replaced with 
zxxq or something similar. 
Place useless code in the application, such as loops that do nothing or random 
variables. This will serve to confuse and make it more difficult to unravel the 
reverse engineered code. 
Finally use professional obfuscating applications to make your code as difficult to 
read as possible. This will make the disassembled code almost impossible to 
fathom. 
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3 .11) Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted a few of the reasons and strengths for the use of Java 
as the language of choice. It has b,een shown that Java meets the requirements of 
supporting network communications, specifically the Internet, as well as setting 
rigid security policies that will ensure the clients safety during network 
communication, 
As the Internet is made up of many different platforms it would have been 
impossible to develop an Internet based application for all of them. Thus Java's 
unique capability of being system independent allows any Java application to be 
supported by Java enabled systems. 
Added to all this, Java has proved Itself as a robust, secu re and simple language to 
program. Ensuring that the development of the application would be a far simpler 
process. 
The next chapter will show how the Auctioning specification given in chapter two 
can be implemented within this Java framework. 
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4) Auction Implementation 
4.1) Overview 
The auction applicatton is essentially the device leading to an understanding of 
Internet based security . Before one may understand the actual application it is wise 
to understand the scope of the problem posed. 
The aim was to create an extendable, robust, real time, system independent 
auctioning application. The auction specifications and design have lead to the 
following solution; using a multithreaded networked based client / server 
application. The application Is divided into two halves. One is the Server 
application, which contro ls the auction and all administrative features. The other is 
the client application, which is in the form of a Java applet. The auction server 
resides on a web server, from where the client applet is executed. The development 
of a web site, completes the application as a whole and make It easier for the client 
to participate in auctions. 
4.2) Hardware requirements 
As far as hardware requirement goes a Pentium 166 or greater shou ld suffice for 
the client. The server wi ll require a Pentium 11 or greater. Both shou ld have 64Mb 
Ram or more. Both the client and server must be connected to the Internet and 
have valid IP addresses. 
4.3) Software requirements 
There are a number of requirements that have to be met before the client or server 
may be executed. Firstly the web site will have to be set-up in accordance with the 
structure of the servers directories. The reasons for this will be made clear later. 
Secondly it must be made clear from the start that the Java Development Kit 1.22, 
or what is now known as JOK 2 was used. This has a number of new features such 
as the swi ng graphical user interface classes. Therefore the Server hosting the web 
site and the server appl ication must have the corresponding vers ion (or greater) of 
the Jre libraries. The client applet has similar demands. The Jre Plug in 1.22 or 
greater will be required for the web browsers. The web browsers must also be Java 
enabled. This software may be downloaded from the Sun Microsystems site 
(Java.sun.com) 
The server machine must be able to host a web site capable of using Active Server 
Pages (ASP) or a CGI scripting language. There are no operating system 
requirements. 
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4.4) The Server 
The most obvious place to start is the heart of the enti re appl ication. The server, or 
more aptly named AucServer. The idea was for the server to execute and set-up all 
the auctioned items Information. Then once it was prepared , to sta rt t he auction for 
a single elem ent at a specified ti me . Once the cu rrent auction was complete the 
rest of t he items would then proceed to be auctioned in an orderly fash ion. 
As there are over seven thousand lines of code it would be foo lish to attempt to 
explain every method and variable usage. The easiest m ethod for demonstrat ing 
t he execution of t he server is to take it task by task. 
4 .5) The Server Files 
The server Is made up of t hi rteen Java files. Each has its own unique responsibilities 
and dut ies. The aim from the outset was to have a mu ltithreaded application that 
could be expanded if need be. A brief explanation Is required for each fi le so that it 
will make t he description easier to follow. 
AuctionServer .Java 
ThiS f ile is the executable for the AucServer. This file starts up all the required 
services and maintains stri ct control on the fo llowing steps. Start ing and Stopping 
of t he server and auctions. 
AucMemCheck.lava 
This fi le starts a thread that monitors the amount of memory used by the 
application every two and a ha lf seconds. 
AuctionHandler.lava 
This fi le contro ls all aspect of the auctions in progress. This includes everyth ing 
from the set-up to the fina l outcome of t he auction. 
Auctionlnterface.Java 
This file controls the entire graphical user interface for the server application. 
Anything that is seen on t he screen is contro lled here. 
AuctionNotify.Java 
This file monitors t he state of the auction everyone second and notifies the objects 
concerned if the auction has been started, extended or stopped . 
ServerLlstener .lava 
This class listens for new clients attempting to join the server and starts all the 
necessary threads. 
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Bidlnfo.Java 
This class is used for storing and retrieving the cl ient's information for each bid in 
the current auction. 
ClientHandler.Java 
This class looks after each individual client's communication with the server and 
auction status. 
Itemlnfo .Java 
This class stores and retrieves all the relevant information about the items being 
auctioned. 
CryptLlb.Java 
ThiS is a common library of methods used for the encryption and decryption 
processes. 
MARSCrypt.Java 
This class contains all the necessary algorithms and key schedules for the Mars 
encryption algorithm. 
RC6Crypt.Java 
ThiS class contains all the necessary algorithms and key sched u les for t he RC6 
encryption algorithm. 
RSACrypt.Java 
This class conta ins all the necessary algorithms and key sched ules for the RSA 
encryption algorithm. 
Starting the Application 
The class file that starts the execution of the application is the AuctionServer .Java 
file. Its main procedure proceeds as fol lows. 






I t creates an instance of itself, which is now, a t h read and w ill not stop executi ng 
until instructed. An instance of the Auctionlnterface is initial ized, which controls t he 
user interface. It t hen creates the application frame with all the req uired graphical 
elements. An instance of the AucMemCheck class is created and started. Now that 
the appl ication is started it sits dormant until t he user decides to fire up the actual 
server, and get the auctions started. 
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The Server State 
The server has a few states of activity once the application has started. The server 
is in a stopped sta te by default. Once the server is ru nning it may then start 
auctions. Once the auction is started it will eventually stop (either manually or 
automatically once the time runs out). From this state it may move back Into the 






Fig 4 .5 .1 S ta tes of the Auction Server a pplication. 
The only state change that is automatically controlled by the server is that of the 
Auction Started to Auction Stopped sta te. The user manipulating the program can 
cause all state changes. 
Server Running State 
Hint: To start the server, Click on the Server I Start Server menu items. 
To get into this state t he user must start the server. The AuctionServer class will 
attempt to run the following code: 
/ / AuctionServer - StartServerNow Method 
Call StartServer method 
StartListener 
/ / AuctionServer - StartServer Method 
Get Servers IP 
Create Server Socket (Port number, Max Users, JP number) 
Update User Interface 
First the application obtains t he local hosts IP number. Then it attempts to create a 
server socket on the cu rrent Port Number (3002 by default), with the current IP 
number and a maximum limit of Users (40 by default). If any error occu rs at this 
stage t he server wi ll display an error message with the problem. Otherwise the 
server notifies the user that the server has been started. Once the server has been 
started it then starts the Serverlistener method which then waits for clien ts. When 
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the user interface is updated, this includes all information displayed as well as the 
updati ng of menu items into the correct states. 
It was originally decided to randomly generate a port number, but as this may lead 
to problems it was changed to an initial port number of 3002. There are about sixty 
five thousand port numbers available to servers over a TCPjIP network. Under a 
thousand are reserved but the number is steadily growing. For that explicit reason, 
if the server fails to start it will inform the AucServer administrator who can then 
manually change it to another port number before attempting to restart the server. 
Server Stopped State 
Hint: To stop the sefYer, Click on the Server I Stop Server menu items. 
This state may only be moved to if the server is in the running state (or if the 
auction is not running, but to get to that state the server must be in t he running 
state) . In attempting to move into the server stopped state a number of checks 
must be carri ed out first. 
II AuctionServer - StopServerNow Method 
Calf StopServer method 
II AuctionServer - StopServer Method 
If (Auction Status = Auction Running) then Stop Auction 
Stop Server 
Update User Interface 
The Auction can be in one of two states (Running or stopped). If the Auction is not 
running the Server may move to the stopped state. However the only way to get 
from an Auction Running state to the Server Stopped state is to first stop the 
auction (Auction Stopped State), and then the server may move to a Stopped state. 
The Auction status is checked prior to the stopping of the server. If it is running the 
current auction is ended and the server is stopped. If any errors occur the user is 
notified. The user interface is updated accordingly. 
Auction Started State 
Hint: To start the auction, Click on the Auction I Start Auction menu items or click 
the black arrow on the menu bar. 
Before one ca n start an auction It is w ise to set-up all the preliminary information, 
such as the item details and the auction stop time. If item details are not entered 
the user will be prevented from start ing an auction until there is an Item to auction. 
Also if one ddes not set the time the auction will start and stop immediately. Once 
these details are completed the auction may then be started. 
IIAuctionServer StartAuctionNow method 
Initialise the AuctionHandler class 
Set AuctionHandler Auction Details 
AuctionHandler. StartAuctionno w 
Create AuctionNotify ( AuctionHandler, AuctionInterface, AuctionServer) 
Start AuctionNotify 
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The fo llowing things occur to get the auction started. The auctionhandler class is 
(re) - initialised, all the details for the current auction are then set. Once this task 
has been completed, it notifies the Auctionhandler that the auction is starting, and 
starts the Auctionnotify class which checks every second on the current status of 
the auction. The Auctionnotify class accepts copies of the AuctionHandler , 
AuctionServer and AuctionInterface class. This is so it may communicate with these 
classes. 
Auction Stopped State 
Hint: To stop the auction, Click on the Auction I Stop Auction menu items or click 
the black square on the menu bar. 
ThiS state may only be changed to if the auction is running. 
//AuctionServer - StopAuctionNow method 
AuctionHandler.StopAuction 
AuctionNotify. Check Timer 
AuctionNotify. Stop 
Vpdate VserInterface 
The Auctionhandler is notified that the auction has ended. Then the Auctionnotify 
class is forced to check the current status of the auction (Stopped). It then notifies 
all required listeners. Once this is done the Auctionnotify class is stopped . Once this 
has been completed the User interface is updated accordingly. 
Now that one has an understanding of what happens to the states and what classes 
are invo lved it would probably be easiest to show the flow of the auction 
application . 
4.6) What Happens when the Server 15 started? 
The server starts operating once it has obtained al l the required elements of a 
server (TCPjIP and port numbers). It creates what is known as a server socket. A 
socket is a channel that allows communication over a network. A server socket 
waits for the in itial connection and then determines whether or not to allow further 
communication. The server socket limits the number of clients that may join the 
server (default is forty clients). 
However before al lowing communication to proceed between the cl ient and the 
server a number of serv ices are requ ired. 
//AuctionServer,Java - StartListener method 
RSA = New RSA object 
Initialise new AuctionHandler (MAXBIDDERS, VI, PortNumber, RSA) 
Initialise new ServerListener (AuctionServer, AuctionHandler, VI, RSA) 
Start ServerListener 
An RSA (Rivest, Shamir & Adelman encryption algorithm) object is created, this 
controls public key secure commun ication and the same public key is used for all 
clients. (Once keys have been shared a different key is used for communication 
between the server and each cl ient.) The Auction handler object Is sta rted and 
passed all the requ ired objects it will need to have access to. MAXBIDDERS is a 
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variable that specifi es the number of top bids to retain. The default is set to five. 
The Serverlistener takes similar objects, which it uses to pass to the client's threads 
once they are created. This allows communication between the client threads and 
t he auctionhandler. The serverl istener is then started. 
The serverlistener is a separate thread that listens for client communication. If the 
maximum limit has not been exceeded the serverlistener thread performs the 
fo l lowing operation. 
//ServerListener Class - StartListener Method 
New Socket = Accept Client Communcition 
Create New ClientHandler (Socket ~AuctionHandler~RSA) 
Start C1ientHandler 
Update User Interface 
First it accepts the connection of the client and creates a local socket of 
communication with the server to the cl ient. For each port there are sixty five 
thousand sockets. As there are approximately sixty five thousand ports available, it 













Fig 4.6. 1 Server Socket accepting connections. 
Once a new socket is created, it is used for exclusive communication to the client 
concerned. Once the communication channel is open and there are no problems the 
serverl istener starts a new ClientHandler thread fo r t he current client. The local 
socket is passed to the cl ienthandler, which then dea ls wi th al l communication with 
t he cl ient. What this means Is tha t each client that j oins will have Its own thread. 
The reason for this Is that the server will be a ble to take advantage of a 
multiprocessor environment, thereby Improving performance and scalablllty of the 
application. 
The Serverlistener class sits In a non- blocking loop waiting for clients. The reason 
for making it a thread is quite simple. The anticipated vo lume of clients joining and 
leaving makes it a busy process, which would have made It quite difficult for the 
auction handler class to dea l with t his facility as well. To faci li tate t he modu lar 
design the server listener was wri t ten as a thread 
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Fig 4.6.2 Initial threads created by the Server. 
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The server application starts the AucMem,AuctionHandler and ServerListener 
threads. Thereafter the ServerListener thread starts the ClientHandler threads. As 
w ill be shown later at anyone stage there is a minimum of four threads executing. 
4.7) What happens when the Auction is started? 
The auctlonhandler object is a reactive object. It responds to requests and calls 
from other objects. These other objects are the AuctionNotify object, the Server 
object and al l the ClientHandler objects. 
However it is important to understand the make up of the AuctionHandler class, as 
it is crucial to the entire program. When the AuctionHandler class Is Initialised, it 
initialises the variables used to control the flow of the application. 
//AuctionHandler - AuctionHandler method (Constructor) 
Set local References to AuctionInterface & RSA 
Stop Time :: CurrentTime 
Maxltems = 10; 
Client List = New Vector List 
Set Root Directory string = current directory. 
Open Log Files 
Initialise lists 
ThiS method is called when the Auctionhandler class is initiated for the first time . It 
sets all required references and variables. It's interesting to note that the Client List 
is a Vector List. This list keeps a list of all the clients current joined to the server. 
The power of Vector is in the fact that they are a dynamic array of objects. Vectors 
are synchronised objects, which means there are none of the problems associated 
with a multlthreaded environment. (These are usually lock ing and sharing Issues). 
In the scope of the application, the arrays of objects in the Vectors are references 
to the ClientHandler objects for each client 
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The Initialisation of lists incorporates the resetting of the ItemInfo lists and the 
BidInfo lists, which are vectors used for storing information about each item in an 
auction. 
The Auctionhandler object has a Boolean variable called auction_status. This 
variab le Is used to indicate the state of the current Auction. As the auction is 
started it is set to True. It has another Boolean variable called values_ changed. This 
variab le Is set to true if the top bid changes in the auction application. The 
Auctionhandler class has a StopTime variable of type Calendar. Calendar is a high 
precision date and time data type. It is set to the stop time for the current auction. 
The AuctionHandler class has all the methods to set and retrieve the variables 
discussed. The pro-active object that updates the state of the auction is the 
AuctionNotify class. Once started it sleeps for one second and then checks to see if 
the state of the Auction or its properties has changed. 
One of three possible scenarios could have occurred, 1 (No change), 2 (Top bid 
change) and 3 (Auction Over). To determine this, the AuctionHandler object is 
queried. 
One 
If no change has occurred the Auctionnotify class wil l do nothing and proceed to 
sleep for another second . 
Two 
To find out if the bids have changed the value of values_changed is returned from a 
method 1, If it is true then a new bid has been placed within the last second. The 
Auctionnotify class then notifies the Auctionhandler who then updates all parties 
concerned. 
Three 
To find out if the auction is over a method called auctionStatus() in the 
AuctionHandler class is executed. The method determines whether or not the 
current time is greater than the finish time of the current auction. If the auction is 
over, true Is returned. The AuctionNotify class then updates the user interface, 
writes information to the log files and notifies the AuctionHandler that the auction is 
over. 
As the AuctionNotify class works once every second it was decided to utilise this 
class for more than one purpose. That is to update the user interface with the 
changing time . It would have been pointless and rather a waste of resources to 
create a new thread for this purpose. The fl ow of the program really boils down to 
interaction between the AuctionNotify class and the AuctionHandler class. One could 
see the Auctionhandler class as the central repository for the entire, pertinent and 
essential auction control variables. However the AuctionHandler will not do anything 
until Instructed to do so. The reason for keeping everyth ing within one class is that 
it is easier to control the access to these variables. Hence it is more secure. The 
AuctionNotify class has no knowledge of these variab les, and has to request them 
from the Auctionhandler class. 
1 All variables are set or retrieved using a Get / Set method. There is no direct 
access to the variables in classes. 
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4.8) How does the user interface work? 
I,l' , 
. Server Auction 
m - I [~jlTQ]!]ill 
Security Help 
The user interface was developed using the Java Foundation Class (JFC), Swing 
class. Sun Microsystems has redeveloped the original Abstract Windows Toolkit 
(AWT), with help from Netscape, IBM and a few other companies. The result was 
the )FC. This is made up of AWT, Java 2D,Accesslbllity, Drag and Drop and Swing. 
Swing determines how the GUI is presented, independent of platform. Swing 
essentially extends the cu rrent AWT with a more advanced lightweight graphical 
library. One of the beauties of Swing is the "Look & Feel" concept. " Look & Feel" 
means the application will look like a native application to the current system. That 
is the application can either have the look and feel of the current platform, or it can 
be fixed to a specific platform. 
The user interface for the server application is controlled entirely by the 
Auctionlnterface application. On initialisation of this class the frame and everything 
within it is set-up and displayed. The enti re visual interface is generated and then 
placed on the frame. When everything has been prepared it is then displayed. This 
technique Is used often to imitate faster program execution . 
The application frame is broken up into four sections . The menu, m enu bar, tabbed 
application pane and the status bar. 
The Menu 
The menu has four menu headings. Those are Server, Auction, Security and Help. 
The Server menu deals with the starting and stopping of the server. The setting of 
the port number and exiting of the application. 
The Auction menu deals with the starting and stoppi ng of an auction . The demo 
menu item starts the Demo Auction. The Item details menu items deal with the 
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populating of auction item details. The Stop Time menu item sets the finish time for 
the current auction. 
The Security menu is divided into two halves. The fi rst half allows one to specify the 
key length used for encryption, and the regeneration of keys. The second half of 
the menu Is dynamic. It lists the available encryption algorithms. For the sake of 
extensibil ity it has been designed to allow new algorithms to be incorporated. 
Cu rrently the two algorithms dealt with are RC6 (defau lt) and MARS. 
The Help menu has one item, which is the Help element. This opens a new window 
that is linked to the default Help HTML page. The wi ndow is essentially a mini web 
browser and al l help pages avai lable are in a specified directory in HTM L format. 
The Menu Bar 
The m enu bar is made up of five buttons. Starti ng from left to right: The Black 
arrow starts an auction. The black square stops an auction. The page icon displays 
the item detai ls for the current auction. The "0" button starts the demo auction. 
The "CLR" button clears the Information page of all text . 
The menu bar uses a usefu l utility called tool tips. These allow a short description to 
pop up, when the mouse is passed over the button in question . This aids in the 
overall user friend liness of the appl ication. 
The Tabbed Pane 
The Tabbed pane is divided into two panels: The I nformation tab and the User tab. 
The Information tab dea ls with information pertaining to the server . Whenever a 
new action takes place it wil l be displayed in the information tab. The User tab 
displays all the users that are current joined to the server , their details and the top 
bid. The User tab Is dynamic and wil l change according to amount of users and bid 
values. Both tab panes are scrolled enabled. This means if the viewing area is not 
sufficient to display al l of the information it will automatical ly add a scrol l faci lity to 
do so. 
The Status Bar 
The status bar Is made up of three Items. Those are, Auction Status, Auction Time 
and Memory Used. The status of the auction is updated to " running" when an 
auction is in progress, otherwise It displays " inactive". The Auction Time displays 
the time rema ining till the end of the auction. This is updated every second by the 
AuctionNotify class. The final element on the status ba r is the Memory used feature. 
This is updated every two and a ha lf seconds by the AucMem class. 
User Interaction 
One will rea lise that all the buttons and menu items are not always available 
(greyed ou t ). This Is due to the state of the current application. Elements become 
unavailable or available due to the current state of the appl ication . Refer back to 
4.5 The Server to understand al l t he states avai lable. 
The AuctionInterface class also listens and reacts to all the events that occur with 
regards to the user interface. All events are sent to a class ca lled the 
AuctionHandler class . This class then deals with all user interactions and selections. 
This class wi ll then call the required methods for the desired selection . For this 
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reason the Auctioninterface class requ ires a reference to the AuctionHandler and 
Server classes; as it allows this conveyance of state change and the execution of 
the methods in the aforementioned classes. 
The Auctlonlnterface class dea ls with all other graphical aspects, such as error 
message dialogue boxes, selection menu boxes and the HTML Help frame. However 
it must be re- iterated that this class does not contai n any information regarding the 
actual auction state. It is the vessel by which the user may move from the one 
state to the next. 
User Information 
The tabbed panes show the user descriptive information with regards to the current 
state of the application. As the Auctionlnterface class has no access to this 
information it would be impossible for the class to achieve this task by Itself. 
Therefore the AuctionInterface class has made available methods for the classes 
that control the application to display information. 
To update the Information tab one executes the method dispJayResult(Message). 
The message will then be displayed on the Information tab. To clear the Information 
screen one simply calls the method clearScreen(). 
To update the User tab one simply has to execute the method updateUserScreen( 
ClearScreen I Message). If the Clearscreen = one, it will clear the User screen and 
start afresh, otherwise it will simply add the message to the screen. 
Application Termination 
Hint: To terminate the application, Click on the Server I Exit menu items. 
Or 
Click on the close button in the top right hand corner of the application 
window. 
When the application Is terminated it follows a Similar routine to that of stopping 
the server. It stops any auction running, then stops the server and finally it 
terminates execution. When the program terminates all references to the objects of 
the application are lost and the Garbage collector cleans up the memory. 
At no stage should the application terminate execution with an error. If this does 
occur it is beyond the control of the application. 
Known Problems 
There are a few problems with the user interface. However these are due to the 
actual language . It is a well -documented problem that there may be refresh 
problems for the JFCjSwing classes. Another problem occurs when recreating keys. 
If the key Is larger than 128 bits, the CPU workload becomes intensive . This 
prevents the screen from being refreshed immediately. 
However these are minor issues and will not impact on the overall performance of 
the application. The benefits of using the Swing classes outweighs the few problems 
that do occur. 
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4 .9) The Clie nt Apple t 
The client's applet was designed to interact with t he servers appl ication and be as 
independent as possible. The aim was to make it as simple as possible for the client 
to participate in t he auction process. 
Applets are Java applications embedded in web pages. They are down loaded once 
one visits the web page t hey reside within. The benefit of th is is that the client does 
not need to do any special downloading and installat ion. The cl ient si mply opens 
the web browser and proceeds to the correct web page. The applet is down loaded 
and then executes on the clients machines, assuming the client has a Java enabled 
web browser and the correct Java version. 
There was some design cri teria tha t had to be met. Specifical ly t he size issue. Not 
all people have ISDN and satell ite connections to the Internet. Slow modems and 
service providers are still prevalent around the world (and pa rt icularly South 
Africa). Therefore the applet had to be as small as possible to aid in t he speed of 
the download to the client's machine. The applet weighs in at thi rty- fi ve kilobytes 
which is less than the average size of a web page. To st rea m li ne matters further 
the applet has been placed in a Sing le JAR (Java Arch ive) f i le . Th is JAR fi le 
compresses all the classes withi n it using the Zip compression algorithm. This 
reduces the size of the applet even more. In fact there is about a forty-five percent 
compression rate for the clien t applet . When a new class f ile is requested Java first 
sea rch the local machine, JAR's included, before requesti ng f rom the origi nating 
server. This tends to speed up the performance of the apple t , as no extra network 
requests wil l be needed to obtain all the requi red classes. 
4.10) The Applet Files 
All the f iles required for the client application are place in the JAR f ile ca lled 
"aucjar.jar". The f i les required by the applet are as follows: 
AucClient.J a va 
This is the main class for the Client applet. It starts all t he req uired obj ects and 
threads . 
AucUI.Java 
Th is class controls the user interface for t he cl ient applet. 
ClientEngine.Java 
This class controls the commu nication and general program m anagement of t he 
applet. 
Au clrnage.Java 
This class controls the process of downloading the image fi les fo r the current 
auction elements. 
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AucTimer.Java 
This class updates the time remaining field for the client. 
CryptLib.Java 
This is a common l ibrary of methods used for encryption and decryption processes . 
MARSCrypt.Java 
This class conta ins all the necessary algorithms and key schedules for t he Mars 
encrypt ion algor it hm. 
RC6Crypt.Java 
This class contains all the necessa ry algorithms and key schedu les for the RC6 
encryption algor it hm. 
RSACrypt.Java 
ThiS class contains all the necessary algorithms and key schedules for the RSA 
encryptlon algor it hm. 
HTML File 
The HTML file in which the cl ient applet resides, contains em beded code to notify 
the web browser what to do wi th the JAR fi le. 
The Client State 
The AucClient .Java class is the file that runs ini tia lly. I t executes the start method, 
as this is what executes in an applet. (As opposed to the main method in an 
Appl ication). 
//AucClient.Java - Start method 
Get parameters (itemid, port number) 
I f (Auction Running) & Port number = ok) 
Initialise AucImage 
End if 
Set Initial I mage = item 
SetupConnection 
Initialise AucUI (applet,AucImage) 
Initialise ClientEngine(AuctionUI,codebase(},AucImage,ltemid, port number) 
ClientEngine.start 
The applet first attempts to get the port number and item id from the HTML page, 
which are passed in as parameters . The port number tel ls the cl ient what port to 
connect to the server, as t he port nu mber is dynamic. The ltemid va lue info rms t he 
client applet what item the client started bidding for . 
I f there were no problems, (such as corrupt pa rameters) t he item id exists and the 
port number is not invalid, t hen the auction conti nues . It ini tia l ises t he AucImage 
class and sets the fi rst image equal to the name of t he itemid. The fo rmat specifies 
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that item images be named the ID of the item. (Le, Item I D = ITEMAA1, t hen Item 
I mage = ITEMAA1.GIF) The AucUI and AucEngine classes are initialised and passed 
the req uired references of objects . The clientengine class is then started, which 
takes over contro l of the ru nning of the client applet . The codebaseO method 
returns the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of the applet code on the web site, 




Clie n t 
Connected 
I 
Cli en t 
Logged I n 
Fig 4.10. 1 The Clients States 
Client disconnected state 
This is the state that the client starts in, However on the loading of the applet, the 
client attempts to connect to the server immediately . If t he connection is lost at 
any stage to the server t he client moves back to the disconnected state. 
Client connected state 
The ClientEngine class sets up the connection to the host as follows: 
//ClientEngine.Java - SetupConnection method 
Get Hosts address 
New Socket = Socket (Host Address, Port number) 
Set Buffered input/output streams 
I ni tia lly the client obtains the host address of the applet. It then uses th is address 
to open a communications socket to the host (Server application), using the port 
number t hat is passed in as a pa rameter from the HTM L document . It may only 
open a network connection to the orig inating host that the applet came from , This 
security feature prevents unauthorised commu nication to ot her machines. Once t he 
client is connected the application may proceed to the next state. 
Client logged in State 
Hint: To log into the server. Fill in all the required details in the relevant text fields 
and then press the "Connect" button at the bottom of the screen. 
This st ate is achieved once t he cl ient has logged into the server wi t h all the 
requ ired personal details. This requires the client to type these detai ls into t he 
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relevant fields on the applet screen. These include name, email etc. The client 
logged in state cannot be achieved unless the client has been connected to the 
server first. The details are simply forwarded to the server . Only once this state has 
been achieved may the client participate in any running auctions. 
Auction running state 
Hint: To participate in the auction, enter a bid in the text box. To submit a bid, click 
on the "Submit Bid" button. 
This state is controlled entirely by the Server application. It notifies the clients 
about the status of the current auction and updates frequently. In this state the 
client may bid for the currently auctioned item. 
Auction stopped state 
Si milarly for this state, the Server is in control. It will end the clients Auction when 
the Server changes its own state. The Cllenteng ine class updates these state 
changes. 
4.11) What happens when the Applet is started? 
The Clientengine object is a reactive object. It responds to requests and cal ls from 
the server and other objects. 
It is important to understand the make up of the Cl ientEngine class, as it is crucial 
to the applet control. When the ClientEng ine class is initialised , it initialises the 
variables used to control the applet. 
//ClientEngine,)ava - ClientEngine method 
Set local References to itemid ,port number, Auclmage & AucUI 
Initialise RSA & CryptLib 
RSA ~ New RSA object 
Set Key ~ 0 
This method is called when the ClientEngine class is initiated for the first time. It 
sets all required references and variables. The ClientEngine also keeps a copy of all 
the clients' details (name, email etc). 
Login page 
The Login page is the first page loaded and displayed by the applet. This requires 
the users details. Without completing this section first the client may not proceed to 
the Bidding Page, 
Bidding page 
The bidding page is displayed once the client has logged in. It displays all the 
details regarding the current auction. This includes the clients Auction ID, the Item 
ID, the top bid, minimum bid and the t ime remaining. The client receives an 
auction ID number that is unique. This is used to differentiate between different 
clients and also maintains client anonymity. The Server generates and distributes 
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the auction ID. This ID number is retained while the client stays logged in. If the 
client leaves the auction and rejoins they will be issued with a new auction ID. 
When the client joins initially, and every auction thereafter the details are sent from 
the server to update the client with all the required details. The client then bids for 
the item and is notified when the auction is over and who won it. When the 
following auction starts the client is notified that a new auction has begun. To aid in 
the user friendliness of the application the client also receives an image (if 
available) of the item cu rrentl y being auctioned. 
If no auctions are running the applet will display no values and the client will not be 
able to bid. This auction running and stopped states are displayed, as long as the 
client is connected. 
4.12) How does the user interface work? 
The AucUI class controls the user interface. As with the server application this class 
has no control of the actual information it displays. However it wil l display the 
Information received from the server. 
The applet is made up of two distinct screen shots (see below), the logi n page and 
the bidding page. The applet uses layered panes. A layered pane is a window with 
more than one pane within. Each pane or element has a z-value. This z-value 
determines what pane is displayed. The pane with the highest positive z-value will 
be displayed over all the other panes. 
When the application begins the logln pane has the highest z-va lue. Once the client 
has logged in the AucUI class changes the z-value of the bidding page so that it is 
higher than the login page. This causes the bidding page to be displayed. The 
reason that this is so useful is that both pages are prepared as the applet starts up 
but remain invisible. The applet takes a little longer to execute initially, but once its 
running things are quicker. When the applet is ready it displays the cu rrent pane 
and makes the perceived speed of the application seem greater. 
The Logl" page 
The login page is made up of one panel and a button. On this are four text boxes. 
They are in order, the Name, credit card (or staff number in t he demo version), 
email and Hostname fjelds. The first three fjelds require the user to enter data. Any 
fields left blank will prevent the user from continuing. The fourth field displays the 
host name of the applet. If there is no connection to the server the applet will 
display an error here. Once the fields are all updated the user can continue by 
clicking on the "Connect to Server" button. This sends the data to the server. This 
page is hidden and the bidding page is then displayed. 





Please Enter your Name: 
Please enter your Stim Numller: 123456 
Please enter your Email : johnd nd.ac2a 
The Host Auction server: ,j 
1 __ .. _ _ .......... _---
Connect 10 Server. 
Fig 4.12.1 The applet login page. 
The Bidding Page 
The bidding page is made up of four sections. The Auction bids, auction 
parameters, auction information and auction image. The auction bids section 
consists of a text field for placing a bid and a button to submit the bid. If the text 
va lue consists of non-numeric characters an error message will be conveyed to the 
client. To send the bid the client must cl ick the "Submit Bid" button. 
The auction parameter section displays the details of the auction. It cons ists of four 
text boxes. The Auction ID textbox d isplays the client's own Auction ID value. The 
auction item ID va lue displays the ID va lue used for the current item auctioned. 
The Top bid field displays the current top bid and the auction Id of the bidder. The 
time remaining text box displays the time left for the current auction. The AucTimer 
class updates th is textbox every second. Due to the fact that the server sends the 
time remaining initially and if there are any changes, there may be a slight 
discrepancy between the clients time and the Servers time. However the server has 
the last word, and it indicates when the auction is over. The time remaining clock is 
meant to be a guideline for the client. To prevent unfair last second bids the auction 
will add a minute to the time remaining if anyone bids withi n the last sixty seconds. 
All of these text boxes are uneditable and are updated by info rmation received from 
the server. 
The auction information page informs the user on minimum bids, bids submitted, 
time extensions and other auction proceedings. The AucUI class has no control over 
the auction image section, instead the AucImage class updates the image section. 
This takes care of obta ining and displaying the correct item image. It downloads the 
item image off the server and promptly displays it in the image section. 
In all instances the ClientEngine class instructs the AucUI and Auclmage classes to 
update the information. 
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User Interaction only takes place on two occasions. When the client attempts to 
logln into the server, and when the client attempts to place a bid. In both occasions 
the class that controls the interaction is the ControlAction class. When it receives 
this action it makes sure there are no abnormalities with the information being 
entered by the client before presenting it to the ClientEnglne class to send to the 
server. 
Applet Termination 
The applet will only be terminated when the client moves to another web page. As 
long as the client remains on the original web page the applet will continuing 
running. Re-visiting the web page will cause the application to restart completely. 
Known Problems 
There are a few problems with the user interface. However they are well 
documented in the Java li terature. The main problem that occurs Is the repainting 
or refreshing of the client applet. On some occasions the applet forgets to repaint 
when it has lost and regained focus. 
4.13) How are messages sent between parties? 
One must first understand that the application uses the TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) protocol. The reason for this is that TCP/IP has 
a number of useful features. It guarantees delivery in the correct order of all 
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information sent or rece ived. This means that al l data sent wou ld be received in the 











Fig 4. 13. 1 TCPj lP comm unication 
IP is a non-guaranteed and connectionless layer that sends datagrams. TCP then 
controls these packets of information, re-sending when necessary, and placing in 
the correct order. The stack layer shows how the applications open vi rtual streams 
of communication via TCP, which send the packets using the IP protocol from the 
server to the client and back again. TCPjIP is far more complex than shown and a 
discussion is not needed in the context of this chapter [Hughes, Hughes, Hoffner & 
Winslow, 1998, plO]. 
Java uses streams to communicate, be it to files or networks. Both the client and 
server applications open input and output datastreams. A standard stream can only 
send and receive bytes. Data Input and output streams allow a higher level of 
communication, such as string and data types. The problem though with these 
streams Is that they are not buffered. As one places Information in the stream it is 
automatically sent. This leads to two problems. One is that it takes a lot of 
resources to do this continuous stream handling, which slows down the operation of 
the application. Secondly it does not use the TCPjIP packets to its fullest, and one 
will be wasting bandwidth, as many packets conta ining few bytes will be sent. To 
combat this problem the streams are buffered. This allows for the messages to be 
completely created and then placed in the stream, when the buffer is flushed of its 
contents, thereby sendi ng information less often in fuller TCPjIP packets [Hughes, 
Hughes, Hoffner & Winslow, 1998J. 
The usage of these wrappers gives the application more flexibility and allows easier 
communication. The way in which the streams are constructed is displayed in the 
following diagram. The original input and output streams are linked to the socket 
that the application has opened to the other parties involved. Both the server and 
client applications use the same send method. 






















Fig 4.13.2 Stream wrappers 
/ /SendMsg (String Message) method 
If (encryption_ set) then Message = Encrypted(message) 





First the method checks for encryption. If this is in place the message is encrypted. 
The message is then placed in the output stream (which is buffered). The message 
is sent once the call to flush the output stream has been executed. If there are no 
stream problems the message will be sent. The message is sent in a UTF-8 format. 
This writes each element of the String message in one, two or three byte formats. 
Common ASCII text will use one byte and the more uncommon ASCII text will use 
three bytes. This decreases the amount of information sent, thereby saving 
bandwidth in an efficient manner. The length of the String is also encoded so the 
stream on the opposite end will know how long the message is and can separate 
messages. This format is the common format for communication between Java 
applications or programs. 
The format of the messages sent between the client and server are quite simple 
and re latively small . The message is divided into two sections. The message 
descriptor and message information. The message descriptor is a space-delimited 
set of numbers. Each sequence of numbers leads to a different command. The 





Fig 4.13.3 The Message format 
Secure Internet Auct;on;ng System Page 48 
Auction Implementation 
The Server's messages 
As has been indicated by the message format, there are conventions for sending 
commands. The following few paragraphs will explain what messages the server 
sends to the client and what results from them. The server sends five kinds of 
messages. The table below lists the format of the messages sent. 
Message Message Message format 
Number Identifier 
Securitv 
0 <Algorithm type> <Public RSA Key> <Public N 
value > 
Registration 
1 <Client Auction ID> 
Auction Details 
2 1 1 <Item ID> <Min Bid > <hrs> <mns> <scs> 
2 2 2 <Too Bid> <Too Bidder ID> 
Bid Response 
3 1 1 <Bid Value> 
(Error messages below) 
3 2 1 Bid must be Higher 
3 22 Auction Not running 
3 23 Bid lower than Minimum 
3 24 Bid lower than Current Top bid 
3 25 Encrvntion Error 
Extend Time 
4 <hrs> <mns> <scs> 
Average Time 
9 
Flg 4.13.4 Mes sage formats from server to chent 
Note: <Value> are values sent to the client. 
The Security message sends, to the client, the type of algorithm that is being used 
for symmetric encryption, as well as the public key pair for RSA encryption. The 
registration message sends the client and Auction ID on confirmation of all their 
details. The auction details messages sends one of two messages. The first is the 
details of the current item auctioned. This is sent by default the instant a client logs 
into the system, or a new auction begins. The second is the current top bid and 
bidder for the auction. This is sent every time the top bid changes. The Bid 
response message replies to the clients bid. The response is either an acceptance of 
the bid or a rejection with an error message. The extended time message updates 
the client with the new finish time of the current auction. The average time 
message is very similar to what is known as an Echo request. On receiving this 
message the client responds immediately with the same message. This allows the 
server to measure the average time packets take to and from the client. All 
messages are space delimited. 
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The servers messages are sent by calling the method Notify_Client(Message No, 
Message) with the appropriate information. 
The Client's messages 
These are the message formats sent to the server from the client's machine. 
Message Number Message format 
Security 
0 <l<l> .. <K, > //RSA Encrypted Symmetric Key 
Login 
1 <Name> <Number> <Ema il > 
Bid 
3 <Bid value> 
Average Time 
9 
Fig 4, 13.5 Message formats from chent to server 
The client has a limited number of messages. The first one sends the client's key to 
the server, It has been encrypted using the Servers public key. The login message 
sends the clients details to the server. The bid message sends the clients current 
bid for the auction to the server. The average time procedure responds with the 
same message received. 
The client calls the method notify_ Server(message number, message). This method 
then executes the correct procedures to send the message to the server. 
Receiving messages 
The cl ient and the server threads sit in a non-blocking loop waiting for information 
to arrive in the input stream. As soon as it arrives both applications call a method 
called readMsg(). 
//readMsg() method 
String = (String) InputStream.readUTFO 
return String 
This method reads the message from the input stream using the UTF format. This 
UTF format is then cast (changed) to a stri ng and returned to the ca ller. A method 
ca lled the MessageProcedure(Message Received) takes this received message and 
deals with it according ly. 
//MessageProcedure (Message Received) method 
New StringTokenizer(Message Received," ") 
Message number = (integer) NextToken.StringTokenizer 
Select (Message number) 
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The method accepts the string received. It then creates a String token izer. The 
str ing tokenizer breaks the string up into tokens or different elements. The 
delimiter used to indicate tokens is a space. For instance "3 250" would have two 
tokens. The first is the message number. This determines what to do with the rest 
of the information sent. The message number retrieved is cast to an integer and 
used in a select statement. This select statement then calls the methods associated 
with the current command. It passes the remaining string to the method being 
called. Conti nuing the example of the Bid "3 350" to t he Server, would mean that 
case 3 Is chosen and the BiddingProcedure(String) would be ca lled. The value "350" 
would be passed to the BiddingProcedure method. 
When the message Is received, at every stage the message is examined for 
malformity. Th is prevents any unwanted or incorrect messages affecting the 
application. If any poor messages are received they are simply ignored, and the 
application makes a note of the occurrence. The message, time and whom it is from 
Is all recorded in the log file for examination at a later stage. 
4.14) What happens when a bid is placed? 
The client sends the bid in a string format. This is placed in the network stream, 
which is then flushed. The Clienthandler object for that cu rrent client receives the 
message. Th is message goes to the messageprocedure method, which determines 
the message type and calls the correct appropriate method (in this case it's the 
BiddingProcedure method). The rest of the string (The actual bid) is passed into t he 
appropriate method where it is dealt with. 
//ClientHandler.Java - BiddingProcedure(String Bid) 
Bid value = (float) Bid 
Result"" SubmitBid(ClientlD,Name,Email,Number,Bid value) 
Switch (Result) 
Case 1: Notify_ CJient(Success) 
Case 2: .. Case 5: Notify_ Client(Error) 
End Switch 
The string value is converted to a floating number. The bid is then submitted, along 
with the cl ient's detai ls. The reason for the deta ils bei ng passed along is twofold. 
Firstly It helps differentiate one bid f rom the next. Secondly no ot her copies of the 
clients details exist outside of their Clienthandler object. When the client leaves t his 
object is destroyed, and so is t he cl ient's information. It was imperative to keep this 
information, so t he cl ients bid and details is stored by the Auctionhandler. When the 
auction ends the AuctionHandler wilt know the detai ls of the cl ient who won without 
having to keep the all the Clienthandler threads alive. This smal l overhead allows 
for an even greater saving of resou rces later in the l ife spa n of the application . 
//AuctionHandler.Java - SubmitBid(ClientID,Name,Email;Number,Bid value) 
If (auction_ status"" stopped) return "Auction Not Running." 
Else 
If (MinBid(Current Item) > Bid value) return "Bid lower than min bid." 
Else 
If (TopBid(Current Item) > Bid value) return "Bid lower than top bid." 
Else 
Secure Internet Auctioning System 
Auction Implementation 











If (timeLeft() < 1) then extendAuction 
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The procedure first checks to see if there are any problems with the bids. It makes 
sure the current bid is greater than the minimum, top. It also checks to see that 
the auction is running before hand. Once all these checks have been confirmed one 
of two cases can occur. The client has bid before or it is the client's first bid . If the 
client had bid before and the new bid is higher than the previous bid, the new bid is 
entered. It overwrites the older bid in the Bidlist and the bids are then sorted to get 
them in order. 
If the client has not bid before, it is added to the bid list . The list is then sorted and 
the Auctionhandler is notified there has been a change in the bid list. On all 
occasions the procedure returns the result of the update. 
Finally this method checks to see if the time remaining in the auction is less than 
one minute. If it is, a bid has been placed in the last minute of the auction, which is 
by all means unfa ir for all the other contestants. This results in the auction being 
extended by another minute. This extension time is defaulted to one minute. 
Bid Storage 
The bids are stored in the BidInfo class. The Auctionhandler class has a dynamic 
array of theses BidInfo objects. The default number of elements in this Bid list is 
five. However it can be extended. The reason for making it a dynamic array was the 
fact that not all auctions are based on the top bid (i.e. Dutch Auctions). The result 
is that the top n (n=5) bidders bids are kept. For each variable there is a get 
method to retrieve the information, 















When the client calls the setBidInfo(ID.Name.Email.Number.Value) method, these 
values are set to local copies of the object, However the BidTimeStamp is also set 
so that the AuctionHandler wi ll know when the bid was placed, This means that jf 
two bids are equal the person who placed the bid first will take preference, 
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The sortBidsO method sorts the bids using a simple bubble sort algorithm, 
comparing bids, and if the bids are equal comparing the Bid time stamps. All the 
methods are synchronised so that any deadlocking problems are prevented. The 
Java system takes care of all the synchronisation of users placing bids. 
4.15) How are the Items stored? 
The items are stored in the Itemlnfo object. An array of ten elements (or less) of 
these objects is created. The user indicates the amount of elements in the array. 
Each stores the following information. 








A lovely UNO emblazoned leather diary. 
"AUCIDOOl loe Soap.Soapl@email.com 
The Item ID is used to differentiate between different items. Each item has a 
reserve minimum bid price, stored in the Min Value variable. There is a string 
description of the each item. This is used to give the user a brief description of the 
item on the bidding web page. Once the auction is over the Winners Detai ls are 
stored. This stores all the information held in the BidInfo object of the win ning bid. 
When the auction is over it writes all the relevant information to log files so that the 
administrator has the desired contact details of the auction winners. 
4.16) How is the Security implemented? 
The security of an application cannot be viewed as just the security of its 
communications. The entire emphasis of this project was on creating an overall 
secure application. For this very reason the methodologies described in chapter 3.9 
Java Programming Security Techniques have been closely followed in the 
development process thus far. 
ThiS means that the security of an application as a whole is based on the secure 
communications and programming techniques. 
The security of the communications hinges on two very important features. The 
first is the cryptographic methods used, and the second being the way in which 
they are implemented. A discussion on the choice and implementation of the 
cryptosystem will be dealt with in the fo llowing fou r chapters, as well as the 
implementation. The system chosen uses RSA to set-up a secure communications 
channel and once this has been achieved the client and server share the same key 
for MARS or RC6 algorithms. 
When the administrator starts the application, the RSA object automatically 
generates new RSA keys. One is public which is sent to the ctient and the other is 
private which the server uses. The default symmetric cryptosystem is RC6. The 
administrator can change the default symmetric cryptosystem. However this must 
be done before the server is started. Once the server has been started one may not 
change the cryptosystems. 
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Hint: To change the symmetric cryptosystem, Click Security menu I Select 
Algorithm 
Page 53 
When a client joins for the first time the server sends the client the RSA public keys 
and informs the client what symmetr ic cryptographic algorithm to use. This 
message is sent as normal with no special encryption. The client has a RSACrypt 
class . Which is used for encryption and decryption of RSA. The RSA public key is 
used by the client to encrypt a random symmetric key, which is used for either RC6 
or MARS encryption . The encrypted random key is then sent to server. The 
ClientHandJer on the server decrypts the RSA message from the client using its 
private RSA key and obtains the symmetric key. The symmetric key is different for 
all cl ients. 
Server 
Applet 
RSA Public key Standard 
Send 
RSA Encrypted Symmetric Key 
Send 
Fig 4.16.1 Exchange of public and symmetric keys 
Thereafter all communication is secure. As the messages are sent they are 
encrypted and when they are received they are decrypted. The class MARSCrypt 
and RC6Crypt are used fo r encryption/decryption of MARS and RC6 algorithms 
respectively. The Cryptlib class is used for encoding strings to and from bytes and 
integers, which are uses by both the encryption classes. 
Server 
Applet 
MARS / Encrypled Messages MARS / RC6 
RCO Send 
Decryptlon 
MARS / RC6 Encrypted Messages MARS / RC6 
Send Decryptlon 
Fig 4.16.2 Secure Communication 
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CryptLib.Java 
The client and the server have a copy of the Cryptlib.Java file. This contains useful 
methods for the encryption and decryption of information. 
On Initialization the CryptLib class creates instances of both the symmetric key 
cryptosystems (RC6 and MARS), as it is not known which one wil l be used. The 
Server decides which cryptosystem is going to be used. This is selected in the 
Security Menu. A variab le called Algo_No in the Auctlonlnterface classes holds an 
integer number representing the current algo ri thm (0 = RC6, l = MARS), this is 
passed to the CryptLib class which records what algorithm is being used in the 
encrypt_mode variable. 
Thereafter whenever the client or server asks for Interaction with current 
cryptosystem, such as setting the key, encryptlng or decrypting, the CryptLib class 
knows what to do for each cryptosystem. 
As an example, when the client sets the symmetric Key for the current auction, 
they call the setKey method. 
//CryptLib.Java setKey(Users Key) 
switch (encrypC mode) 
End 
case 0 : return RC6.generate_Keys(Users key, key length) 
case 1 : return MARS.generate_Keys(Users key, key length) 
The class determines which algorithm is being used and then cal ls the correct 
generate_Keys, which generates the required key. 
The decrypt and encrypt methods work in a sim ilar fashion 
//CryptLlb.Java Encrypt(Mesg, Key) 
switch (encrypCmode) 
End 
case 0 : return RC6.RC6Encrypt(Mesg,key) 
case 0 : return MARS.MARSEncrypt(Mesg,key) 
The CryptUb class has a number of other useful functions. It can generate a 
random key using a seed from the user, a random number and the MDS hashing 
algorithm 
//CryptUb.Java randKey(Size, Random Values) 
generate random bytes[sizej 
MD5.update(bytes) 
Return MD5.digest(Random Values) 
The user provides random values, which are used to encrypt the random data, 
using MDS (See Appendix). 
The CryptUb class provides some functionality for both the symmetric 
cryptosystems. There are methods for converting an integer to bytes and vice 
versa. One can convert strings to bytes, and bytes to strings. 
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As all messages are strings, they are converted to bytes, and then from bytes to 
equiva lent integer values. These integers are then encrypted by the cryptosystem. 
When decryption is complete, the process converts decrypted integers into bytes, 
and then the bytes into the original string format . 
4.17) What problems are associated with the threads? 
An understanding of what threads are is probably a good place to start before 
anything else may be discussed. A thread is shorthand for a thread of control. This 
thread of control is the simplest element of a program that can execute 
independently, [Oaks & Wong, 1999]. Even the most simple of applications has a 
single thread of execution. However when one starts dealing with streams and user 
Interfaces it becomes easier to break a program up into separate procedures to deal 
with asynchronous stream commu nications. 
Ever since the inception of a multithreaded environment there has been 
competition for the available resources. When threads demand access to resources 
at the same time it can lead to confusion and incorrect results. As an example lets 
take two threads: Thread one and Thread two. Both are competing for the output 
stream to the monitor. Thread one attempts to output "Hello world", and thread 
two attempts to output "This is a test". As they are fighting for control of the single 
resources the result is a jumbled output of the two threads. 
Hell ow arid _ ... _ .... _-----
Thread! 
This Is a test ... - .. - ... ...;;;;.;.--. 
Thread2 
HeUThlsow Is aorld test 
Result 
Fig 4. 17.1 Threads fighting for the same resource. 
If however there is some form of control of the threads, for access to the resources. 
this problem would be alleviated. 
A semaphore is one way in which one may control the threading issue. A 
semaphore allows only one thread to gain access to a resource at a time. All other 
threads wanting to gain access are put to sleep until the current thread is finished. 
The next thread in the queue is then allowed access to the resource. To achieve this 
affect Java uses synchronization to control the paths of execution of threads. The 
way in which one may use this feature is quite simple. By declaring a common 
method synchronized, any threads attempting to use the method will have to wait 
until it is free. 
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Admittedly threading issues are far more complex than indicated here, and Java's 
support for a multithreading environment is just as complex. However the 
synchronization of methods and to cont rol access to a resource is sufficient for this 
application and its demands. 
4.18) How does the server use synchronization to update all the clients? 
As has been mentioned beforehand the server has a list of all the cl ients currently 
connected. This is the client list vector, which is a dynamic array of object 
references. A Vector can dynamically grow and contract as required. 
There are two methods that are used, the addElement(Object) and 
removeElement(Object). The add Element method adds a reference to the current 
object at the back of the Vector. The removeElement method removes the object in 
the Vector. It does not require its Index as it searches and removes this reference. 
The power of Vectors arises at this stage, as the removed element would cause an 
empty index to exist in the array. However the Vector re-packs all the elements in 
the list to consume the empty index, When a client joins or leaves the server they 
are added or removed from the client Vector . These method calls are synchronized 
so on ly one update occurs at a time. The adding of a client takes place once they 
have logged into the server. The removal of a client occurs when the 
communications channel is closed between the client and the server. 
The objects that are referenced in this list are the clienthandler objects for each 
client. When the Auctionhandler determines that an update is required, it calls the 
method updateAll(Message Type,Message). An update is required on three 
occasions, one when a new top bid is received for the current auction and the final 
two when a state change has occurred. (Start or stopping of an auction). 
//AuctionHandler.Java - updateAI/(Message Type,Message) 
synchronized( clienClist) { 
} 
Enumerated = clienLlist 
While (Enumerated.hasMoreEiements()) 
(ClientHandler )Enumerated, nextElement . 
notify_ Client(Message Type,Message) 
End while 
The first thing that the method requires is the message type or number, and the 
actual body of the message. The client_list is then synchronized. This is done, as 
one does not want users joining or leaving as the AuctionHandler traverses the 
client Vector. Once the method has control of the client vector It fIrst creates an 
enumeration of the Vector. 
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Auction 
Cl ient Client Handler 
Applet Handler 1\ 
1,\ .. .. 
I I I I I I .. .. V Client 
Client Client V List 
Appl et Handler 
Vector 
Fig 4.18. 1 The Client Vector List, and its references to ClientHandler objects. 
Once the method has control of the client vector it first creates an enumeration of 
the Vector. This enumeration generates a series of al l the elements in the Vector. 
The method then extracts each element one at a time until there are no elements 
left to interrogate using the nextElement call on the enumeration. Once one has 
access to this element it is cast to a ClientHandler object. This gives one a 
reference to a client's Clienthand ler object. Once this has been ach ieved the 
method notify_client(message type, message) is ca lled, wh ich deals with the 
physical communication to the individual cl ient. The notify_client method has 
already been addressed in section 4,13, 
In this way all clients that are currently joined to the server are updated with all the 
correct information regarding the auctions. 
4 .19) What logging takes places? 
The server application performs logging on a continuos basis. It was or ig inally 
envisaged to al low logging to be controlled, and stopped or started. However 
logging is such an important role for any server application that it was decided to 
fo rce logging to be continuous. There are two log files, Aucserver. log and user.log. 
The Aucserver log file stores information regarding the genera l ru nning of the 
server. Th is includes sta rt and stop times of the server and auctions. Any error 
messages generated by the server will be recorded within the file. 
The user log file stores information about t he past win ners of auctions. This 
incl udes all their details, the bid made, the items involved and the date it all 
occurred . 
As the application runs cont inuously it was decided to append information to the log 
fi les. If these files do not exist, they are then created and thereafter they are 
appended. This means that there is a continuous history about the server 
application as well as al l the auctions run. 
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4.20) How are the directory structures set-up? 
The directory set-up Is straightforward. The server application can be installed 
anywhere, but the children directory structure must be as follows. The server root 
directory holds al l the classes required for execution . This directory requires 























Fig 4.20.1 Directory structure 
There must be a logs directory called " logs". This is used to hold the log files that 
the application writes to . This directory does not need to be readable or executable, 
however the server must have write access to this directory. 
The " html " Directory holds all the HTML files for the web sever, as wel l as the 
applet JAR flies aucjar.jar. The HTML " images" directory holds all the images for the 
HTML pages and the images of the items auctioned. This is where the applet 
retrieves the images it uses from . The server requires write access to the " html" 
directory to update the history and current auction files. A virtua l web site should 
be set-up on this directory. The virtual web directory requires executable privileges 
to execute the ASP / CGI script and the Java applet file. One must not al low write 
priv ileges in this directory as this will compromise the security of the application. 
The " htmlhelp" directory holds the help for the server applica tion In HTML files. The 
required images are placed in the " images" directory. The application needs read 
access to this directory. There Is no need for execute or write privileges. Note that 
In the Windows environment the directories are not case sensitive. In Unix all lower 
cases are used. 
The server may be set-up anywhere on the system, and will require the directory 
structure as described above. If these requirements are not met it may lead to 
unpredictable results. The privilege requirements have been listed as read, write 
and execute as a guideline. Different operating systems have different or no 
policies regarding these privileges, 
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4 .21) What files are used and Why? 
There are four files that the AucServer uses continuously. Those are the two 
discussed log files and two HTML include files. These are files included when HTML 
pages are displayed. Specifically auchtm.inc and history.inc. 
Auchtm.inc file 
The auchtm.inc files includes a list of all the items to be auctioned. This file is 
generated dynamically by the server application, Every time an auction begins or 
ends, the server rewrites the file. It displays the file in the following format: 
<Auction ID> I <Description > I <M inimum Bid > I <Finish Time > 
ITEMAAl A lovely UND 250 Wed Jan 12 
emblazoned leather 13:58:26 
diary. GMT+02:00 2000 
Actual HTML text 
<tr><td> <td> A lovely UND <td>250</td> <td> Wed Jan 12 
lTEMAA1</td> emblazoned leather 13:58:26 
diary.</td> GMT +02:00 
2000</td > </tr> 
It displays the auction ID number, the brief description, the minimum bid and the 
finish time. The actual file includes all the required HTML text. The HTMl file that 
includes this file is the auctions.asp page (auctions.html in Unix), It uses the HTML 
code: 
<!--#INCLUDE FILE="auchtm.inc"- -> 
When a client views the auctions. asp file to get a listing of the available auctions, 
the auchtm.inc file is included into the current document. This means that the 
application does not impact on the design of the web pages whatsoever. 
auchtm.inc Server 
dtemid> <desc> .. . App 
<i temid> <desc:> ... wri tten 
inc luded auctions.asp 
<itemid> o::dasc:> ... 
0:: itemid> <desc> ... 
Fig 4.21.1 auchtm.inc file being included into auctions. asp. 
Secure Internet Auctioning Sys tem Page 60 
Auction Imple mentation 
If one of t he items is currently being auctioned, t h is page displays an HTML 
hyperlink to the itemauc.asp page. As an .asp file is designed to work in the 
Wi ndows environment usi ng VBScript it wil l not work in a Unix environment. The 
server detects what system is being used and will appropriately use the correct 
auctioning page. This is itemauc.asp for windows, and itemauc.cgi for Unix, as both 
are used for scr ipting on their respective systems. The item id value is highlighted 
as the actual l ink to this page, which executes client applet. This l ink is generated 
dynamically by the server and is created in the fol lowing, manner: 
<A href=itemauc.asp?port=<Port number>&itemid=<Item ID» Item id </a> 
auctions .asp itemauc.asp 
3002 Applet 
include itemaal ••••• port=? 
file itemid=? 
, 
Fig 4.21.2 Passing parameters to applet. 
Th is resul ts in the itemauc.asp page being called. Two parameters are passed to 
into this web page. These parameters are then passed onto the cl ient applet 
res iding in the page. The parameters are Port Number and Item ID. The applet 
requires the port number pa rameter so it knows how to commu nicate with the 
server. The Item ID is for the item currently being auctioned. This is required by 
the client's applet as it must know the item the client origi nall y bids for. The 
original way In which one added an applet to a web page was to embed it into the 
HTML code as foll ows: 
//Itemauc.asp 
<Applet Code = "AucClient" Archive="Aucjar.jar" Width=H350" Height=H450"> 
<Param Name = port Value = <%=request.QueryString("Port"}% > 
Name = itemid Value = <%=request.QueryString("itemid")%» 
</Appfet> 
This wou ld run the file AucClient.class that is found in the JAR AucJar.Jar. The width 
it would be displayed in is 350 and height 450 . The pa ramet ers passed in are the 
port and item ID numbers. To extract t he parameters from the querystring, 
VBScript is used. On a Unix system Perl can be used instead (A sample itemauc.cgi 
is included w ith the source) . 
However the with Java 2 ava ilable the type of embedded applet command has 
cha nged. Su n Microsystems have released an application (" HTML Converter") that 
will update the previous HTML code to the correct vers ion implementation. The 
application can be down loaded for free from their web site (Java.sun. com) . The 
reason for doing this is that the client will automatically try and update t he Java 
vers ion if it is not compliant with the current applet being used . This al lows for a 
more robust system. 
The auct ions. asp f ile is reloaded every fifteen seconds so that the user will see any 
changes in auctions. 
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Histo ry.inc f ile 
The fina l fi le that the server writes to is the history.inc fi le. This file gives a 
complete history of al l the previous winners, their bids, the Item ID and the time it 
was achieved. The HTML file that uses the history .inc is the history.asp file. All it 
does is include the history.l nc file, so that when t he HTML file is processed so Is the 
include file. 
<!--#INCLUDE FILE="history.inc"--> 
<Auction Number> <Winners Details> <Winni ng Bid> I <Finish Time> 
ITEMAAl AUCID001 (loe 
SoaD) 
history.inc 
<i tem> <winner> ... 







!- item> <wInner> ... 
<item> <winner> ... 
Thu lan 12 13:01 :15 
GMT +02:002000 
Fig 4.21.3 history. inc file included into history .asp 
Only the ID value and name of the client is given and not any personal details. This 
file is appended unlike the auchtm1.inc file. So it will not overwrite any of the 
previous information, thus g iving a complete history of all the past winners. The 
way in which the server interacts with files has been developed such that It has no 
effect what operating system or f ile structure is being used. The development of the 
web pages needs on ly make one or two small concessions to incorporate the 
servers file usage to allow the auctions to take place. 
Porting 
Admitt edly there is a bit of preparation required to set-up the server but t he source 
code comes with the examples HTML fi les. These HTML fi les use ASP and reside on 
a Wi n32 web server. All the scripting is currently performed using VBScrlpt, 
However it is not difficult to port the ASP VBScript to a lang uage such as PERL or 
JavaScrlpt if one desires. The only thing that is actually requ ired is to replace the 
code below with the appropriate script to extract the Querystring parameters port 
and itemid . <%=request.QueryString("Port") % > & < % = request.QueryString (" 
ItemID ")% >. 
The source has been included for the Windows and Unix versions, 
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Conclusion 
The aim was to create a robust and secure Internet based application. This 
application must be system independent and extendable. The application surpassed 
what was expected performing admirably well in testing and development stages. 
Java showed Its true potential in the application with its natural support for Internet 
based applications and applets. The seamless capability of Java to interact within a 
networked environment holds great promise and should bode well for its future as a 
development language of choice. 
Using object orientated programming techniques and the power of the Java 
language I believe all goals were met admirably. Not only did it meet all the goals, 
but also, with the increasing popularity of Internet based auctions, the application 
has real world marketable potential. 
In the next few sections I will discuss the security issues in greater depth. 
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5) Security 
" ... the security of information systems and networks ( is) the major secu r ity 
challenge of this decade and possibly the next centu ry ... there is insufficient 
awareness of the grave risks we face in this arena." 
[Joint Security Commission, www.nsa.gov] 
The mathematical science of securing information is known as cryptology. 
Cryptology's rise in importance is due mainly to the advent of the digital age. 
The original Greek terms are Kryptos "" graphia, essentially Kryptos meaning 
hidden, and graphia meaning writing. There are four goals that crypto logy strives 
for: 
Confidentiality 
The content of the information and messages must be kept confidential. 
Authentication 
Determine the identity of the sender of information. 
Integrity 
To validate that the information has not been tampered with during transmission . 
Non repudiation 
Prevent the sender from denying that they sent the message, at a later date. 
5.1) Terminology 
The two parties involved in the communication are usually known as Alice and Bob. 
Eve is the undesirable attempting to eavesdrop on the communication channel. The 
original information to be encrypted is ca l led the plai ntext ( P). The encrypted 
information is ca lled ciphertext (C). Both plaintext and ciphertext are stored in t he 
standard digital fo rmat (Binary, Hexadecimal etc.). Encryption Is any method by 
which plai ntext is converted into ci phertext. Similarly decryp tion is any met hod by 
which to convert ciphertext into plaintext 
Encrypt ion and Decryption require keys (passwords, PINS or suchlike) to perform 
the procedures. The keys ( K) help lock (encrypt) the information, as well as unlock 
(decrypt) the information. The encryption key (K1) and the decryption key (Kz) may 
or may not be the same. This depends on the cipher (algorithm) being used. There 
are two types of algorithms: 
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Symmetric Algorithms 
The same key is used for encrypting and decrypting the cryptosystem. This is also 
known as a "symmetric key" system, e.g. DES (Data Encryption Standard) . 80th 
parties (Alice & Bob) agree on the same key before any commu nication can take 
place. 
Ek(P) = C 
Dk(C) = P 
Plaintext ~ Ciphe:rtext ~ Plaintext] 5 . e (J) Cl ymme'"c k <t}k ( Algorithm 
Fig 5.1.1 The Symmetric Algorithm 
Asymmetric Algorithms 
Different keys are used for encryption and decryption. The encryption key js usually 
known as the public key, and the decrypt ion key is usual ly known as the private 
key. This is also known as a "Public key" system, e.g. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). 
No information can be gathered from the encryption key about the decryption key. 
E,,(P) = C 
D,,(C) = P 
The key Kt is not the same key as K2. 
Plaintext ~ Ciphe rtext ~ Pl3intext] Asymmetric 
Algor"hn, 
Fig 5.1.2 The Asymmetric Algorithm 
Each algorithm attempts to have at least one of t he following properties, but 
preferably both. 
Confusion 
Confusion is the process by which the algorithm hides all relationships between the 
ciphertext and plaintext. It makes it difficult to conclude anything about the 
plaintext from the ciphertext . 
Diffusion 
Diffusion attempts to hide any statistical character istics in the plaintext. This is 
requ ired as In most languages each letter has a different probability of occurring in 
any text. 
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Letter Probability Letter Probability Letter Probabi lity Letter Probability 
A 0.083 H 0.161 0 0.075 W 0.023 
B 0 .015 I 0.070 P 0.019 X 0.001 
C 0.028 J 0.002 IQ 0.001 Y 0 .020 
D 0 .043 K 0 .008 R 0 .060 Z 0 .001 
E 0.127 L 0.040 5 0 .063 
F 0.022 M 0.024 T 0 .091 
G 0.020 N 0.067 U 0.028 
" . Fig 5.1 .3 Probabilities of mdlvldualletters In English. [Stmtston, 1996[ 
As one can see from the tab le some letters are more popu lar than others in the 
English language , The letter "E" is the most popu lar, with it contributing 
approximately thirteen percent of any written English text. Using statistical 
evaluations of vast amounts of ciphertext of the English language could possibly 
yie ld results if the algorithm does not perform any sort of diffusion. One must bear 
In mind that most cryptoanalysts have some form of probabilistic idea about the 
plaintext, as they will understand what type of information is to be encrypted. 
Cryptography is divid ed into two sets of practitioners, cryptographers and 
cryptanalysts . The former creates systems to secu re information. The latter 
attempts to break these systems and find faults in them. There are a number of 
attacks that can be mounted on any cryptosystem they are as follows : 
Ciphertext only attack 
The cryptoanalyst on ly has a few ciphertext messages generated by the system . 
Known plaintext attack 
The cryptoanalyst has ciphertext generated by the system as wel l as its 
corresponding plaintext messages. 
Chosen plaintext attack 
The cryptoanalyst chooses the plaintext and is able to generate the corresponding 
clphertext. 
Chosen ciphertext attack 
The cryptoanalyst Is able to generate the plalntext for a given clphertext. 
Each of the attacks attempts to find the keys used by the cryptosystem. There are 
a number of assumptions for each of the attacks. It is assumed that the 
cryptoanalyst knows the cipher being used. This is known as Kerchoff's principle. It 
is generally considered a very poor option for the entire system to be based on the 
secrecy of the algorithm. This is security through obscurity, which history has 
proved never works. It has been shown that the strongest algor ithms are the ones 
that have withstood the scrutiny of the industry. 
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5 . 2) A formal definition 
The following definition is due to [Stinston,1996] formulates it as a mathematical 
concept. 
Definition: A cryptosystem is composed of the following four conditions; 
• P is a finite set of plaintexts (p c P) 
• C is a finite set of ciphertexts (c c Cl 
• K is the key space, which is a finite set of keys 
• For each keK, there is an encryption and decryptlon rule 
• Ek( P) = C, Dk(C) = P ,such that Dk( Ek(x)) = x for every plaintext x,P 
An immediate consequence is that each encryption must be injective. If this was 
not the case one could end up with the fol lowing result: 
This Is potentially disastrous, since not only wou ld the cryptoanalyst not be able to 
find the correct plaintext, but neither would the va lid parties (Alice and Bob). 
The definition of an asymmetric, or public key cryptosystem as related by [Stinston, 
1996) is as follows. 
Definition: A cryptosystem is composed of the fo llowing conditions: 
• P is a finite set of plaintexts 
• C is a finite set of clphertexts 
• K is the key space, which has a finite set of key pairs (kp, ks ), where 
(kp is the public encryption key, ks is the private decrypt ion key) 
• For each (kp , ks) e: K, there is an encryption and decryption rule 
• Ekp( P) = C , Dks(C) = P ,such that DkS(Ekp(x)) = x for every plaintext x£P 
• For each xeP and (kp, ks) eK , Ekp(x) = y should be feas ible 
• Given y, it should be Infeasible to calculate x with only the knowledge of y and 
k, 
• Given y, It should be feasible to calculate DIcs(Y) = x 
One of the main criteria with public key cryptosystems Is that no information must 
be gathered about the plaintext with just the ciphertext and encryption key. Most of 
the public key cryptosystem are based on what are believed to be one way 
functions. 
E" (x) = y , wi t h F ol(y) = x infeasible to ca lculate. 
The enti re field is usually based on this type of premise. However there are 
cu rrently no proofs that one way functions actually exist. 
The security of cipher can be classified as computationally secure or unconditionally 
secure. Almost all ciphers fal l into the former category . 
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Computational security 
Computational security means that the resources required to break the 
cryptosystem are relatively infeasible at this time. The amount expended 
attempting to break the cipher, in time and fiscal terms, would be unprofitable. This 
does not mean that the cryptosystem is absolutely secu re and that It ca nnot be 
broken. This measurement is somethi ng that needs to be re-evaluated constantly 
due to the huge advances in computing power. A cryptosystem that is 
computationally secure today may be thoroughly insecure in five, ten or twenty 
year's time. An example of this is the DES cryptosystem . In 1977 the NSA (National 
Security Agency) supported it, however by 1996 the NSA had withdrawn all support 
of DES. A year later DES had been broken in a measly fifty -s ix hours, a year later it 
was done In twenty hours on a hundred thousand-dollar machine. In 1977 it wou ld 
have taken years of computing time, as wel l as millions of dollars to achieve this 
feat. 
Unconditional security 
Unconditional security places no bounds on the amount of resources and t ime tha t 
may be used to mount an attack on the cryptosystem (An impossible situation). 
Nonetheless even wi th all these resources the cryptosystem wou ld never be broken. 
There is only one pure unconditional secure cryptosystem . This Is the "One Time 
pad", which has a random key as long as the actual message. For this reason it is a 
totally Infeasible cryptosystem. It is difficult to quantify the security of algorithms, 
as one deals with infini te resources, and hence one uses probabilities to measure a 
cipher. 
5.3) The Protocols 
The protocol is the actual implementation of the ciphers in a secure and efficient 
manner. When one implements a protocol all aspects of the ciphers must be looked 
at first . Once all points have been weighed up, all parties involved must know what 
protocols are bei ng used and have an identical implementation to aVOid any 
conflicts. 
What Is required? 
The auctioneering application requires secure communication over the Internet. 
This needs to be relatively quick and efficient so it can run on your average home 
processor, as this is the targeted market of users. It also needs to be Invisible to 
the user and must not hamper in any way the actual running of the auction system. 
The client and server need to communicate securely and quickly. It is important to 
point out that most of the messages sent from the client to the server are relatively 
small and this wi l l have an Impact on the cryptosystems used. The lifetime of 
messages is not long, as the auctions are re lat ively short. All keys used wi ll be 
dynamically and randomly chosen. The application regenerates keys on instruction 
and there are no hard coded keys. 
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There are four things that need to be targeted on the Internet to en hance security; 
Improved cryptographic algorithms, efficient cryptographic processing, routing and 
multi-party cryptography [S.M .Bellovin, 1998] . The scope of the latter two is 
outside of the current topic. 
Currently there are only a few individuals working on algorithms that will be 
successful in the future. It is relatively easy to throw together a block cipher, but 
this does not mean that it is going to be any good at all. The science of 
cryptography has been described as more of an art. Even though an algorithm may 
seem to be secu re it may have inherent weaknesses. It does not take much for one 
to realise why people with a strong background In theoretical mathematics, number 
theory and information theory, not to mention extensive experience, do relatively 
well in the industry. This is the primary reason why I decided not to implement my 
own algorithm, but to look at a mix of proven and new algorithms available. Even 
with all the experience and support available one's algorithm is not tried and tested 
until it has stood up against the indu stry for a number of years. Each of the 
algorithms discussed in later chapters has a number of benefits that will be 
highlighted in the text that follows. 
The efficient processing of cryptographlc algorithms is where a number of problems 
occur, and, as one wi ll see later where most applications can fail. The incredible 
advancement of technology is facilitating the improvement of algorithm 
implementation . The difficulty arises when one attempts to implement an 
algorithm that was never intended for use on any form of network. Attempting to 
place an Implementation of an algorithm into a twenty-five year old protocol is no 
easy feat . There are varying arguments for and against different implementations 
of algorithms and the problems that may be faced but these will be dealt with later. 
Each of the symmetric and asymmetric algorithm types have benefits and 
disadvantages. 
Symmetric Algorithm Asymmetric Algorithm 
Fast Slow 
Single key Separate keys for encryption I Decryption 
Smaller key Larqer keys 
The biggest problem with symmetric algorithms or ciphers is the fact that the single 
symmetric key needs to be securely shared with Alice and Bob. If Alice and Bob 
already have this secure communications channel for sharing keys what is the 
reason for implementing the cipher? As one can see symmetric cryptosystems 
would be ideal for Internet applications and hence the current problem faced. 
As symmetric ciphers are on the whole about one thousand times quicker than 
asymmetric algorithms it makes sense to use them for bulk encryption of 
information, Even though processing power has increased considerably over the 
past few years, and will continue to do so in the future it is still not feasible to use 
public key cryptosystems for bulk communication due to their general sluggishness. 
However as the question has already been posed it Is difficult to exchange the 
single key discreetly and securely. A solution wou ld be for Alice and Bob to 
physically communicate the key via telephone, courier or some other physical 
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means, but in many cases this is impractical, especially over the Internet which has 
released client t he from physical limitations. Not only is it impractical, but if any 
person listens to the conversation or views the message as it is been couriered then 
the ent ire security of the algorithm is under threat. 
The answer lies In the fact that one may use the asymmetric cryptosystem to 
resolve some of these issues. Using the best of both worlds as it may be. The 
asymmetric cryptosystem as has been pointed out is rather slow. However it does 
not need a single key. There are invariably two keys, a public and private key. The 
public key is distributed to everyone that wants to speak to Alice, in other words it 
is made public. As the algorithm has been agreed on, anyone who wants to send 
Alice a private message need only encrypt the messages using the encryption 
algorith m with the pu blic key. Alice is the only one t hat can decrypt t his message 
with the associated secret key. The solution then is to use the asymmetric 
cryptosystem to share, secretly, the symmetric key between Alice and Bob. This is 
known as a hybrid cryptosystem. 
Hybrid Cryptosystem 
In a Hybrid cryptosystem more than one cryptosystem is used. The public key 
cryptosystem is used to create a secure communication between Alice and Bob. 
Once this has been achieved, Alice and Bob can then generate and send the 
symmetric key to one anot her. Once they have shared this key using the 
asymmetric cryptosystem, the cryptosystem is then changed for the remainder of 
the communication session. The symmetric cryptosystem is then used for 
encryption as both Alice and Bob have the same symmetric key. 
Initially one has to bear with the slower performance of the asymmetric algorithm 
to take advantage of its key sha ring ability. Thereafter one may switch to the faster 
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There are a number of problems that exist. One may ask the question, why doesn't 
public key cryptosystem become more popular? If speed is an issue it will be 
resolved as technology evolves. Within the next ten to fifteen years technology will 
be fast enoug h for it not to matter about the strain that encryption places on the 
system. However public key systems are also weaker, relative to their symmetric 
counterparts. As the encryption function and key are avai lable, the system is 
susceptible to a plalntext-mounted attack, Therefore most public key cryptosystems 
require larger keys to make the system relatively stronger against this line of 
attack. However this does allow an exhaustive search technique by which the 
cryptanalyst can attempt to determine the private key . 
However al l is not lost as public key cryptosystems are designed with this fault in 
mind. Its security is based on two things, the unfeasibi li ty of determining the 
private key with knowledge of the public key, as well deducing the plaintext given 
the ciphertext [B.Schneir, 1996]. 
Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie developed public key cryptography in 1976. 
Their idea was to remove this key exchange problem altogether. Each person has 
their own set of public and private keys, they release their public keys, and use one 
another's public keys to en crypt and send information. Similarly they use their own 
private key to decrypt the message sent. Using this method no forms of secret key 
exchange takes place. 
RSA, RC6 and MARS 
The three cryptosystems used in this project were RSA, a well known and tested 
asymmetric (public key) Cipher, RC6 which is a symmetric cipher developed and 
advanced upon RCS, and finally MARS which is the latest symmetric cipher. It must 
be mentioned that Re6 and MARS are part the Advanced Encryption Scheme (AES), 
which is controlled by the American National Institute of Standards and 
Technologies (NIST) to develop a replacement for DES. The usage of these 
algori thms in th is project has a number of implications that wil l be mentioned later. 
RSA is used for the key exchange, and either RC6 or MARS are used for secure 
communication. 
5 .4) Provable 5ecurity 
The problems that most security applications face these days are vast . It has been 
shown that in most secu r ity breaches it is not t he actua l algorithm that Is at fau lt, 
but it usually is a problem with the implementation of the algorithm, usage of the 
algorithm and the keys selected in the algorithm. This is usually due to a poor 
understanding of the algorithm and essentially the ineptitude of the implementers. 
Any problem with Implementation is going to give a cryptana lyst another possible 
point of att ack, and will generally weaken the system as a whole. 
The idea is to find a f ine balance between t he pract ical implementat ion and the 
mechanism s of the cryptosystem. The hybrid cryptosystem discussed above using 
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RSA and RC6, or RSA and MARS is the current secu re protocol for message passing 
systems on the Internet. 
However what is required of a good secure cryptosystem as related by [M Bellare, 
1998] is good primitives. The atomic primitives are the foundations of the protocols 
used. The idea is to base the protocol on good primitives, resulting in a good 
protocol. One needs to question how good these primitives are? How secure are 
they? Are they suited to the specific protocol? This will be done In each of the 
following chapters concerning the relative algorithms. 
How do you prove "Provable Security"? 
This task was formerly proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [M Bellare, 1998]. The 
idea is based on a mathematical notion and there are a few steps . First one needs 
to model a secure system and conceptualise the points required for this secu re 
system. In a similar fashion one models the current protocol. Using reduction, and 
breaking down the protocol one looks at all its weaknesses. If a weakness is found 
in the protocol then the entire protocol needs to be re~assessed . Once the protocol 
has been reduced to its primitive elements, the security of the protocol then rests 
entirely on the security of these primitives . 
The only way then to break the protocol is to break the primitives it is based on. 
Then cryptoanalysts will focus on these primitives and if they are secure then the 
entire protocol Is secure. Needless to say one has to prove the security of the 
primitives, and before this can be done one must understand what the primitive is 
designed to do. Just like a matchstick bridge would not serve the purpose of 
supporting lorries, nor will a cipher work in an environment it was not developed 
for. 
To prove that a protocol is sound or secure, one uses the Complexity theory 
approach . A discussion on this follows in the next section. However this theory 
does not actually look at secure practical physical implementation of the protocols, 
rather it examines a theoretical approach. The practice orientated provable security 
methods attempts to quantify the security of the physical protocol as discussed by 
[M Bellare, 1998], thereby giving it a measure of security. This is made up of two 
measurements; the degree of insecurity, which is measure by how easy it is to 
attack the protocol and the degree of security which is measured by the reduction 
of the protocol and primitives. The reduction of the elements allows one to break 
the protocol down to Its most basic elements and examine the security of each. 
Admittedly one must realise that when one model's a protocol there are a number 
of assumptions that need to be made. Due to the fact the real world cannot be 
entirely modelled, all circumstances cannot be foreseen. The models of the 
algorithms discussed wi ll show how each of the cryptosystems is implemented, 
where their strengths and weaknesses are and where possible lines of attack may 
be seen. There are always the attacks that are not seen, which can brutally destroy 
a protocol, but bear in mind the security model derived does not prove that it is 
secure against the unknown, just the known with a number of assumptions. If any 
of the assumptions are wrong and the unknown attack occurs, the entire security 
model collapses. 
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5 .5) Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory has been developed to examine the complexity of mathematical 
formulae. It hopefully leads to some measurement of the formu lae, and hence its 
security. 
One needs to determine the complexity of an algorithm to deduce any further 
information about it. This is measured by the time and space the algorithm 
requires. The resultant value is expressed as the order of magnitude of the 
complexity of the algorithm. Both time (T ) and space ( 5 ) are functions of n , with n 
being the size of the input of the algorithm. The order of magnitude (0 ) Is 
measured as the biggest va lue of n , as n increases. Th is is because as the n tends 
to Infinity, the highest order of magnitude wil l count the most. This order of 
magnitude then shows one, the effects of a bigger input, on the time and space 
required for the algorithm. IB.Schneier, 19961 
T = 0 (n ' ) < T = 0 (n ' ) 
Algorithms can be of a number of different equations, depending on O . These 
range from constants, to polynomials to exponentia l order of magnitude. Algorithms 
are usual ly classed as some time complexity equasion (i.e. Polynomial-time 
equations 0 (n * a) ) . The aim is to find some function that will be able to break 
the cryptosystem. New algorithms are designed with this in mind, and attempt to 
make this breaking algorithm of exponentia l- time complexity, thereby making it 
incredibly hard for one to find a short method for breaking the cryptosystem. 
However this theory does not prove that there is no existence of a trapdoor 
algorithm that can quickly and easily find a solution. The following table shows why 
only the higher order of magnitude of n is considered . Once the order of magnitude 
becomes a polynomial equation, breaking the system becomes even more difficult. 
Class Complexi ty No. of Operations, Time of operation 
N = 10' 
Constant o (1) 1 1/1000 sec 
Linear o (n ) 10' lsec 
Quadratic o (n ') 10 12 11.6 days 
Cubic o (n ' ) 10 18 32000 years 
Exponential o (2") 1030 1030 10301006 age of 
universe 
Fig 5.5 Running times of different algOrithms [B.Schneter, 1996] 
There are a number of problems with this method as discussed by [E . F. Brickell & 
A. M. Odlyzko]. As it is a measurement of the actual algorithm and the time taken 
to break it, it cannot deduce what may occur once the cipher is implemented and 
has external influences. Secondly this theory is based on the experimental evidence 
about the algor ithm. The way in which this is done is by showing how quickly the 
algorithm is broken with fewer rounds and then extrapolating this figure out for al l 
rounds. Th ese are really just assumptions. 
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Complexity of Problems 
This theory is used to discern the complexity of the actual cryptosystem. All this is 
based on the work of Alan Turing, who invented a non-deterministic finite state 
machine, commonly known as the Turing machine. 
Problems can be divided into two groups as discussed by [B.Schneier, 1996], those 
that are feasible, and those that are infeasible. The feas ible problems are usually 
solved in some polynomial time by the Turing machine. Those that are infeasible 
mayor may not have a solution. These problems are divided into a number of 
classes: P,NP, P-Space and EXP-Time. If the algorithm is breakable, the 
cryptanalyst will find a P class solution. In other words it executes in polynomial 
time and Is a feasible solution . If the problem can be solved in NP time then things 
get more difficult. NP time means the solution is solvable by a non-deterministic 
Turing machine in P time. A non-deterministic Turi ng machine makes the correct 
guesses required to solve the problem. This does put an upper limit on the tIme 
required to solve the problem. P-Space problems have been shown to be provable 
in polynomial space (The machines would have enough memory to hand le them) , 
but cannot be done in polynomial time. The EXP-Time class of problems can be 
solved In exponential time 
The interesting thing here is that P class problems fal l under NP as a subcategory. 
In other words if a solution can be found in polynomial time on a Turing machine, it 
can be found on a non-deterministiC Turlng machine In Polynomial time . Most 
cryptosystems fall in to this NP class of problems. Thus far no one has managed to 
prove that the class P = NP. In doing so they would prove that any cryptosystem 
problem is solvable In polynomial time and all algorithms are breakable. The 
solutions to the algorithms wou ld still need to be found, but one wou ld know they 
existed. The world would fall into anarchy as chaos ruled supreme and all 
economies collapsed. 
The cryptosystems that are being dealt with in this book are suspected to be of 
type NP hard problems. However as there Is no proof of one way functions 
(especially when dea li ng with RSA), this is conjecture and thus there is always a 
chance that a cryptanalyst could find a solution to these problems In P, thereby 
destroying the algorithm. 
5.6) The Process 
As has been mentioned previously, RSA, RC6 and MARS are the three algorithms 
that are examined . However what has not been discussed is some of the 
preliminaries regarding the algorithms. This includes the key generation, 
authentication, and verification of the auction system. As is mentioned in [T Aura, 
1997], " .. we stress t hat the techniques shou ld be implementable at a reasonable 
cost in computation and bandwidth. This is essential because designers of concrete 
protocols often struggle with tig ht performance constraints." The aim of this project 
has been to achieve a relatively secure system, with as little impact on CPU and 
network usage as possible. 
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There are two things that are done. The first is to set-up and share a public key 
cryptosystem with the use of RSA. The server generates RSA public and private 
keys on starting, or when the administrator issues an explicit command to re-create 
the keys. The server sends the client the public key, and information regarding the 
symmetric algorithm to be used. (See Chapter 4.13 and Figures 4.13.4, 4.13.5). 
This is sent in plaintext, thus anyone can read it. The client receives the server's 
public key. Once the client has this key, all messages sent to the server can be 
encrypted with this public key. The client can then generate the symmetric key for 
the symmetric cipher decided upon. Once this key has been generated (See Keys 
and Key management later in this chapter) it is then encrypted using RSA and the 
servers public key. This encrypted symmetric key is sent back to the server. The 
server receives the message and decrypts it using RSA and the private key. No 
other action or request from the client will be accepted until secure communications 
are set-up. The server extracts the symmetric session key from the message. This 
session key is only for the current client concerned. Clients have their own session 
keys for the duration of the auction. The Clienthandler object keeps the session key 
for the respective client. If no symmetric key is shared or there is a problem with 
the key the server wi ll request the key up to a maximum of three times. Thereafter 
if there are still problems communication is ignored from the client. This prevents 
malicious flooding and denial of service type attacks. 
At this stage the RSA cipher is not used anymore. Thereafter, whenever 
communication takes place between the client and the server it is with either the 
RC6 or MARS algorithm. As both the client and the server have the same symmetric 
key they may use the quicker symmetric cipher system. Al l communication is 
automatically encrypted on sending and decrypted on receiving. The client only 
uses this key for the duration of the auction. If the client leaves the auction and 
then joins again, a new session symmetric key is generated. It should also be 
mentioned that if any communication between the cl ient and server has errors or 
attempts to perform illegal operations, it is ignored, the message is logged and the 
administrator notified. This will catch any message tampering, thereby 
guaranteeing message integrity for the messages accepted. 
AES 
In 1997 NIST made a formal call for new algorithms to replace the current ageing 
standards. There were a number of stipulat ions for these algor ithms. They must be 
symmetric ciphers of 128-bit block size and 128 to 256 bit key sizes. Within a year 
fifteen AES ciphers had been submitted from all over the world . 
Since then there has been analysis of these algorithms from the best cryptoanalysts 
around the world. A number of the algorithms displayed weakness that caused 
them to fall by the wayside . At the end of 1999 5 candidates stili stood standing 
meeting all the requirements laid down by NIST. These requirements are quoted as 
the following: 
Secure Internet Auctioning System Page 75 
Security 
"Security is the most important factor in the evaluation. Security encompasses 
features such as resistance of the algorithm to cryptanalysis, soundness of its 
mathematical basis, randomness of the algorithm output, and relative security as 
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Cost Is a second important area of evaluation that encompasses licensing 
requirements, computational efficiency (speed) on various platforms, and memory 
requirements. Since one of NIST's goals is that the final AES algorithm(s) be 
available worldwide on a royalty-free baSiS, intellectual property claims and 
potential conflicts must be considered in the selection process. The speed of the 
algorithms on a variety of platforms must also be conSidered. During Round 1, the 
focus was primarily on the speed associated with l2B-blt keys. Additionally, 
memory requirements and constraints for software implementations of the 
candidates are important considerations. 
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The third area of evaluation is algorithm and implementation characteristics 
such as flexibility, hardware and software suitability, and algorithm simplicity. 
Flexibility includes the ability of an algorithm: 
• to handle key and block sizes beyond the minimum that must be supported, 
• to be implemented securely and efficiently in many different types of 
environments, and 
• to be implemented as a stream cipher, hashing algorithm, and to provide 
additional cryptographic services. 
It must be feasible to Implement an algorithm in both hardware and software, and 
efficient firmware implementations are advantageous. The relative simplicity of an 
algorithm's design is also an evaluation factor." 
[ITL Bulletin, Aug 1999, online] 
The finalists of round two were MARS, RC6™, RijndaeJ, Serpent, and Twofish. 
However, before these results were published I decided to examine and use MARS 
and RC6 because of all their strengths. A discussion comparing the algorithms 
would be out of the scope of this thesis. 
Due to export restrictions granted by NIST to myself, I may not distribute or 
disclose any of the digital code of the two AES algorithms. However I have 
developed my own Java implementations which I will be discussing and comparing 
to the optimal Java implementations by the actual creators . Hopefully this MSc will 
be completed before a winner of the AES algorithms is chosen in late 2000, or early 
2001. 
5.7) Keys and Key Management 
Keys are a highly contentious issue in the world of cryptology. It has been shown 
that weak keys or poor choices of keys can turn a secure system into a redundant 
system. The aim is to create and share secure keys, whIch do not put the primitives 
of the algorithm at fault for any security breach. 
As described by [S.Halevi, H.Krawczyk] any key sharing technique that Is required 
cannot be based on symmetric ciphers alone. This is the reason for using RSA to 
share the keys. As the current auctioning system has a number of requirements it 
should be shown what Is done to protect and generate the best keys possible. 
PRNG 
The most common method for generating a key is to use a Pseudo random number 
generator (PRNG). It has been realised recently that a PRNG is actually a form of 
cryptographic primitive. In most cases the PRNG is the weakest point in the entire 
system and most cryptoanalysts attack this first [J.Kelsey et al]. There is no true 
random number generator on a computer, since as one knows, there is nothing 
random In a computer. New products are being released as add-on features to 
computers that will perform some random functionality. This includes measuring 
the heat of hard drives, spin speeds positions, using OSCillating crystals, or pushing 
circuitry to its breaking point and outputting the resu lts its spews out. The only 
thing that Is truly random Is nature. However this makes it rather difficult to 
monitor In a non-living machine. 
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Key attacks 
The methods used for attacks on PRNG's and the keys paces that they generate can 
be classified as fol lows: [J .Kelsey, et al] 
1) Direct cryptanalytic attack 
This occurs when the cryptanalyst can see the results of the PRNG, and 
determine whether it's random or not. By deducing this one may reduce the 
keyspace and hence make it easier to guess the correct key. 
2) Input based attack 
The cryptanalyst has knowledge of the inputs to the PRNG, or may contro l it 
thereby compromising the keys. This attack is divided into three parts: The 
known input attack means the cryptanalyst has confirmation of the information 
placed in the PRNG . The replay-input attack allows the cryptanalyst to force the 
same input state to be used. The chosen input attack allows the cryptanalyst to 
modify the input state . 
3) State Compromise attack 
The cryptoanalysts manages to obtain some internal state values of the PRNG. 
This results in the cryptanalyst being able to guess and extrapolate what the 
future results are of the PRNG. 
These are the kind of attacks that may be mounted on the PRNG. If one of them is 
successful the cryptographic primitives that the protocol is based on will be 
comprom ised, as they are only as strong as the keys used. 
PRNG Guidelines 
When working with PRNG it is best to take the advice of the industry. As 
A.E. Neuman once said "Learn from the mistakes of others; you'l l never live long 
enough to make them al l yourself". [J.Kelsey, et a/] recommends some 
methodologies to foll ow to make the PRNG reasonably secure. 
One should base the PRNG on something secure. This means that the cryptanalyst 
has to break the cryptographic primitive used in the PRNG. The internal state of the 
PRNG should change over time. This prevents the cryptanalyst from guessing the 
current state of the PRNG, which allows one to generate following Information. It 
should resist chosen Input attacks. If the cryptoanalysts guesses the correct 
internal state, but not the input, they shou ld not be able to determine the result. 
The PRNG should recover quickly from compromises. Each change of input shou ld 
result in a drastic change in the output. 
Key Generation - The Server 
Keys are generated in two places, the server and the client . The server generates 
the RSA keys to enable the key exchange. The client generates the session key for 
the symmetric algorithm. 
The server uses the BigInteger class to generate a large prime number. This class 
first uses the random function of the Java class generate a large odd number. The 
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BigInteger class then uses the Solovay Strassen primality test to test the primality 
of the generated number. The Solovay Strassen test algorithm is as follows. 
1) n>l and is a random odd number, a Is a positive integer < n. 
2} If gcd(a , n) ~ 1, then n is composite. 
3) If Jacobi(a, n) .. a (n-1)/2 (mod n ) then n is composite 
4) else n Is prime 
5) Probability ~ Probability / 2 
6) Repeat from 2, using a different value of a until the probability that n is not 
prime is Infinitely small 
If n is composite it cannot be prime and the test fails. This process continues until 
the probability of n's primeness exceeds the minimum limi t as speci fied by the user. 
Doing this allows one to be as certain as one wants of the primeness of the random 
number. The Miller-Rabin primality test may also be used and Is a quicker 
algorithm. However the reason for using the system class function is that it will be 
faster than anything I could write. The default setting for the probability that the 
random number is prime is ninety-five percent. When dealing with such large 
numbers one can be reasonably confident that the number is prime . If there are 
any errors a new set of RSA keys will be generated and the problem will be 
resolved . 
It has been shown that standard random number generators are not very good at 
generating random numbers. However the reason that I have used the standard 
Java random number generator is that one takes two of these prime random 
number and multiplies them together to get the base of the modulo arithmetic, 
which is still difficult to determine. This is the basis of RSA security, and in fact as 
long as the prime numbers are large enough and prime, the result of multiplying 
them together will make it just as hard to factorise and should not Impair the 
system, It may slightly decrease the key space that the random numbers are being 
chosen from, which at 512 bits up to 4096 bits will be 2512 to 24096 keys to search, 
To prevent the random number from being too static the PRNG has been seeded 
with two seed values. These are then multiplied together to give a large initial seed. 
The seed chosen is the time the application takes to execute, multiplied with the 
current memory used by the system. Both of these will be different on all servers, 
depending on the following factors: the speed of the CPU, the current amount of 
applications running simultaneously, the load on the CPU, the amount of memory 
and the amount of memory currently used. 
Key Generation - The Client 
The client application needs to generate the symmetric key. The Java Sandbox 
prevents one from obtaining random values from the client machine, and therefore 
another method would be required to generate the key. It also needs a different 
type of key that does not need to be as long, but is required to be far more 
random. A few steps are followed to obtain a relatively random number from a 
PRNG. The client is asked to enter thirty characters into the keyboard, these must 
be as random as possible . The client need not remember this information, and all 
characters are allowed upper, lower, alphanumeric and special characters. This is 
then converted to a byte array (4 bytes/ Char, 30 Chars ~ 120 bytes) . Then a 
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number of random bytes are generated using the random number generator. The 
client's characters are used as a key to encrypt the randomly generated values 
using MD5 algorithm (See Appendix). MDS is a hashing algorithm, and its output is 
used as the symmetric key between the client and the server. 
MDS is based on MD4 and has been around since 1991. The reason that I use this 
algorithm is that it can be construed as a PRNG. A single change in the key or the 
random Input va lues will result in a huge change in the result. The RSAREF 2.0 is 
based on the MDS hashing algorithm and addition modulo 2128. MDS has proved 
itself rather useful over the past decade In this function and there have been a 
number of attempted attacks mounted. It has been shown to be vulnerable against 
a chosen input attack that can force the algorithm into repeating information. This 
allows the cryptanalyst to work out its internal state at a certa in time. This works In 
conjunction with a timing attack that monitors how the CPU works and can deduce 
what some of the internal state is. MDS also has another problem. This occurs 
because MDS results are order independent of the input. It does not matter if one 
sends A, then B into MDS, or B then A, one still gets the same result . [J .Ke lsey, et 
all 
However there are ways of counteracting these attacks. One should prevent the 
cryptanalyst from choosing the input. This is achieved, as the client is the only one 
to actually select the characters to be inputted as the key for MDS. The 
cryptoanalyst must guess this ( relati vely hard), and guess the random number 
generated by the computer (relatively easy). As the client machines' information 
may not be easily deduced over the Internet, and not much information can be 
discovered about the CPU usage. The timing attack fal ls away. The order 
Independence problem is resolved because only one set of va lues is ever generated 
and this makes it difficult for the cryptanalyst to deduce any statistical or frequency 
information. 
The MDS algorithm has proved itself over the last few years, and there are some 
problems. However due to its design and usage in the protocol it manages to avoid 
these weaknesses and hence generate keys that are random enough for usage with 
the RC6 and MARS algorithms. 
Requ ired Key Le ngths 
It has been shown that the security of an algorithm lies in the key, assuming that 
there are no major faults with the algorithm. A system wi ll therefore be considered 
strong if the only attack that can be mounted on the system is a brute force 
method, whereby every key in the key space is tried until the correct one is found. 
Thus given a strong system it is imperative to have a large key space. 
The auctioning system Is dealing with sensi tive data, but at most this wil l be staff 
cards, id numbers or credit card numbers. The fl ow of economic transactions could 
not be compared to that of a large corporation and hence it can be concluded that 
the type of attack on the system would not come from such a large organization. As 
has been mentioned before the benefits of the attack mounted on the auctioning 
system must outweigh the costs. Bear in mind that this was included in the design 
and development of the application, and therefore some issues that would be 
contentious (such as authorization and verification) in other protocols and systems 
are not so here. 
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Symmetric Key length 
There are a number of ways in which this brute force method can be achieved. It 
can be implemented as distributed software that ca n be placed on all the machines 
on a university campus. These machines could run the application trying different 
keys when they are not in use. This type of attack would not cost any money, as 
the machines are free to use and usually idle. Some dedicated students could 
mount this attack over a weekend. At the other end of the scale trans-natlonal 
corporations and governments could create specific hardware to perform the task of 
finding a key. It essentially boils down to two resources, time and money. They are 
indirectly proportional in mounting an attack on a system. The table below, from 
[B.Schneir, 1996] shows one the estimated cost of a brute force attack for 
symmetric keys of increasing length. 
Cost / length 40 bits 56 bits 64 bits 128 bits 
$100000 2 seconds 35 hours 1 year 1019years 
$1000000 .2 seconds 3.5 hours 37 days 1018years 
$100000000 2 mllll -seconds 2 minutes 4 days 1016years 
$10 Tri ll ion 0.02 mlcro- 1 millisecond 0.3 second 1011years 
seconds 
FIg 5.7.1 Average Time for brute force attack In 1995 
As one can see the, the more money one has to spend, the easier it gets to mount 
a hardware brute force attack. These estimates were made in 1995, so they are 
now redundant, as no one can predictably measure the speed increase in hardware, 
with its associated drop in price for more than two to three years. This means it has 
become considerably cheaper to break larger key lengths over the past five years. 
Another paper by [M.Blaze, et an, which is about a year older than the figure above 
shows how quickly these values must be re-assessed . 
Type of Attacker Cost 40 bits 56 bits 
Civilian Nil to $400 1 week Not feasible 
Small business $10 000 5 hours 38 years 
Corporation $300000 12 minutes 18 months 
Big Company $10 000 000 24 seconds 19 days 
Government $300000000 0.7 seconds 12 seconds 
Fig 5.7.2 ReVised average time brute fo rce attacks 
In 1997 a machine costing one hundred thousand U.S dollars was used to break the 
DES cryptosystem with a brute force attack. It took fifty hours, a year later, the 
price of the system had halved and it took twenty hours. DES was using a fifty-six-
bit key. Th is Is an indication how quickly tech nology changes. 
The facts that concern the key length are simply this, what information is being 
secured, how long does it need to be secured for, and who would attack it. Bearing 
this In mind one can apply it to the current problem. The auctioning system has 
data that will only be va l id for the lifetime of the current session and auction, which 
is measured In minutes and hours. Secondly the Information is not extremely 
important so the kind of attacker that would be attracted wou ld be a sma ll 
corporation or less. The auctioning system uses 128-bit key encryptlon (32 byte) 
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for the symmetric ciphers RC6 and MARS. The reasoning has already been 
provided, but to keep up with advances in technology these can be upped to 256-
bit keys. This should maintain the security of the current session keys for a long 
enough period, against advances by the intended attackers. 
Asymmetric Key lengths 
AS public key algorithms release their public keys, they are susceptible to a 
plaintext attack. For this reason the keys in general have to be longer than 
symmetr ic algorithm keys. In fact public keys need to be exponentially longer to 
attain the same level of security. Most of these keys are also based on the fact that 
factoring large numbers and finding their prime decomposition Is rather difficult at 
the present time. So one does not need to find the key, one Is required to discover 
the pr imes that the key has been created with. 
Symmetric Key Length Asymmetric Key LenQth 
56 bits 384 bits 
64 bits 512 bits 
80 bits 768 bits 
112 bits 1792 bits 
128 bits 2304 bits 
Fig 5.7.3 Key Length compansons for eqUiva lent secunty [B.Schnc ler , 19961 
This had lead to the rise in specia l factoring algorithms: the quadratic Sieve, and 
the number field sieve are but a few. Currently the research in this field is 
exploding and this has resu lted in large numbers being faetored at quicker speeds. 
Currently 130-digit to 140-digit numbers are being faetored , which means that RSA 
512 bit keys are at risk . Admittedly it takes a lot of computation and resources, but 
It has been shown that these keys are breakable. Therefore one shou ld not be 
complacent with current key lengths, The level of security should be determined by 
the information being encrypted, and how long does it need to be secured for. As 
the key will be used to distribute session keys it has to last the length of the 
session and auction, The default is a 128 bit key, however one has the option to 
increase up to and including 4096 bit keys, which does take quite awhile, but wi ll 
guarantee security for at least the next five years, 
[B.Schneier, 1996] has recommended that in the year 2000, one shou ld have the 
fol lowing public key lengths, 1024, 1280 and 1536, These are against Ind ividual, 
corporation and government attacks respectively. This would have increased 
dramatically to 1280,1536,2048 against individual, corporation and government 
attacks respectively by the year 2005. These are just estimates but they do show 
the huge strides that are expected in the respective fields of tech nology and 
cryptana lyst. 
In t he light of all this one should not forego the unknown. We may be on the verge 
of a monumentous discovery involving the faetoring of numbers that may yield 
public key algorithms defunct. 
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5.8) Protocol Attacks 
There are a number of techniques that could be employed to attack the current 
protocol. They are as follows: 
Eavesdropping 
Eve or t he undesirable listens to the communications cha nnel and tries to deduce 
some information about the information being sent. This can be performed in a 
number of ways. A network sniffer is a utility that catches all packets along a 
network l in e even if they are not destined to the current machine . Another method, 
which Is rather simple, is a technique by which an electronic device is placed 
around a section of the network cable. This then makes a copy of the packets being 
sent and diverts them to the attacker. 
Replay 
The attacker has some record of the messages sent along the communication 
channel. The attacker attempts to place these copied messages in the 
communication channel at a later stage and determine what occu rs when the 
message is received. 
Man in the middle 
The attacker posses the power to divert the commu nications channel and add or 
replace messages in th is cha nnel. The attacker usual ly rep laces the current 
message with his own message. The attacker sets up a block between the client 
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Fig 5.8. 1 Man in the Middle attack 
Server 
The server sends a message to the client (Ks); the man in the middle (Eve) 
intercepts this. This is replaced by (Ke), and forwarded to the cl ient. The client 
receives (Ke), and uses it to encrypt (Kc), as it is assumed to be the servers key. 
The client sends this message back to the server. However th is message is also 
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intercepted by Eve, whom decrypts this with the (Kd) key. Eve has now got a copy 
of (K,) and (K,) . Eve encrypts (K,) with the server's real key (K, ) and forwards it 
onto the server. The client and the server don't realise there is a problem, The man 
in the middle continues this process as he may decrypt and encrypt all messages 
between the client to the server . 
Miscellaneous 
The attacker may use other techniques to get keys to the algorithms from the 
client . For instance there are devices that can be pointed at computers from a 
distance away and can reproduce the state of the monitor or internal information. 
Another method would be to bribe or threaten a user for keys. 
5,9) Safeguards 
Now that one has a brief understanding of the attacks that may be mounted on the 
protocol, we wi ll d iscuss some measures that may be taken to avert such attacks. 
Authentication 
Authentication schemes provide the user's of protocols with authentication and 
confidential ity of the information sent and received . This results in the non-
repudiation property of the cryptosystem being met. Authentication is usually 
achieved by use of digital signatures and certificates, implemented through public 
key cryptosystems, 
In the current problem there are only two parties the server and the client. If one 
were to use digital certificates one would have to introduce a third trusted party 
known as the CA (Certificate Authority). This means that the problem space would 
now have grown, The server would have a certificate that supports its claim to be 
who they are, this has been distributed to the server from the CA. The client then 
requests the CA certifies the certificate, acknowledging the server's claim. All this 
extra work is not a necessity in the current problem and would place an extra 
burden on network and computational resources. 
One should understand that authentication and key exchange are two sepa rate 
problems that most people seem to lump together. Authentication is about 
convinci ng the client that they are communicating with the intended server. Key 
exchange is the sharing of a single key between th e two parties, As [M.Bel lare, 
Progaway, 1995] stated, "Most of the time t he entity authent ication Is Irrelevant...". 
What is really a concern is making sure that one can securely share a key between 
two parties. Authentication will help in this matter, but it will not achieve this goal. 
It will go a long way to resolving the man in the middle attack. 
Averting Replay 
Replay attacks occurs when the attacker copies some messages from the client or 
server and then uses them at a later date. The messages w ill fall Into two 
categories, those to the client, and those to the server . If the messages are to the 
client or server It does not really matter as the session key only lasts for the 
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duration of the auction. Thereafter it Is changed and the message wil l be ignored, 
as it cannot be decrypted. An alternate client cannot use the current client's 
message, as they will have a different session key and hence the message will not 
be decrypted. This prevents the hijacking of sessions from currently joined clients. 
The message can only be a bid message and if it is replayed it will be exactly the 
same information as contained in the last bid, in which case it will have no affect on 
the auction. 
To prevent replay attacks it is suggested that one uses time stamping or a counter 
in the message so that the host can differentiate from the previous messages. 
There are a number of problems with t ime sta mping . The first is that It 
compromises the system as the attacker will now know a partial extract from the 
message as it is not too difficult to determine the time on a machine. This will make 
it easier to mount an attack on the encryption protocol. Secondly, even if the 
counter or time stamp is hashed it is going to increase the size of the message, 
thereby using larger bandwidth for communication. The aim is to use as little 
resources as possible, and to do this the messages are as sma ll as possible. To 
avoid having to use time stamps or counters the auctioning system commu nication 
was developed so that a client may place a bid, which is time stamped once it is 
received , All messages thereafter, even if they are a repeat, will not be val id unless 
the bid Is higher than the previous bid. The use of threads and unique session keys 
has averted the risk of replay attacks. 
Replay and authentication are both issues that need to be resolved when dealing 
with protocol development, However for the current problem I believe that these 
matters are not an issue. 
5.10) Hardware vs. Software 
The implementation of this problem has been software approach, whereby the 
algorithms have been manually coded and executed. These days with the huge 
increase in digital communication many organizations find that the software 
implementation is not efficient enough. This has resulted in algorithms being 
implemented in hardware. These come as chips or add on ca rds that allow one to 
plug them straight into the system. Each of the algorithms that will be discussed In 
the following chapters gives an indication of the software implementation speed at 
which they operate . 
It is obvious that anything specifically created in a hardware format is going to out 
perform the software implementation. There are many companies moving into this 
territory and I assume that it won't be long before ha rdware encryption takes over 
from software, 
As one can see from the table most hardware implementations will be designed for 
specific hardware platforms or operating systems. However they are incredible 
quick, and the cost to the user of encryptlon will be less than a software 
implementation which will slow the computer. This will result in more memory and 
CPU's for the server involved. The disadvantage of hardware Implementations is 
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that the are not easily upgradeable, as opposed to the softwa re implementation 
which ca n be changed and simply recompiled. 
Hardware Encryption Software Encryption 
Fast Slow 
CPU independent CPU intensive 
Cost effective (Cheap) Expensive 
System dependant Portable 
Fixed Modifiable 
Fig 5.10.1 Advantages / Disadvantage of hardware and software encryptlOn 
The PIJNENBURG Company deals In these kind of add on ca rds, as example it is 
interesting to see the specifications and feature attained by such a card . 
pcc- ISES featu res: 
ARM7TDMI® Microprocessor with 128KB RAM 
Embedded Cryptographic Accelerators 
RSA up to 4096 bits, DES, 3DES and SAFER, MD5, SHA- 1 and RIPEMD 
True Random Number Generator, Tamper Securi ty Circuit 
Function Speed 
RSA - 1024 bit 300/ sec 
DES (ECB) 400 Mbps 
Triple Des (ECB) 400 Mbps 
MD5 375 Mbps 
SHA-l 300 Mbps 
Random Number SO Kbps 
Fig 5.10.2 Example of speeds of encryption In a hardware ImplementatIOn. 
[http://www.pijnenburg.nl/. on line] 
As one can see, the performance of this card is exceptionally fast in all 
cryptographic aspects . The card price is estimated at approximately four hundred 
US dollars. This is far cheaper than the cost of a new computer, which would deal 
exclusively with encrypt ion features of a server. 
These types of add-on cards will become more prevalent in the future and will 
invariably become programmable. This will enable any bugs or problems to be 
fixed. This will increase the ease of use of encryption and make it a com mon place 
feature for all network communication In the future. 
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5.11) Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the types of problems and issues that face the designer 
of a security protocol. The requirements of the current protocol were discussed and 
the resultant solution Investigated. This included the types of algorithms used, what 
they required and how they interlocked to create the finished cryptographic 
protocol. 
The major weakness of the protocol is its vulnerability to the " man in the middle" 
attack. However as this type of attack is very hard to mount and the rewards are 
small it was decided not to persue an expensive third party authentication method, 
which is currently the only known way to defend against such attacks. 
In the sections that follow I wi ll discuss in detail the RSA algorithm, its 
Implementation and its problems 
Secure Internet Auctioning System Page 87 
RSA 
6 ) RSA 
W.Diffie and M.Hellman first brought public key cryptography to light in the paper 
"New Directions in Cryptography". In nineteen seventy-six they patented (U.S 
Patent #4,200,770) the idea of public key cryptography. In their system all users 
have a publ ic and a secret key. The public key is made avai lable to all , and the 
secret key remains private. Anyone may encrypt a message using the public key, 
but only the secret key of the recipient of the message, will perform decryption. 
The RSA cryptosystem Is based on this theory and was publicised in 1977 by 
R.Rivest, A.Shamir and L.Adelman. It was patented in 1983 (U. S. Patent 
#4,405,829), and it is patented in a number of countries. The security of RSA is 
based squarely on the difficulty of factorising large numbers. " I n Scientific 
American, Martin Gardner described the RSA scheme as "A New Kind of Cipher That 
Would Take Millions of Years to Break." Oddly enough, just 60 years earlier in 1917, 
the same journal published an article touting the Vigenere ciphers as "impossible of 
translation". (D.Denning, 1996] 
An interesting aside is something brought to light in "The Code Book" by S.Singh. It 
has been shown that RSA and public key cryptosystems were actually invented in 
the late sixties by the British Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS). Three 
gentlemen by the names of M. Williamson, C.Cocks and J.Ellis had discovered this 
technology and due to the secrecy act, were forbidden to talk about it. It was also 
for this very reason that their ideas were not patented, as this would mean the 
cryptosystem would fall into enemy hands. In 1997 this department revea led the 
truth at a press release. 
This tragedy is best described by one of the men involved. As related by J.Ellis in a 
secret document, "Cryptography is a most unusual science. Most professional 
scientists aim to be the first to publish their work, because it is through 
dissemination that the work realises its value. In contrast, the fullest value of 
cryptography is rea l ised by minimising the information available to potential 
adversaries" (S.Singh,1999] 
6.1) Overview 
The RSA cryptosystem has been in existence for over twen ty yea rs and has 
withstood large amounts of cryptanalysts. Admittedly It wi l l not always be the de 
facto standard in asymmetric cryptosystems, but currently there is no better 
solution to the key exchange problem. RSA is part of the following international 
standards; International Standards Organziation (ISO), the Consultative Committee 
in Internationa l Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT) X.S09 security standard, the 
Society fo r Wolrdwide Interbank Financial Telecommunicat ions (SWIFT) and the 
ANSI X9.31 sta ndard for the u.s banking industry [RSA FAQJ. 
This is the expUcit reason that I used the RSA cryptosystem. It has been the 
dominant force over the last twenty years and its Impact on cryptology will be felt 
for years to come. The interesting thing about this algorithm, is the fact that it has 
never been proven absolutely secure. It has been based on a difficult problem that 
is commonly known as a one way function . A one way function is very easy to 
eva luate. However it is difficul t to find the Inverse of the function. A trap door one 
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way function uses the same principle but with a back door. It is easy to calcu late 
F (x), and difficult to find F -l(y), unless one has some extra information which 
makes the inverse possible. Almost all public-key cryptosystems are based on this 
premise of assumed existence of one way, trap door functions. 
The major flaw in the thinking is that is has not been proven mathematically that 
these functions exist. If a method is found to calculate F - I(y) easily the 
cryptosystem would be rendered useless. However thus far no major breakthroughs 
have been discovered for inverting RSA's supposed one way trap door function. The 
key here is that it is "a lmost impossible", but not purely impossible. This fact will be 
revealed later in the cryptanalytic attacks that are mounted on the RSA 
cryptosystem . 
Even when RSA lies a broken cryptosystem, the way in which it has been used, and 
the amount of effort that has been utilized In the examining of the system still 
makes it worthy of studying. This is the prime reason I included the most popular 
and simple asymmetric cryptosystem currently in use on a global scale. 
6.2) Theory 
The RSA cryptosystem is based on a number of mathematical premises, which need 
to be examined before one can discuss the cryptosystem. 
GCD 
An integer a is known as common divisor if it divides two integers x and y, i.e. 
where 
a lx and a ly 
The Greatest Common Oivisor (GCO) is expressed as the following. 
a ~ gcd( x, Y ) 
where a is the greatest common divisor of the two integers x and y. For Instance, 
x = 20, the divisors of x are: 1,2,4, 5,10. 
y = 28, the divisors ofy are: 1,2,4,7,14. 
The greatest common divisor, gcd(20,28) = 4. 
Note that when another va lue z divides x and y, but is not the greatest common 
divisor, then z divides the greatest common divisor. In the current example 
z = 1 or 2 
The GCO is relatively simple to determine when the numbers are small, however 
when the numbers being dealt with become large it becomes difficult to determine 
the GCO. The best solution to this problem can be found in the Euclidean algorithm. 
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Euclidean Algodthm 
The Greek mathematician Euclid published the Euclidean algorithm in approximately 
300B.C. 
The algorithm is a repetitive loop of division until the end result Is attained. Its 
formal definition for (x, y) is as follows: 
x = yql + rl 
y = g2r 1 + r2 
rl = gJr2 + r3 
" " 
" " 
r m-2 = rm-lqm + rm 
r m 'l = r mqm+l + 0 
0< rl < y, y < x 
o < r2< rl 
o < rJ < r2 
0 < rm < r m_l 
This repetitive division yields the greatest common divisor of x and y as the value 
rm· The initial value of gl multiplied by y is the greatest whole number less than x, 
and rl is the remainder. 
An example to find the gcd(8246,2326) 
8246 ~ 2(2326) + 1268 
2326 ~ 1(1268) + 1058 
1268 ~ 1(1058) + 210 
1058 ~ 5(210) + 8 
210 ~ 26.8 + 2 
8 ~ 4.2 + 0 
gcd(8246,2326) ~ 2 
o < 1268 < 2326 
o < 1058 < 1268 
o < 2 10 < 1058 
o < 8 < 210 
0<2<8 
Note: The running time of this algorithm is determined by O«log n) 2) 
Now that one has this method for determining the greatest common divisor, what 
can be achieved with it. Before one may continue it is necessary to describe a field. 
Definition: A field is a commutative ring in which all non-zero elements have 
multiplicative inverse [D.Stlntston]. 
Z5 is a fie ld, in which all operations on the fie ld are modulo 5. 
I Ve· -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
0 1 2 3 4 
~e+ 5 6 7 8 9 
Fig 5.2 Z5 field 
One can see from the table above what va lues ou tside the field Z5 equate to inside 
the Field. Le - 4 mod (5) = 1. ReturnIng to the definition, which states that inverses 
must exIst in the field. The extended Euclidean algorithm determines these inverses 
in the current field, 
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Extended Euclidean Algorithm 
The extended Euclidean algorithm is based on the fo llowing theorems: 
If x E Zn ,there exists a yE Z,. which is a multiplicative inverse of x . Le. 
x. y =1 in Zn. 
It fol lows that If gcd(x,n) = 1 (No other elements in the ring are a divisor for x), 
then the inverse of x in Zn Is unique. 
The extended Euclidean algorithm is as fol lows: 
Calculate to to tm as follows: 
Ca lculate the Euclidean and Extended at the same time. 
r. = r'.2 - Q.-l . rH 
!!! t •. 2 . r1 - qj.! . t'_1 r, (mod ro) 
.Ii ( t._ 2 - q H ' t._ j ) rl (mod ro) 
• t, ' rl (mod ro) 
Calculate the Euclidean algorithm for (x , y), substituting the values of q. 
determined above into the following formu lae. Calculate to to tm as follows: 
to= 0, t 1=1, 
t, = (to- q, . t,) (mod n) 
t, = (t,- q, . t,) (mod n) 
" " " 
tm= (tm-z - qm- l . tm-d (mod n) 
If rm :;t 1, then there is no inverse, If this is not the case then the inverse is 
tm (mod n) = a-I In Zn 
An example (47563,31387), calculate Euclidean first to see if an inverse exists, 
Eucl idean 
47563 = 1.31387 + 16176 
31387 = 1.16176 + 15211 
16176 = 1.15211 + 965 
15 211 = 15.965 + 736 
965 = 1.736+ 229 
736 = 3.229 + 49 
229 = 4.49 + 33 
49 = 1.33 + 16 
33 = 2.16 + 1 
16 = 16. 1 + 0 
Extended Euclidean 
t, =(to- q, . t.) (mod n) = (0-1. 1) ( mod 47563) = 
47562 
t, = (1 - 1.47562) (mod 47563) = 2 
t, = (47562 - 1.2) (mod 47563) = 47560 
t, = (2- 15. 47560) (mod 47563) = 47 
t, = (47560 - 1. 4 7) (mod 4 7563) = 47513 
T, = (47- 1.47513) (mod 47563) = 197 
t. = (47513-4.197) (mod 47563) = 46725 
t, = (197-1.46725) (mod 47563) = 1035 
tlO = (46725-2 .1035) (mod 47563) = 44655 
(47563,31387) = 1, therefore an inverse exists, so conti nuing with the extended 
Euclidean, the inverse is tlo = 44655 
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Therefore 31387"1 in Z"7563 = 44655. This algorithm is one of the core building 
blocks of RSA. However there is sti ll a little more theory required to cement the 
process. 
Primes 
A Prime numbers has the special property, which is that, it may only be divided by 
itself or the number one. Re latively prime numbers are two integers x,y such t hat 
gcd(x,y) = 1. They are prime to one another, this does not mean they are prime. 
The Euler function, 0(n), denotes the number of integers in the interval 1..n, which 
are relatively prime to n. If p is prime then 0 (p) = p ~ 1. The Euler function is also 
multiplicative, so that 0 (mn) = 0(m) 0(n). 
The Chinese Remainder Theorem 
The Chinese remainder theorem states that if one has a number of relatively prime 
positive integers (Pl .. Pk), which are the prime factorization of n (n= P t P2 .. Pk), one 
can use this to solve the set of equations, 
" " 
Which have a unique solution x, with x < n. So, for an arbitrary a < P and b < q 
(where P and q are prime), there exists a unique x, where x is less than pq, such 
that x . a (mod p), and x . b (mod q). 
The Euler Fermat Theore m 
If some integer x e Z'n, where (Z'n = {x e Zn, X-I exists in Zn}) , then 
x0{n) = 1 in Zn, and for every gcd(x,n)=l, x0(n) ;e: 1 (mod n) 
fermat's Theorem 
If p is a prime number and x a positive integer, then 
gcd(x,p) = 1, and xP' l • 1 (mod p), and XPE X (mod p). 
Its a lso Interesting to note that if p is prime then Z'p Is a group of order p- l. 
This theory is what the RSA algorithm is based, and all will be much clearer once it 
has been discussed. 
6.3} RSA Algorithm 
The following steps are used to implement the RSA algorithm 
1.) Alice generates two large random prime numbers p and q . 
2.)n= pq 
3.} 0(n) = 0 (pq) = (p-l)( q- l) 
4 .) Alice then picks a random integer a such that gcd (a, 0 (n» = 1 
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The public key is then (a ,n ). This is used to encrypt information using the fo l lowing 
encryption algorithm 
E(a,n) (m) = mOl mod n 
This rai ses the message value to the power of a in the field Z n. The Chinese 
rema inder theorem guarantess a unique solution. This means that on ly the current 
message wi ll result in the corresponding ciphertext message. 
5.) Allce then determines the inverse of (a -I: b) In Z 0(n) ' 
The secret key is then (b , n ). This is used to decrypt In the fo llowing fashion: 
D{b,n) ( c ) = Cb mod n 
The decryption algorithm raises the ciphertext to the inverse of the key, thereby 
reverting it to its plaintext status. 
The entire secu rity of RSA lies one thing, which is the factorising of n to find the 
two primes. Withou t these primes one Is unable to find the Euler function, 0 (n ). 
The Euler function is the field in which Alice discovers the inverse of a. This inverse, 
b is the key to decrypting the encrypted messages. Please note that I I rn' 11 n, 
denotes mll mod n. 
Theorem : 
D (b.n) ( E ea.n) ( m » == m 
Proof: 
D(b."' (E, •. ", (m)) ~ « m') (mod n)) ' (mod n) 
~ (m) ,. (mod n ) 
Now b.a = l(mod 0 (n )), as b= a" ,where 0 (n )=(p -1)( q - 1) 
= 1 H(p -1)( q -1), where integer t > 1. 
= (m) l+t(p· l )(Q- l ) (mod n ) 
= m m t{p- l ){q- l ) (mod n) 
EO m ( mt0(n» (mod n ) 
As m exists in ZOI by Fermat m0(n ) i"i! 1 
~ m.(l' )(mod n ) 
~ m (mod n ) 
D{b.n) ( E{I.n) (m» = m 
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It wou ld probably easiest to show the working of RSA In an example . 
1.) Generate two primes p and q (211 ,2 51 ) 
2.) n = p .q = 211.251 = 52961 
3 . ) 0 (n ) = (p -1)( q- 1) = (210)(250 ) = 52500 
4.) Choose a , such that 1< a <52500 , a = 139 
Kp = (139,52691) is the public key, Now one has to determ ine the private key . 
5. ) Calculate the inverse of, using the extended Euclidean algorithm, 
Use Z 0 (n) as the field, in other words determine the inverse of (52500,136) , 
a " = b = 36259. 
The secret key is then K, = (36259,52691). 
The public key is given to Bob and anyone else who wants to communicate with 
Alice, Bob receives the key and decides to send Alice a message "Hello World! ". 
Now that this has been determined let us perform the encryption of the string 
"Hello World! ". One needs to convert these characters to numerical characters. 
Where, a= OO,b= 01, .. z=25, space=26,!=27 , For the sake of the example we will 





















To make things easier to work with, combine the letters into group of two. The 
numbers however must be smal ler than the values of n ( n= 52691 ), to prevent 
any problems, This resu lts in the following sequence of numbers that may be 
encrypted separately. 
0704,1111,1426,2214,1711,0327 
E(1 39,52691)(0704) = (0704)''' (mod 52691) = 13400 
E(t39,5269 1)(1111 ) = (1111) 13' (mod 52691) = 14823 
" " " 
E(l39,S2691) ( 1711) = (1711)'" (mod 52691) = 24843 
E(l39,S269 1)(0327) = (0327) 13' (mod 52691)= 40232 
The resultant encrypted message is: 
13400,14823,38303, 43817,248483, 40232 
27 
This is the message sent from Bob to Alice, On receiving it Alice decides to decrypt 
the message with the secret key Ks. 
D(36259,52691)(13400) = 
D(36259,52691)(14823) = 
(13400)3625'(mod 52691)= 704 
(14823)36259( mod 52691) = 1111 
and so on until the message received is 
0704,1111,1426,2214,1711,0327 
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which is the original message sent by Bob to Alice. 











The RSA cryptosystem that has been implemented in the auctioning application is in 
the RSACrypt.Java fi le. As the number dealt with can get very large [ have decided 
to use the new Java implementation of the Big Integer Class, as opposed to coding 
up my own class. The Big Integer class has been reworked in Java two and is 
incredibly fast and efficient. It would be unproductIve not to use the native support 
for large numbers. 
The Big Integer class will represent as large a number as one requires and allows all 
the required mathematical functions to be performed. " Immutable arbitrary-
precision integers. All opera tions behave as if Big Integers were represented in 
two's-complement notation ( like Java's primitive integer types). BigInteger provides 
analog ues to all of Java's primitive integer operators, and al l relevant methods from 
java. lang.Math. Additional ly, Biglnteger provides operations for modular arithmet ic, 
GCD calculation, prlmality testing, prime generation, bit manipulation, and a few 
other miscellaneous operations." [Java 1.2 Help files]. 
The class has a number of functions and methods. The class stores the clients 
Information, this includes, p, q, n, 0(n) and the public and secret keys. They are all 
of type Biglnteger. 
When the class Is Intlallzed for the first time It ca lls the method to generate keys 
IIRSACrypt.Java - generate_Keys(size,error,seed) method 
p = generate_prime(slze,error,seed) 
q = generate_prime(size,error,seed) 
n = geCN(p,q) 
phi = geCphi(p,q) 
pub/ickey = geCA(phi) 
privatekey= geClnverse(publickey,phi) 
The p and q va lues are generated, once this has been done the value of n Is then 
determined by calling the geCN(p,q) method. The value of phi is determined by 
ca lling the geCPhl(p,q) method. The public key Is determined by ca ll ing the 
geCA(phi) method, and the private key Is determined by ca lling the 
geClnverse(publickey,phi) method. 
Generate_prime(size,error,seed) 
This method generates the random large prime numbers for RSA. 
Random Number (seed) 
if (Error> 99) then Err = 99 
else if (Err < 1) then Err = 1 
return Random Biglnteger(Size,Err) 
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The method makes sure the error value is not out of range, and then generates a 
random prime number. The error va lue determines how sure one is that the 
random number is prime using the Solovay Strassen test. 
It is interesting to note that the number of primes five hundred and twelve bits long 
or less is equal to 1015°, which is more than the number of atoms in the known 
universe [RSA FAQ) . 
This method multiplies the two BigInteger values and returns the result. As has 
been mentioned before the BigInteger values have explicit functions for 
mathematica l functions. 
Return p. multiply( q) 
This method subtracts one from p and q respectively and multiplies them together 




This method generates a random public key value between 1 and t he phi value. 
This value is then checked to make sure that the greatest common divisor of t he 
va lue and phi is one . The key generated is also a prime number, which should 
mean that the gcd test succeeds. 
Do { 
Public key = generate_ prime(sizeOf(phi) -1,error) 
}while Not (gcd(public key,phi) =1) 
GeCB(phl, a) 
This method returns the value b, given a and phi. The va lue of b is simply a-I. 
Return geLlnverse(phi,a) 
Get_lnverse(publickey, phi) 
The inverse function is inverts a va lue in the phi field. It calls the function 
geCPower(xI 8,n). This function is also used by the encrypt and decrypt methods. 
The public key value is simply raised to the power of negative one, thereby 
determining the inverse . This is then returned. 
Return get_Power(public key, Biglnteger(- l), phi) 
This uses the functionality of the Biglnteger class to perform all t he hard work. It 
uses the mod-pow function of the Blglnteger class. This will raise a va lue to a 
certa in power and then mod it by a mod va lue . In doing 50 it meets the 
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requirements of the RSA algorithm, as all operations have to be modulus the n 
va lue. 
Retrun x.modpow(a,n) 
Xa (mod n) is t he result. 
RSAEncrypt(plaintext,public Key,n) 
At the heart of the encryption is this method. Which accepts a string cal led 
plain text, this is then converted into a 8igInteger. This plaintext value Is then 
raised to the power of the public key modulus n. The result is returned as a string 
value 
Return geCPower(BigInteger(plaintext),public keY,n) 
RSADecrypt(ciphertext,secret Key,n) 
The decryption method works in exactly the same way, but to make things clear, it 
has been coded up with a different name. 
Return geCPower(8iglnteger(ciphertext),secret keY,n) 
There are a number of methods for storing and retrieving the public key, private 
key and n values as strings and integers. 
6.5) RSACrypt Usage 
Each of the client applets and the server creates an instance of the RSACrypt class 
as it is central to t he encryption process. This is done in the server's main thread in 
the serverlistener method. A copy of this object is passed to the auctionhandler and 
each of the clienthandler threads. On initialization the keys are generated for use 
between all the cl ients. This Is only changed at the end of an auction or on the 
command of the server application administrator. When a client connects to the 
server, the server sends a message with the public key (Kp,N) to the client (See 
Chapter 4.13). 
The client creates an instance of the RSACrypt class. On receiving the message 
containing the public key, it extracts these key values and places them In the 
RSACrypt class variables, through the get/set methods. The client then generates 
the symmetric key. This key Is of type byte, and is made up of thirty- two bytes by 
default. The key is divided into pieces of four bytes each, these four byte values are 
then converted to single integer va lues. (Le 32 bytes = 8 integers) . The client then 
individually encrypts each integer using RSAEncrypt and the public keys . Once all 
the integers have been encrypted they are sent back to the server. The 
CryptUb.Java library performs the converting of Integer to bytes and vice versa, as 
well as a number of other useful cryptographic functions. 
//CllentEngine.Java - setEncryptionO Method 
For (loop=O;loop<sizeOf(Symmetric Key)14;loop++) { 
Integer = ConvertTolnteger(SymmetdcKey[foop*4]) 
Message += RSAEncrypt(Integer, Public Key, N) 
} 
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The server receives the encrypted integer values. Each integer value is decrypted 
using the private key, until all the integers have been dealt with. The integer values 
are then converted back to a byte format. All the bytes make up the resulting 
symmetric key, which is used for the symmetric algorithm. Only once the 
symmetric key has been received, does the usage of RSA stop and the symmetric 
cryptosystem takes over. If the server recreates RSA session keys they are 
distributed to all new clients as the start, but not clients that are already 
communIcating using the symmetric cryptosystem . 
6.6) Timing 
The timing of the algorithm is interesting to look at because it shows one how fast 
the encryptlon and decryptlon is and the kind of pressure it is placing on the CPU. It 
Is also useful for one to compare against hardware implementations of the RSA 
encryption which show how much faster it could be (Chapter 5.10, Fig 5.10.2) 
32 bits 128bits 256 bits 512 bits 
Encrypt 220ms 5820ms 32370ms 217610ms 
KBlts/ Sec 142.04 21.47 7.63 2.29 
Decrypt 220ms 5830ms 32790 214050 
KBits/Sec 142.04 21.48 7.61 2.33 
Fig 6.6. 1 Times for 1000 encryption and decryption's of RSA. 
Using equal sized bits for P and Q and large A. 
As one may see from above table the encryption and decryption figure are similar 
for the different keys. All get exponentlally slower as the size of the key increases. 
One can see however how slow in general the actual operations are. As related by 
[B.Schneier,1996], RSA 512 bit is attaining up to Sixty four kilobits a second in a 
hardware Implementation, which is Significantly faster than the software 
implementation. 
32 bits 128 bits 256 bits 512 bits 
Encrypt 60ms 220ms 490ms 1980ms 
KBits/Sec 520.80 568.17 510 .19 252.51 
Decrvot 280ms 6310ms 32680 218380ms 
KBits/Sec 111.60 19.81 7 .64 2.28 
Fig 6.6.2 Times for 1000 encryption and decryption's of RSA. 
Using equal sized bits for P and Q . but a very small e. 
The timi ng of the RSA encryption and decryption functions was performed on a 
Pentium 11 450MHZ CPU with 196MB ram. Each encryption and decryption is 
performed one thousand times to get a good average. 
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Optimization 
The classes used for the operation are all system classes and therefore are as quick 
as possible. The only other speed-ups will occur from smaller numbers and hence 
quicker operations. On average public key encryption is of the order 0(n2), private 
key decryption takes time 0(n3 ), and the key generation takes the longest with an 
order of magnitude of O(n') [RSA FAQ] 
One method suggested by Shamir [H.Gilbert , et al] is by fiddling with the public key 
exponent. One chooses equal size p and q va lues, but the value of a (xa(mod n» is 
chosen to be small , and it meets gcd(a,(p-l)(q-1)=1. In some cases this a has 
even been chosen as sma ll as three. This will mean that the encryption of the 
message is Incredibly qu ick. However this does not decrease the speed of 
decrypt ion as the inverse (secret key) wi ll inva riably be a la rge number. 
Another method is the use of different sized p and q 's. Whereby the val ue of p Is 
half the size of q. However this m ethod is susceptible to attack as discussed by 
[M.Joyle & J.J.Quisquater, 1997] and will not be discussed. 
6.7) Attacks on RSA 
RSA has been checked, analysed, pulled apart and attacked in many different ways, 
but none of these attacks have actually crippled the cryptosystem . There are one or 
two main lines of attack, but most seem to attack the improper implementation of 
the cryptosystem. 
There have been many attacks over the past twenty years and al l are not relevant 
to this discussion. Only a few of the main attacks wil l be discussed here . 
Factorization 
The non -factorization of n (n=pq) into its component va lues of p and q is the basis 
of the security of the algorithm, and also its main point of attack. One must realise 
though that the difficulty of this factorlng problem is actually a conjecture, and 
furthermore it has never been proven that one needs to factor n to find the 
decryption exponent. 
One asks how hard is it to discover the factors of the modulus n. Once these have 
been discovered , 0 (n) is easily determined and b = a -I (mod 12'( n» ca n be found. 
Determining these factors is commonly known as a brute force attack as one tries a 
huge number of solutions until the correct one is found . The factoring of large 
numbers is related by [D.Boneh] as " ... one of the most beautiful problems of 
computatonal mathematics. N 
The factorlng of large numbers has been getting better every year due to a 
combination of things. The technology used to implemen t the factoring of numbers 
is getting quicker, as well as cheaper, and the algorithms used are becoming more 
efficient and powerful. The Quad ratic sieve the fastest-known algorithm for 
numbers less than 110 digits. The fastest algorithm for digits above this is the 
Number field sieve (NFS). As an indication, t he General number fie ld sieve, which 
has factored 132 digit numbers (Approximately RSA 512 bit), has a running t ime of 
exponential ((c +0(1»nl13109213n), where c<2, on n bit Integers. {A.K .Lenstra, et 
al], relates a discussion of the Number field sieve. However the interesting thing to 
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note here is that the NFS is generally considered ten times faster than the QS for 
larger numbers. 
"In March 1994, a 129-digit (428-bit) number was factored using the double large 
prime variation of the mu ltiple polynomial QS [66J by a team of mathematicians led 
by Lenstra. Volunteers on the Internet ca rried out the computation: 600 people and 
1600 machines over the course of eight months, probably the largest ad hoc multi -
processor ever assembled . The calculation was the equivalent of 4000 to 6000 
mips-years" (B.SchneierJ . This means that for anyone wi l ling to spend a few million 
dollars it is within the rea lm of posslbJl!ty to break a 512-blt RSA encryption . Each 
year the price of the hardware drops, the speed increases and the size of the 
numbers to be facto red Increases. 
For the purpose of the current protocol it wou ld take a rather long t ime to factorise 
the required values. The length of the auction is measu red in hours and minutes, 
and hence so Is the RSA session key. The time taken wou ld require days and 
months to determine, which means that by the time the decryption exponent was 
discovered it would be out of date for the current auction. 
Revealing decryption exponent 
This may seem trivial at first, but it is relevant to show how the revealing of the 
secret key wou ld result In the cryptosystem fa iling . This is described in [O.Boneh, 
Pg3] , but if one does have the decryption exponent b , it seems pointless 
determining and factoring n, as one will be able to decrypt all messages. 
However if the encryptJon and decryption exponents (public and private keys) 
change often and the value of n is constant it is shown that by using the Chinese 
remainder theorem and by guessing one can find the factors (p and q). However 
this will take the order of 0(n 3 ) . The attack on a common modulus Is described In 
[O .BleichrnBacher, et a/][O. Boneh] and [M.loyle & l.l.Quisquater, 1997]. 
The only way that one could get the decryption exponent from the auction server 
would be to have some control over the system It Is running on. As Is indicated In 
most security speCifications, if an intruder has access to the machine the system Is 
executing on no security may be guaranteed. In other words, all bets are off. The 
entire protocol Is designed at maintaining secure communication between the client 
and the server. The server is assumed to be a relative ly secure environmen t . If the 
server is unfaithful and reveals this information then noth ing may be done. 
Discovering 0 (n) 
It has also been suggested that one guesses the values of (p -l) and (p-l), one 
could then use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find the Inverse of the 
encryption exponent. To find these values though would be just as difficult as 
factoring n . There are two equations available to finding the factors of n. 
n=p.q (1) 
0(n ) = (p -1)( q -1) (2) 
with q= nIp from (1) substituted into (2), we have 
Secure Internet Auctioning System 
0(n) ~(p-1)(n/p- 1) 
0(n) ~ n - p - n / p + 1 
p' - np + n - p + 0 ( n )p ~ 0 
p' + (0 (n ) - 1 - n)p + n ~ 0 
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Expanding the right side of the eqn. 
multiply by p, and take to the left side. 
The roots of this equation would give one the values of p and, as n is known, the 
value of q drops out. However before this can be solved one needs the value of 
0(n) . As it has already been stated the value of 0(n) is therefore just as difficult to 
determine as the factorising of n, and one would need to discover 0(n) to solve the 
above equation. 
The same Idea holds for this attack as it does for the factorlng of n. It rea lly boi ls 
down to the feasibility of the attack, the time required and the general lifetime of 
t he key . As it wou ld take huge fisca l sum, a large amount of t ime and a lot of 
effort, it would be pOintless mounting an attack where the keys last hours and the 
information encrypted would not be sufficient to recoup the costs. 
Small Encryption Exponent 
To increase the speed of encryption the size of the encryption exponent is made 
sma ll ((ma) where a very smal l). In some cases a=3 Is used, but 216+1=65537 is 
the most common value (This is even used in the SWIFT implementation). As this 
encryption exponent is small it will be easier to encrypt information, as (mil) where 
a is small, is easy to calculate. However the decryption not be as quick as the value 
of b (decryption exponent) will not be small. 
The attack for th is method is based on D.Coppersmlth Theorem. "Let N be a integer 
and Zx be a manic polynomial d. Set X = N1fd ' e for some e>O. Then given <N,f>, 
one can find all integers jXol < X satisfying F(xo)=O mod N. " [D.BonehJ. 
This attack shows in some instance the attack can be quicker than a brute force 
attack, but it st il l t akes on exponential ru nning time to determine d [D.Boneh, 
G.Durfee]. The theorem proves that a sma ll exponent is susceptible to an attack, 
but due to the fact a small exponent is not used in the auction systems 
implementation of RSA this is not an issue . 
Brute Force 
It is certainly possible for a cryptanalyst to try every possible b until he stumbles on 
the correct one. Alternatively one could guess the plaintext and encrypt plaintext 
guesses until the exact same ciphertext appears . This would take a lot of time and 
effort, as it has been shown that a brute-force attack is even less efficient than 
try ing to factor n . 
The implementation of the protocol is used in such a manner that the plaintext 
encrypted by RSA on the clients side cannot be guessed. As this is a key created by 
the MD5 algorithm (See Appendix). This means that someone would have to first 
break MDS, guess the correct plaintext and key for MDS, and on ly then mount the 
plaintext attack on RSA. This is really infeasible and certain ly not efficient. 
Attempting all t he decryption exponents has two problems, the fi rst bei ng t hat t he 
exponent may not be found as one does not have 0 (n), and second ly even for t he 
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next few years guessing and attempting al l these numbers is beyond the power of 
computing . 
Timing Attack 
An attack that this algorithm is susceptible to is known as the Timing attack. One 
can measure the time it takes for the computer to decrypt messages received. This 
along wi t h the information pertaining to the system ca n lead one to determine t he 
suspected length of the decryption exponent. Armed with this information one wi ll 
be able to guess the range in which the decryption exponent lies. Knowing this 
range one can simply try all the elements in this range until the correct decrypt ion 
exponent is discovered. 
There are a lot of assumptions made here, and essentia lly the cryptanalyst needs to 
be able to record minute timing details from the decryption obj ect. This is rather an 
impractical attack for the current protocol as a lot of the information required would 
not be discernible from the server running the auctioning system. 
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6.8) Conclusion 
RSA has shown over the last twenty years of its existence that it is a relative ly 
secure asym metric cryptosystem and shou ld rema in for a few years yet. This is 
assuming that no major breakthroughs in factoring, or that any other attacks, are 
developed in the near future. One should not be complacent, but nothing has 
indicated that this will happen in the near future, and for the time being the 
primitive used in t he asymmetric cryptosystem is secu re. 
It has been shown how RSA has been implemented and what attacks may be 
mounted upon the protocol. The protocol was developed so that it minimised the 
effects of the attacks discussed on RSA. It should be impractical, infeasible in 
monetary and time constraints, to mount an attack on the auctioning system. 
The next chapter will examine the first symmetric key cryptosystem Re6 . 
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7) RC6 
RC6 is a block ciphert or symmetric cipher based on the fi ve-year-old ReS system 
invented by Ran Rivest, one of the designers of RSA. There are four operations that 
the algorithm depends on; XOR, addition, multiplication and rotation. 
RC6 was created to meet the AES requirements, the improved the security and 
efficiency of the algorithm. The RC series of ciphers has been undergoing revision of 
the algorithms. RC2 was the first algorithm released, and even to this day the 
workings of it are unknown, as a non-disclosure agreement is signed by anyone 
that uses it. The RC supposedly stands for "Rivest's cipher". 
7 .1) Overview 
The reason I decided to use RC6 as one of the two symmetric ciphers is that it has 
been based on a relatively secure foundation. The RC algorithms have been in 
existence for awhile, and are used to this day in many commercial applications. The 
RC5 algorithm has been around for a number of years and has proven to be 
re latively secure, with no serious fl aws. As RC6 Is a natura l progression of RCS, one 
hopes that it is stronger than its predecessor. 
RC6 is what's known as a block cipher. Block ciphers encrypt blocks of plaintext at 
a time. Stream ciphers, which are also symmetric cryptosystems, encrypt or 
decrypt single bits. The RC6 algorithm is also known as RC6 w/r/b. Where w stands 
for the size of the words being encrypted, r is the number of rounds the algorithm 
is for executed, and b is the size of the key in bytes. I have used the algorithm 
default here as it speeds up the encryption and decryption process. The defau lt 
values are w=32 and r =20. Essentially the algorithm uses thirty-two bit words and 
twenty rounds of operations. 
However before one can examine the algorithm, its implementation, and attacks 
against it, it is pertinent to look at the theory behind symmetric cryptosystems. 
7.2) Concepts 
These backg round concepts behind the block ciphers are useful for both of the 
algorith ms used in the auctioning application. As was discussed In chapter 5, 
confusion and diffusion is the aim of the encryption process and serves to hide 
statistical information . 
Bayes Rule 
This is based on what is called conditional probability. This in essence Is the 
occurrence of event A, based on the occurrence of another event B. As is standard 
notation, the probabi li ty of A occurring by itself is P(A), and the probability of A 
occurring given that B has occurred is written as P(AIB). 
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Bayes rule is as follows, 
P(AI B) = P(A)P(BIA) / P(B) , and P(B). O 
For a good discussion of this and all the required proofs refer to EL.Bain & 
J.EngeIHardt,1991]. This assumes that A's probability is dependent on 8's 
probability. Another variation of this is if A and B are Independent of one another, 
which would mean that P(AIB)=P(A). Th is is known as Independent events 
The reason that Bayes rule is important is that it relates directly to the secrecy of 
the cryptosystem. What this boils down to is that the secrecy of the encryption 
algorithm is based on the plaintext and the key. If any probability can be concluded 
from the clphertext about the plaintext without knowing the key, one then has a 
weak cryptosystem. 
Entropv 
Entropy is the measure of the amount of information in a message. The way in 
which It Is measured is by the probabi l ity distribution formulae. The formu la Log 2 
rn, Is commonly used where rn is the total amount of meanings for the current 
message. 
The entropy of a message is denoted by the function H(X) . One has to determine 
the probability distribution of all the possible messages, where Xl .. Xrn are all the 
messages. The probability of them occurring is P(xd .. P(xm ). H(X) is expressed as 
fo llows: 
H(X) = -L P(x,) 109, P(X,) 
I_l .. m 
This is useful as it gives an average amount of bits needed to encode the message. 
As an example consider three events that can occur with the following probabil ities, 
The entropy of this would be as follows: 
H(X) = -x109,X - ylog, y - zl09,Z 
V2 log 2 112 + 1/4 log 2% + 1f4log2 V4 
= (V2)1 + (V4)2 +(V4)2 
= 1.5 
Now that we have a definition of the entropy, what can we use it for? If one 
expands that equation to include something called Conditional Entropy it will 
become clear. 
Conditional Entropy 
Conditional entropy is the entropy of some X, given some value of Y, where Xt .• Xm 
and Yl"Ym are the random variables. 
H(XIY) =-L P(y,) (L P(xdy,) 109, P(x, IY,» 
J-1..m I_ I. .m 
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This formula determines the uncertainty of some value X, given V, where y eV. This 
Is averaged for all the values in the finite set Yl .. Ym. So if X was our plaintext, and V 
ou r ciphertext, what is the uncertainty of t he plaintext given that one knows the 
ciphertext. Conditional entropy al lows one to measure how difficult it is to 
determine the plalntext once It Is encrypted. 
Key Equivocation 
After examining the entropy of the plaintext and the ciphertext it is pertinent to 
discover the entropy of a key from the ciphertext. Using the standard notation 
where P is the finite set of the plaintext, C the finite set of ciphertext and K the 
keyspace 
H(KIC) = H(K) + H(P) H( C) 
Proof: See [D.Stinston] 
The uncertainty (entropy) of the key given the ciphertext Is, the uncertainty of the 
key and plalntext minus the uncertainty of the ciphertext (as Its known). The 
security of the cryptosystem lies on the entropy of the key. The higher the entropy 
the harder it is to determine the key, and thus harder to discover the plalntext. This 
is the reason that larger keys invariably mean better security as the entropy 
increases. 
Entropy of Languages 
The entropy of a language measures the information per letter that the language 
holds. This is denoted by Hl • 
Hl = lirn (H(X") / n) 
n- >"" 
Where Xn is a random set of letters of length n in the language L. This is an 
approximation, and studies have shown the English language to have an average of 
approximately 1.5 bits per a letter . With the knowledge of the entropy of the 
language encrypted, one has a good idea of the message type, and one can then 
Ignore keys that result in gibberi sh once the ciphertext is decrypted . These keys are 
known as spu rious keys. 
The reason the natural entropy of a language is important is that it allows one to 
work out the redundancy in the language. 
Redundancy of Languages 
This is the excess information in a natu ral language. In other words In an intelligent 
stri ng of a language, the measure of letters that are not actually adding to the 
information in the string. This is denoted by RL • 
Rl = 1- Hl / (Log, !PI) 
P is the probability of a random string in the natural language. As the Hl of English 
is between 1.0 < Hl < 1.5, one can approximate that Rl 
0.5 < Rl < 0.75 
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ThiS means that Engl ish is a highly redundant language, but as has been show n, so 
are all natural languages. As the ciphertext gives some information about the 
plaintext it is important to reduce this redundancy in the plaintext. The redundancy 
gives the cryptanalysts information regardi ng the plai ntext encrypted . 
Unicity Distance 
Unici t y distance attempts to find the minimum length of ciphertext for which a 
cryptanalyst will be able to determine an intel ligible pla intext solution . Unicity 
distance is given by the fo llowing formula 
u ~ H(K) / RL 
This is t he entropy of the cryptosystem, which is based on the key entropy, divided 
by the redundancy of the language. A good cryptosystem should aim to remove the 
redundancy of t he plaintext by using some form of compression. Since in the above 
formula , as RL tends to zero, the Unicity distance tends to infinity and it becomes 
almost impossible to determ ine the correct plaintext for the current ciphertext. 
Confusion & Diffusion 
As has been mentioned before a good cryptosystem incorporates the two properties 
of confusion and diffusion . Confusion hides all links and relationships between the 
plaintext, ciphertext and the key. Djffusion spreads the statistical information held 
in the plai ntext over the entirety of the ciphertext. 
Using these two properties, statistical , linear and differential cryptanalysis becomes 
difficult. How does one hide the information t hat can be determi ned by unicity 
distances, entropies and statist ica l examination? One of the most powerful methods 
Is by the use of a Feistel network. 
Feistel Networks 
I n th is methodolgy one ta kes the plain text and divides it into two equa l ha lves. 
These are commonly known as Land R, which stands for left and ri ght respectively. 
Each round in the algorith m (or loop of operations) involves a process whereby the 
left and right values are swapped. 
LH 1 1 RH 
• CD- I k;_l 
• 
<--L-,---; -,I L-I _ R-,---; -' 
Fig 7.2.1 Feistel Network 
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l.; = R,-I 
R, = l.;-I Ell F(RI-l ,K,) 
This process Is repeated from i= 1 to the max number of rounds. The function F, 
which is reversible, encrypts half the Information with the current round key. The 
trick comes with the XORing of t.... -I with the function F(R1_1,K1) as this is a XOR 
process it is reversible and as the algorithm proceeds the data originally held in R 
and L is spread repeatedly after each round, as well as encrypted, making it 
exceptionally hard to determine any statistical information about the original 
plaintext. 
S-Box 
$-Boxes or substitution boxes help In strengthening the security of an algorithm. An 
S-Box is usually an array of predefined numbers. The $-Box takes input from a 
function and maps this input to an element in the S-Box, resulting in a new output 
obtained from the S-Box. The input is used as the index value in an S-Box array. 
This step is a non-linear step, as the S-Box is some random data. The resulting 





F(x)= S-Box Value 
Fig 7.2.2 Extracting S-Box elements 
The larger the S-Box, the harder it is for someone to cryptanalyze the system. 5-
Boxes are especially strong if the information contained within them is random, and 
Independent of the key. 
ECB 
Electronic codebook (ECB) mode encrypts a block of plaintext at a time, If the 
message is too big it is broken into correct sized chunks, which are then, encrypted 
separately with the same key, 
The benefit of this method is that each block of ciphertext is independent of the 
rest so an error in one block will not propagate throughout the ciphertext. 
CBe 
Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode encrypts a block of text, which is first XORed 
with the previous block of ciphertext. Each block encrypted will be based on the 
plaintext and the previous block of ciphertext . 
The big problem with this method Is that if just one bit of Information Is lost in 
transmission, all following ciphertext will not decrypt correctly and the message wi ll 
be ru ined. 
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Other Modes 
There are a number of other methods including streams, output feedback (OFB) 
mode and cipher feedback (CFB) modes. However for a longer and more involved 
discussion please see [B.Schneier,1996]. The only mode encryptlon that Is of 
interest in this application is the ECB mode that is used. 
7.3) RC6 Algorithm 
The RC6 algorithm has two important parts, the actual encryption/decryption and 
the key schedu le. It is easier to discuss the key schedule first as it creates the S-
Box used for encryption and decryption based on the users key. As RC6 Is an AES 
candidate the amount of information regarding the algorithm is l imited and hence 
most of the Information comes from the paper [R.Rivest, et aI, 1998]. 
The operations 
The are a number of common operations performed in the key schedule, encryption 
and decryption. The are as follows: 
A+B Addition modulo 2w 
A-B Subtraction modulo 2w 
A*B Multiplication modu lo 2w 
Ae B XOR modulo 2w 
A< <8 Rotation left of A, by B 
A»B Rotation right of A, by B 
[R. Rlvest , et al) 
Whenever one sees these operations in the following algorithm it is assumed that it 
is performed as described above. These operations are usually quick and relatively 
efficient on most operating systems . As the algorithm is made up of these primitive 
operations It Is designed to take advantage of the speed benefits offered by them . 
The Kev Schedule 
The key schedule is composed of three steps. The copying of the user key into an 
array (L), the initialisation of the S-Box array, and finally the mixing of the two 
arrays into the resultant key used for encryption and decryption. 
Step 1 
The user-supplied key, which is of size b bytes, is placed in the array L. The array L 
has c elements in it, L[O] .. L[c-l]. The array is of type integer, and therefore the 
bytes of the user key need to be converted to integers. The first four bytes are 
placed In the array element L[O], and so forth. 
The value of c is determined by the closest number of words derivable from the 
number of bytes of the user key (Word = Bytes / 4). If any extra bits are required, 
zero are appended to make up the missing terms. 
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C = (Length User Key) / 4, if Length Key = 0, then c= 1 
Place user key into L[OJ .. L[c-1J 
Step 2 
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The next step is to initialize the 5 array. There are recommended starting va lues, 
Pw and Qw' These values are mixed into the Initial 5 array creati ng random values, 
which are Independent of the key. To get as accurate as possible values for these 
two numbers, the word size binary numbers are used 
Pw = «e - 2)2W) (e=naturallog base) = P" = b7e15163 = 2.718281828 ... 
Qw = «0 - 1) 2W) (golden ratio) = Q" = 9a3779b9 = 1.618033988 ... 
The initial value of 5[0] = Pw' The 5 array has 2r+3 elements, where r is the 
number of rou nds used for the algorithm. (5[OJ .. 5[2r+3]). 
The 5 array is then modified with the following formula, initialis ing all its values. 
The 5 array elements are words. 
5[iJ = 5[1-1J + Qw 
This process is repeated from i=l to 2r+3. The operations are performed modulo 
2w, where w is the size of the words being used in the algorithm. The bigger the 
word size (w) of the system, the more accu rate the values of Pwand Qw, as 
specified in the paper [R.Rivest,199S] . "These va lues are somewhat arbitrary, and 
other va lues could be chosen to give custom or proprietary versions of RC6" [ 
R.Rivest, et at]. This essentially means any values that are difficult to determine 
can be used to initialise the 5 array as long as they are Independent of the key. 
Step 3 
The final step mixes the Land 5 array together. The operations are designed to be 
relatively one way, so it Is difficult to determine the user key from the 5 array. The 
mixing is repeated by the maximum of c or (2r+4) multiplied by three. 
LoopUmit = 3 * Max(c,2r+4) 
Four temporary variables are used for the mixing process, A, B, I, j. All of which are 
initial ised to zero before the operations are performed . 
For loop = 0 to LoopLimit do 
A =5[IJ = (5[IJ +A+B) «3 
B =L(jJ = (L(jJ + A+B)«(A+B) 
I = (i+1) mod (2r+4) 
J = (j+1) mod c 
End For 
The result of x «y, means that x is shifted to the left by y places, All operations 
are carried out modulo 2w , The S-Box array is the same for encryption and 
decryptlon. The key schedule algorithm is almost exactly the same one used in 
ReS, as It has shown to be quite successful in the past. 
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The Encryption Algorithm 
Encryption with RC6 w/r/b, (word size/rounds/key size in bytes) is a block cipher 50 
the plaintext is treated as such. Thus far the key has been generated and it resides 
in the 5 array. or the expanded key table. The 5 array is not quite an S-Box as the 
values in it are used sequentially as opposed to the lookup method used in an 5-
Box. The encryption encrypts four w bit words at a time. These words are placed 
into the variables A, B, C, D. They are also known as registers. 
The plaintext is placed in the word registers using little endian notation, whereby 
the first byte of the plaintext takes up the low order byte of the word A. The fourth 
byte of the plaintext is the high order byte in the word A and the fifth byte of the 
plaintext then takes its position in the low order byte of 6, and so forth. 
The 5 array is initially added to the plalntext and thereafter it is mixed In with the 
encryption function. This helps in distributing the key and the plaintext, and 
increasing the entropy of both . The algorithm is as follows: 
8 = 8 + 5[0] 
0=0+5[1] 
For (i=l;l<r;i++) 
t = (8 * (2B+1) «log, w 
u = (0 * (20+1) «log, w 
A = «A Ell t)«u) +5[21] 
C = «C Ell u)«t) +5[2i+ 1] 
(A, B, c, D) = (B, C, 0, A) 
End For 
A = A + 5[2r+2] 
C = C + 5[2r+3] 
The values of 5[0] and 5[1] are added to the B, and D respectively. The main 
operation then begins and is repeated r times. The user specifies all the values of r, 
wand b. The variables t and u are temporary for holding the information as it is 
modified in each round . The interesting aspect about this algorithm Is the fact that 
it is so short and simple. This leads to efficiency in computation. The aim of the 
designers of RC6 was to meet three requirements, security. simplicity and good 
performance. 
The values of A, B, C, D are modified in a Feistel network fashion. The actions 
performed by (B * (2B+l) «1092 wand (D * (2D+l) « log2 w, are actually the 
transformation function being applied to half of the values each round. The one to 
one function that is used to change each register is: 
F(X) = x * (2x+1) mod (2W) 
Theorem: 
F(X) = x * (rx+s) mod (2W) 
Is one to one over {O,l,2,,,,2W -
'
}, whenever r is even and s odd 
for any integer w>=O 
Proof: by contradiction 
Assume F(x) = F(V) for x <> V 
Then 
x(rx+s) =y(ry+s) mod 2w 
r(x'-v') = s(V-x) mod 2w, 
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Thus r(x+y)(x-y) = -s(x-y) mod 2 " . 
But 2 divides the left side more times than the right side. QED [R.Rivest] 
















Fig 7.3.1 Encryption with RC6-wjrjb. F(x):x (2x+l) [R.Rivest, et 01, 1998[ 
The function's design is to diffuse the information being encrypted, thereby hiding 
all relationships and statistics. After the transformation function Is applied the 
values are XORed with previous values and then rotated. Once these values have 
been rotated the next elements of the key are added. The left rotations are 
dependent on the va lues transformed in u and t. 
One can see that this plaintext is split up and values are swapped at the end of 
each round. The values of A and B are not simply swapped with C and D, instead 
they are mixed , (A, 8, C, D) :: (8, C, D, A). This means that the va lues are equally 
shifted to the left every round and each element will be changed accordingly. It will 
obviously take four rounds for each element to move full Circle back to its original 
register . 
As rand b increases so does the security of the algorithm. This is because the 
plaintext is distributed more evenly as the rounds increase, and a larger key will 
make it more difficult to guess (i ncreased key entropy). However this tends to slow 
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down the speed of the encryption and decryption. The 5 array is not l ike other 
algorithms that can access any element of the array at once, which requires the 
entire array to be In memory. It uses the elements sequentia lly, and therefore only 
one element at a time needs to be dealt with. This saves vast amounts of memory, 
and is a big reason why RC6 is targeted at applications that use minimal memory 
(Smartcards, etc) 
The add ition of the key to the regi sters before the rounds begin 
6 = 6 + 5[OJ 
D = D + 5[lJ 
and after the rounds end, 
A = A + 5[2r+2J 
C = C + 5[2r+3J 
is known as the pre and post whitening stages. The reason for these stages is that 
if it is not done the plaintext will reveal the input in the first part of the encryption, 
and the clphertext will reveal the part of the input of the last part of the encryption. 
This is something that ca n be attacked so the key Is added to hide this information. 
This forces the cryptanalyst not only to guess the key used in the algorithm but 
also to guess the values used for whitening. 
The Decrypt ion A lgorith m 
As the encryption algorithm makes use of left rotations, XOR's, multiplication and 
the swapping of values, all the decryption algorithm does is invert each stage of the 
encryption algorithm. This includes right rotations, XOR's, divisions and reverse 
swapping of values. 
The clphertext is placed In the same registers A, B, C, 0, In the exact same format 
little Endlan format the encryption algorithm uses. The same number of rounds r 
are used, and the same keys in the 5 array are used. 
The algorithm is as follows 
c = C - 5[2r+3J 
A = A - 5[2r+2J 
For (I = r; i> 0 ;1-- ) 
(A, B, C, D) = (0, A, B, C) 
u = (D*(2D+1)) «Iog,w 
t = (B*(2B+1))«log,w 
C = «C-5[21+1]»>t) El) u 
A = «A-5[2I]»>u) El) t 
End For 
D = D-5[1J 
6 = 6-5[OJ 
The decryption starts at the last round and essentially undoes what the encryptlon 
algorithm performed. Reversi ng all t he results round by round until the orig inal 
va lues are attained. 
Secure Internet Auctioning System Page 113 
RC6 
An Example 
As an example, using w/r/b = 32/4/4. Please note that some values may be 
negative, as this is due to the rotations of the integer values. Integer values must 
be in the ran!}e (_232+ 1) to 2n, any value exceeding this will simply wrap around, 
hence the negative values. 
Let the user key be, 
o 1 23 
This is then given to the key schedule algorithm, wh ich then expands the key 
schedule . 
C = 1, therefore there is only one element in L 
L[OJ ~ 50462976 
The initial values of S are then calculated for 2r +4 elements of S. 
S(OJ ~ Pw = Oxb7e15163 
5[0 .. 12J = {1209970333 1444465436 -196066091 -1836597618 817838151 -
8226933761831742393191210866 -14493206611205115108 -435416419-
2075947946} 
The values of L[] is mixed into S[] , which results in the finalS array value of 
S(O .. 12J = {1089557206 -2003891483 2122675648 - 172460913 -1170572592 
955928541 -1506510775 -129986502 -5240755341310761307 - 1839897398 
1162524834} 
Now to encrypt the message " Hello World !", first one converts it to integer values, 
this is done using the CryptUb method ConvertAnyString(String), that converts the 
string to bytes and then to integers. 
Hello World! 
181904314418679809115602294900 
When the values are passed into the encryption algorithm they are placed in the 
registers A, B, C, 0 where 
A=1819043144, B~ 1867980911, C~ S60229490, D=O 
A bit of pre-whitening takes place and the values of 8,0 are increased by 5[0] and 
S[lJ respectively. 
A=1819043144 B= -1337429179 C= 560229490 d~ - 2003891483 
The algorithm then starts performing the rounds. It determines t, u and then the 
resulting A and C values. The values A, B, C t 0 are then all swapped. 
Round = l 
t~ - 1227714832 
u~621646576 
A= 1782468734 




A=1782468734 8=-1337429179 C=-197494536 d=-2003891483 
After 




A=-165 1 060695 
C=-1651060695 
Before 
A=-1651060695 B=-197494536 C=-752376605 d=1782468734 
After 







A=261684431 6=-752376605 C=-246186761 d=-1651060695 
After 







A=716825574 B=-246186761 C=-696265647 d=261684431 
After 
A=-246186761 B=-696265647 C=261684431 d=716825574 
After the rounds are complete, the post whitening takes place. 
A= -2086084159 B=-696265647 C=1424209265 d=716825574 
Finally our ciphertext is 
-2086084159 -696265647 1424209265 716825574 
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To decrypt, the ciphertext and key are passed to the decryption algorIthm, and the 
first thing that takes place is the de-whitening 
A=-246186761 6 = -696265647 C=261684431 d=716825574 
This is where C = C - S[2r+3] and A = A - S[2r+2]. The rounds then begin starting 
at the highest round and decreasing there after 
Round=4 




Secure Internet Auctioning System 
RCS 
C~-246186761 
Until we get to the last round, 
Round=1 






After the rounds are complete the values left in the registers are the following: 
A ~ 1819043144 B~-1337429179 C~ 560229490 d ~- 2003891483 
The final values of the key are then subtracted (D ~ D-5(1) and B ~ B-5(O)) which 
results In 
A~ 1819043144 B~ 1867980911 C~560229490 d~O 
These are the same values as our original plaintext, which Is "Hello World!" 
7.4) RC6 Implementation 
Due to the non-disclosure agreement that was signed with NIST, I cannot display 
any of the actual code for the algorithm. However I will discuss pseudo code for the 
RC6 algorithm. 
The Class has a number of predefined variables, these are the 5 array and the 
values of rand w. All of these are stored as integers. The RC6Crypt initialise 
method performs the following: 
//RC6Crypt.Java RC6Crypt method 
CL ~ New CryptLib 
W~32 
R ~ 20 
User_key[32] ~ 0 
5 = generate_ Keys(User_key,32) 
A new object of the CryptUb class Is created. as a few of the methods are used by 
the encryption and decryption functions. A default user key is created which is set 
to zero. This enables a default 5 key array to be created, when generate_ Keys is 
called. The values of wand r are set to 32 and 20, but these may be changed to 
increase the secu rity of the algorithm at a later date. 
There are two encryption and decryption functions, and the method for generating 
the keys. 
Generate_Keys(userKey, size) 
This method takes a user key of bytes and uses it in the key schedule to expand 
the key into the 5 array. It returns the S array of type integers. 
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RC6 
For (loop=1;/00p«2*r+4);/00p++) 
S[loopJ = S{loop-1J + Oxge3779b9 
End For 
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This section initialises the 5 array as described in step two of the key schedule. 
c = key_'ength / 4 + Key_length % 4 
L = new integer [cl 
For (looP=Oiloop<key_'engthiloop+4) 
L{loop/4J = ConvertTo[nteger(UserKey{loop .. /oop+3J) 
End For 
This section determines the length of c (Amount of words In the bytes), and then 
converts the bytes to integers which are placed in the L array, as described in step 
one of the key schedule. 
A= B=i=j=v=O 
v = max(c,2*r+3) 
for (loop=li1ooP < VilooP++) 
A = S[/oopJ = (S[iJ+A+B)«3 or (S[iJ+A+B»>29 
B = L[LoopJ = ( L[j]+A+B)«(A+B) or (L[j]+A+B» >(-1 *(A+B)) 
[=(l+1) % (2*r+4) 
] =(j+1) % c 
End for 
The third step of the key schedule initialises all the variables used to zero. Then it 
determines the maximum of c or 2*r+3. The 5 array and L array manipulation then 
take place. The reason that I have ORed both of these steps with the two rotations 
«<3, and »(32-3» is that this stops the timing attack that is discussed later. 
Finally once the key schedule is complete it returns the 5 array. 
RC6Encrypt(pla intext String, u serkey) 
There are two version of the encryption, one accepts a string and the other four 
integer values in an array. 
Tempint[] = CryptLib. ConvertAnyString(P/aintext) 
For (loOP=Oi loop < Templnt. LengthiloOp+4) 
BlockPlain text[ 4] = Tempint[loop,loop+ 1,loop+2,loop+ 3] 
B/ockP/aintext[4J = RC6Encrypt(B/ockP/aintext{],use key) 
Ciphertext += BlockPlaintext 
End for 
The current method accepts the plalntext, and converts it to an array of integers, 
which is of uniform length that is divisible by four. The ConvertAnylnteger pads the 
end with zeros if it Is not long enough. Then the code copies four elements of the 
plain text integers into an array of four elements. These four elements are then 
encrypted using the other RC6Encrypt method, passing the array of four plaintext 
integers and the user key. The result of this is then added to a string called 
ciphertext. The loop continues looping until all elements in the plaintext integer 
array Tempint have been encrypted. The cl phertext string is returned. 
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RC6Encrypt(plaintext[] Integer, userkey) 
This method accepts the four plaintext elements and the key. This method then 
proceeds to encrypt the four integer (also known as word) values. The plaintext 
elements are copied to variables a, b, c, d. 
a=b=c=d=t=u=O 
a=plaintext[OJ, b=plaintext[lJ, c=plainlexl[2J, d=plainlexl[3J 
5= user key 
The algorithm then proceeds with the whitening of the input. 
b+= 5[OJ, d+=5[lJ 
Once this has been achieved the rounds begin, 
For (loop=l;loop< =r;foop++) 
1= (b*(2*b+ l ) 
1 = (1« log,w) or (t»(w-Iog,w)) 
u = (d*(2*d+l)) 
u = (u« I092W) or (u» (W-Jo9 '2W)) 
This Is done as a two step process, as then it is more efficient to calculate the value 
of x*(2*x+l) once, and then performs the data dependant rotations. Wherever 
possible I have tried to speed up the encryptlon by hard codi ng elements that 
would not change in the application. 
a = (a Xor I) 
c = (e Xor u) 
a = ((a < <u)or(a»-u)) + 5[2*loopJ 
e = ((e«I) or (c»-I)) + 5[2*loop+lJ 
(a, b, c, d) = (b, c, d, a) 
End For 
To optimise calculations the same procedure is followed in the calcu lations of a and 
C initially. Thereafter the shifting, left and right, of a and c Is performed. Finally the 
values of a, b, c, d are all swapped. 
The post whitening then completes the encryptlon 
a+= 5[2*r+2J 
c+=S[2*r+3J 
Plaintext[OJ= a, Plaintext[lJ= b, Plaintexl[2J= e, Plaintexlf3J= d 
The plaintext array of four integers is then returned. 
RC6Decrypt(ciphertext String, userkey) 
The same process is used in this method, as the RC6Encrypt(String, key) method. 
The string is converted to a uniform length integer array. A loop is then executed 
taking four of these integers and calling the RC6Decrypt(Ciphertext[] Integer, Key) 
method. The results are then appended to a string called plaintext. 
Tempint{j = CryptLib. ConvertAny5Iring(CipherText) 
For (Ioop=O;loop < Templnt. Length;loop+4) 
BlockCipherText[ 4} = Tempint[loop,loop+ l ,foop+2,loop+ 3} 
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BlockCipherText [4} = RC6Decrypt(BlockCipherText[],use key) 
Plaintext+ = BlockCipherText 
End for 
The results are then returned in the plaintext string variable. 
RC6Decrypt(Ciphertext(] Integer, UserKey) 
Page 118 
The same registers and variables are used in this method as the RC6Decrypt 
(Plaintext[J Integer,UseKey) method. They are all initialised as the algorithm 
proceeds. 
a=b=c=d=t=u=O 
a=Ciphertext[O}, b= Ciphertext [1}, c= Ciphertext [2}, d= Ciphertext [3} 
5= Userkey 
The removal of the whitening then takes place 
a- = 5[2*r+2} 
c-=5[2*r+3} 
And the rou nds begin from the r down to the last round one. 
For (Ioop=r, loop>O;loop--) 
(b, c, d, a)= (a, b, c, d) 
t= (b*(2* b+l) 
t = (t«IOg2W) or (t»W-IOg2W) 
u = (d*(2*d+l)) 
u = (u« I092W) or (u»w-I092W) 
a -= 5[2*loop} 
c -= 5[2*loop+l} 
a = ((a < < u)or(a > >-u)) Xor t 
c = ((c«t) or (c»-t)) Xor u 
End for 
This reverses the operat ions performed by the encryption process. The same 
optimislng methods have been used for the decryption method as were used for the 
encryptlon method. 
b -= 5[0}, d -=5[1} 
Ciphertext[O}= a, Ciphertext[l]= b, Ciphertext[2}= c, Ciphertext[3}= d 
The ciphertext integer array of four elements is returned, containing the recently 
decrypted ci phertext. 
7.5) RC6 Usage 
The client and server application has a copy of the RC6Crypt class. This Is initialised 
on the initialisation of the CryptUb class. As has been mentioned before the cl ient 
generates the user defined key . The client sends this key, first encrypting it with 
RSA, to the server. The server then decrypts the RSA message and obtains the key. 
The key Is specific to each client, and therefore the copy of the key is kept in each 
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clienthandler class. Therefore each client has their own session key which wi l l be 
different f rom any other client key. Once the key is received it is then given to the 
generate_Keys method which executes the key scheduler which will create the 
correct key for encryption and decryption . 
The Cryptlib class deals with the administration of the algorithms and their uses . It 
monitors which algorithm is being used, it also executes the corresponding key 
scheduler method. This generates the key in the 5 array . The cl ient and the server 
perform the same key schedule method and hence they wi ll have the same key for 
the current client's session. Once the key has been generated, and there are no 
problems, the encryptlon then changes from RSA to the specified encryption 
algorithm (i n this case its RC6). 
//ClientHandler.Java - send method 
If (encrypCmode>O) 
CurrentMesg= CL. Encrypt(CurrentMesg,Key) 
EndIf 
Thereafter whenever the SendMsg method is cal led by t he client , and Send method 
by the server, the messages are first passed to the CLEncrypt() method. This 
method passes the message to the RC6Encrypt(Strlng,UserKey) method , which 
encrypts the message and returns a set of numbers in a string format. This is the 
ciphertext, and it is then sent to the recipient of the message. 
//CllentHand lerJava - run method 
CurrentMesg = ReadStream 
If (encrypCmode >O) 
CurrentMesg= CL. Decrypt(CurrentMesg,Key) 
EndIf 
When the client or server rece ives a message, it is first passed to the CL.Decrypt 
method which passes it to the correct decryption method (RC6Decrypt(String, 
UserKey». This method decrypts the message, and then the message is dealt with . 
I f any errors occur while decrypting messages they are ignored, and the error is 
reported to the administrator. 
7.6) T imin g 
Speed tables are used to show the reader how much quicker a symmetric 
cryptosystem over asymmetric cryptosystems is. The algorithm has been optimised 
in one or two places, but for the sake of readabi l ity It Is as close as possible to the 
pseudo code. The Optimised implementation results of RC6 are from [R.Rivest, et 
aJ) performance figures . 
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Lanquaqe Scheme Blocks Sec Mbits Sec 
Auction RC6 
lDK 1.2 EncrvDtlon 4545.45 0 .554 
JDK 1.2 Decrvotion 6250.0 0.762 
Optimlsed 
Imolementations 
JDK 1.1.7 Encrvotion 12100 0.19 
JDK 1.1.7 Decrvotion 12300 0.19 
Java JIT) Encrvotion 197000 3.15 
Java (lIT) Decrvption 209000 3.35 
ANSI C EncrvDtion 325000 5.19 
ANSI C DecrvPtion 353000 5.65 
Fig 7.6.1 Encryptlon a nd Decryptlon figures of RC6 32/20 / 32 
The Auction version of RC6 has been implemented and tested on an Intel PII 4S0. 
The encryptlon's and decryption's were performed one thousand times each to 
obtain a good average. It can be seen that the Auction implementation on the 
whole Is slower than most of the optimised figures quoted. These optimlsed 
implementations were executed on an Intel Pentium Pro 200 . In the article by 
[B.Schneier, et al] the performance implementations are discussed , as it is noted 
that the performance of RC6 on a Pentium Pro ie; three times faster than on any 
other Pentium class chipset. The reason for this is that multiplication and variable 
rotation are not naturally supported by these chipsets. 
RC6 also has huge differences in speed depending on t he type of Chipset (ie RISe, 
Intel, etc). The main reason is because of the integer multiplication that takes 
place. It is interesting to note though, that the optimised version of RC6, when 
executed with a JIT compiler is not that much slower than the ANSI C version. As 
Java has always been hailed as much slower than e on all platforms this is an 
encouraging sign. [B.Schneier, et al], relates a more in depth discussion of the 
performance of RC6 and the ot her AES candidates on different platforms (32-bit 
and 64-bit ). 
The results of the timings do indicate however that the current implementation 
used for the auction application will more than suffice. The average message size is 
only a few bytes (approximately 32 bytes, 1 block = 16 bytes) long, and 
approximately five blocks need to be encrypted or decrypted per a client. The 
server application could handle easi ly over one thousand clients . 
7 .7) Attacks 
As RC6 is based on RCS, many of the attacks wi ll follow the current trend of attacks 
on ReS. There are two ways in which the algorithm is going to be broken. Breaking 
the key schedule, or breaking the algorithm, and both will be discussed. 
Key Schedule Attack 
The Re6 algorithm can use up to 2040 bit keys, which means the key space is very 
large. It has been suggested that when the key size is very large there is a good 
chance that there are Similar keys. These are known as equivalent keys, which are 
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keys that will perform very simi lar encryption [M-J. O. Saarinen). If this is t he case 
then the key space is not as large as initially expected. There is no proof that 
different keys yie ld the same round of keys. As an example, the chance of two 2S6-
bit keys existing and y ielding a table of 44, 32-bit round keys is approximately 
22'256-44>32 = 2-896 (High ly unlikely in other words.) [R.Rivest, et al] 
RC6 uses forty four keys for a twenty round implementation. Two are used for pre-
whitening (5[0] & 5[1]), forty are used for the rounds and two more are used for 
post whitening (5[43] & 5[44]). If the keys used for encryption of the same 
plaintext, differ by 5[43J and 5[44] (two key elements), the ciphertext w ill be 
constantly different as wel l. This means that one can start to look for matches when 
using different keys. By guessing just two key elements, one can decrease the key 
space considerably. Instead of 44 elements, only 42 are required . This can be used 
to mount an attack on the system, and it w ill certa inly decrease the amount time 
required for a brute force attack. 
Using this idea, it has been suggested by (M-J. O. SaarinenJ, that one can guess 
round va lues when generating the key. It has also been shown that if one selects a 
value of L[i), it wi ll only change the values from 5[i+1,,,,43]. If one is able to 
determine 5[43J and 5[42], one can get an approximation of L(43-i). The problem 
here is that the key scheduJer is a one way algorithm, in as much as the rotational 
value (A+B) is lost once the rotation has been completed for the rounding, making 
it difficult to reverse the process. This is what makes the attack impractical. 
As this is the same key schedule that has been used for RCS, it has been 
extensively cryptoanalyzed. What has been concluded is that due to the nature of 
the scheduler and the algorithm that uses it, there are no weak keys. In other 
words all keys should be equally as strong. 
Timing Attack 
The timing attack comes about because of the data dependant rotat ions of the 
encryption algorithm. "Rivest notes that on 'Modern microprocessors, a variable 
rotation ... takes constant time"'[H.Handschuh, H.Heys]. As this is not always the 
case with modern hardware it ca n lead to some susceptibility. The bits have to be 
moved or swapped bit by bit. Each movement takes time, and one can determine 
from this what the rotational value is. This attack was original noticed in RCS, but 
the same idea may be extrapolated out to RC6. 
A full discussion on the attack on Res is discussed in (H .Handschuh, H.Heys], and 
some interesting Ideas can be drawn from this attack. The attack measures the 
time of the entire rounds of encryption. It then be easily determined what the time 
is for one round of operation. As all the operations are known in each round, one 
can break it up into the fixed time operations and the variable time operations per 
round. This fixed time operations do not change, and hence if once subtracts it from 
the total round time one is left w ith the variable operations time. This is the time 
used for rotating «A $ t )«u) and «C $ u)«t). With work and approximations 
one is able to determine important va lues for each round which may allow 
reconstruction of the piaintext. 
This attack is aimed mostly at the likes of smart cards, etc. It would be difficult to 
gather the t iming information in the curren t implementation due to the fact that the 
cryptanalyst does not really have access to the machines being used, as well as the 
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timing information. The current implementation is not immune to this attack, so a 
solution has been put in place to nullify the attack. 
As recommended by [R.Rivest, et al], a modification to the implementation of the 
algorithm which does not cha nge the encryption is used. To do this the left shift of 
x bits Is ORed with a right shift of (w-x) bits. The time of the rotation now becomes 
data independent, and the timing attack will not succeed. 
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis 
To mount any of the Linear or Differential attacks on the system it needs large 
amounts of corresponding ciphertexts and plaintexts. This in practise is difficult to 
obtain, as the auction system will probably not generate the kinds of 
plaintext{ciphertext that is required, and even then the attacker will need to know 
the values of the plaintext{ciphertext pairs. 
Differential cryptanalysis examines the evolution of simi lar plaintexts as t hey are 
encrypted with the same key, giving probabilities for each iteration of encryption. 
This allows one to make approximations of the plai ntext as it is encrypted and the 
keys used to encrypt it. The most powerful differential attack on RC6 uses 
differences in va lues (Le A-B) to help obtain the probabilities of plaintext values. 
However the main problem with this is that it requires large amounts of plaintext. 
As mentioned in [R.Rivest, et at], RC6 32{8{b (8 round) requires 276 of chosen 
plaintext it mount such an attack. When one expands this attack for greater rounds 
it does not fare as well as it becomes exponential ly hard er on each rounds iteration 
to determine the keys and plaintext. 
Linear cryptanalysis uses known plaintext to approximate the actions of the 
algorithm. This is done incrementally with large amounts of plaintext, and one can 
then start determining information about the key. The attack uses a linear 
approximation over a number of rounds regarding the quadratic function. This 
method works rela t ively well over a short number of rounds (6 to 8), but thereafter 
the numbers dealt with and required amount of plaintext to mount the attack 
becomes incredibly large. The suggested amount of plaintexts to mount a linear 
attack is of the order 2182 , which is more than cu rrent auction applica tion will 
encrypt in a lifetime of operations. (To encrypt 264 and 280 blocks of data on 50 
machines capable of encryption rate of 1012 bits/sec would be 1 and 98000 years 
respectively [R.Rivest, et at]) 
These techniques of cryptanalysis wil l work, but there are really three problems 
that prevent them from doing so. The amount of plaintext, and ciphertext required 
is not even attainable. The computing resources required wou ld be enormous, and 
the time it takes to perform all these attacks would invariably be an exponentially 
large number. Bearing in mind that the auction application does not deal with large 
fi scal va lues and the life span of the messages is relatively short, barring any huge 
advances in cryptanalysis and computing power the algorithm is secu re enough. 
Brute Force 
It has been shown that to mount a brute force attack on the system, the exhaustive 
key search difficulty is estimated to be the minimum of (28b, 21408)[ R.Rivest, et at], 
where b is the number of bytes of the key. If the user key were larger than the 
table of keys it would be easier to guess this latter. 
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The problem with the brute force attack is that it gets exponentially difficult to 
perform as the size of the key increases, as there are more va riations to attempt. 
This means that the algorithm does not really have a weakness and the only other 
alternative is to try all keys. This shows that the algorithm is strong, and unless a 
weakness is found it will take a large effort in computing, fiscal and time resources 
to determine the ciphertext. As the life span of the keys and messages is not all 
that long, it would be improbable that the ciphertext messages examined would be 
broken within the required time. The opportunity cost of breaking the ciphertext 
message is not quite enough for someone to mount this exorbitant attack on the 
system. 
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7.8) Conclusion 
The RC6 cipher is based on a proven secure algorithm, and has been improved to 
take advantage of 32-bit systems. It was decided to stick with the suggested 
Implementation of the algorithm RC6 32/20/b as it has been shown in the literature 
available that anything less than this will weaken the system. 
One has to choose between speed and security trade-offs . The higher the number 
of rounds the slower the algorithm, but the more secure it becomes. At the moment 
the algorithm more than meets the requirements of the auction application in both 
the speed and security departments. 
With current trends and technologies it is not feasible or viable to attack the auction 
system, and unless some inherent weakness in the algorithm is discovered it will 
protect the information more than adequately. 
The next section will examine the implementation of and attacks against MARS. 
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8) MARS 
The MARS algorithm was designed and created by IBM as a replacement for the 
DES cryptosystem. IBM originally designed DES in the seventies. MARS is a result 
of a group of eleven IBM cryptographers, and majority of information comes from 
the paper by [C.Burwick,eta,1998]. 
8.1) Overview 
The MARS algorithm was designed with a number of predefined specifications in 
m ind. The choices as related by [C.Surwick,eta,1998] are as fol lows: 
Operations 
The algorithm was designed to take advantage of the current computing 
technology. This involved the usage of strong operations, wh ich are operations that 
can be easi ly and quickly performed by computers. 
Structure 
The structure of the algorithm is very important, and it has been shown that 
different parts of the structure perform different security actions. MARS was 
designed to use a mixed structure. 
Analysis 
All the components of the MARS have been designed so that extensive analysis may 
take place. This enables one to examine each component and note is strengths and 
weaknesses. 
As an introduction to symmetric ciphers has been given in the previous chapter we 
may now proceed to the MARS Algorithm itself. 
8.2) The MARS Algorithm 
MARS is a symmetric key block cipher, which supports variable key sizes. The block 
size used is 128-bits, and the key size varies from 128 bits to 1248 bIts. As has 
been indicated the MARS algorithm was designed with a number of prerequisites in 
mind. 
The operations used in the MARS algori thm are XOR's, multiplication, addition, 
subtraction and rotations. The XORlng of keys and information mixes the two 
together. All XOR's have additional operations included, as it is not a strong 
cryptographic primitive operation by itself. It is however a reversible operation 
which makes it very useful for undoing the operat ions initially performed. 
Addition and subtraction are standard operations on any processor, and one will 
find that they are incredibly quick to perform. Hence the reason they are so 
common in most algorithms today. Multiplications were initially very expensive 
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operations on computers, however this has changed as technology has developed, 
and it now on ly take 2 machine cycles to complete on modern architectures. 
The rotations used are of two types, fixed and data dependant. The fixed rotations 
are used to obtain the required bits out of data. The data dependant rotations are 
used because of their strong cryptographic results, wh ich prevents certain types of 
attacks. There are a few weaknesses but these wi ll be addressed later. On the 
whole rotations are re latively quick operations on modern computer architecture. 
Another operation that takes place is that of the table lookup of the S-Box. This is 
the basis o f security in the MARS algorithm. It has been shown that S-Box's resist 
differential or linear attacks, as they are non-linear in operation. The problem with 
the S-Box (512, 32 bit words in MARS) is that the operations are quite costly in 
resources. It require memory lookups, and the S-Box is usual ly memory intensive 
as this is where it resides. 
The development of MARS was aimed at complementing the cu r rent strengths of 
computer archi tectu res today. The algorithm requires an S-Box, an expanded Key 
and the encryption/decryption functions that will be discussed next, and are shown 
in the paper by [C.Burwick, et a/] . 
The S-Box 
The S-Box for MARS has been developed to resist linear and differential attack by 
carefully picking the entries used. The elements have been generated using SHA- 1 
(A hashing algorithm) . The three inputs were 'It, e and a constant c, which was 
changed for a number of iterations. The S-Box that was developed went through 
226 different values of c until a value was found that met the requirements below. 
Each S-8ox and its elements was checked for certain properties. Some of the 
differential properties were as follows 
• No all zeros or all ones in a word 
• Every entry differs by at least four bits 
• 5 has no entries where S[i]=S[j] or -S[i]=S[j] or S[i]= -S[j] with i * j 
The linear properties: 
• Two Consecutive bi t s have a probabi l ity of 1/30 of occu rring. 
The generated S- Box has been checked for strengths of its va lues as they make it 
difficult for ana lysis to take place. This S-Box is recommended jf one wants to keep 
MARS secure. Other S-Sox's may have weaknesses or inadequacies that cou ld be 
exploited. 
The Key Schedule 
The key schedule expands the user key, which is comprised of n 32 bit words, into 
an array K[] of forty words. The user key requi res no predetermined structure, all 
structure is created in the key generation. The key elements created have two 
provisions, the last two bits are set to one, and there are no elements that contain 
all ones or all zeros. There are four steps in the key schedule algorithm. 
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Step 1 
The f irst step initialises an array T[], which has forty seven elements. The T[] array 
is indexed as -7 .. 39. The first seven ent ries are then filled with the first seven 
entries of the S-Box. 
T[i] = 5[i+7], T[-7]=5[O] .. T[-1]=5[6], 
Once this has been completed the user key is then mixed in using the fol lowing 
formu lae, 
T [i] = ((T[i-7]EI)T[i-2])«3), i= 0 .. 38 
T[i] = T[i] El) k[i mod n] El) i 
This XOR's two of the current T{I] values, and then sh ifts these values to the left by 
three positions. Once that has been completed, the va lue of T[I ] is then XORed with 
the user key k. The index to determine which user key is used is given as 
(i mod n ), where n is the leng th of the user keys in words ( n = UserKey Length). 
This means that if t he index i is out of the user key index range, it then starts 
repeating the keys used so that all the va lues of T[i] will have user keys mixed in . 
The aim is spread the user key throughout the expanded key. The key is then 
XORed with the val ue of the index. 
T[39] = n 
ThiS is used so that no two keys of different lengths generate the same key, If one 
has two different length user keys of all zeros, it wil l force the resultant keys to be 
different. 
Step 2 
Once the ar ray has been created it is then mixed using a Feistel network. There are 
two operations that are performed seven times. 
For (rou nds = 1 to 7) 
For ( i = 1 to 39) 
T[i] = (T[i] +5[Low 9 bits of T[i-l]]) < <9 
End For 
T [O] = (T[O] +5[Low 9 bits ofT[39]]) < <9 
End for 
The inner loop adds the current T array elements to a S-Box element. The index 
used to determine which S-Box element to use, is the lowest nine bits of T[i-l]. 
Once this loop has fini shed the T[O] operation is performed manually as when i=O 
the T[I-l] element equals T[-l], and one wants wrap around of the elements. 
Step 3 
The words in the T(] array are then placed in the 40 element key array K. 
For ( i=O to 39) 
K[7*i mod 40] = T[i] 
The words are then placed in the K array in the order specified by seven multiplied 
by the loop variable I modulus forty. The elements will be placed such that 
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K[O) = T[O) , K[7) = T[l), K[14)=T[2) .. , K[35) = T[5), K[2) = T[6) 
and so forth. This means that the elements are reordered. 
Step 4 
The final step checks the keys that are used for multiplication in the encryption and 
decryption. The check is to prevent the formation of weak keys, such as zero or 
one, as this will cause the algorithm to be susceptible to cryptana lysis. The keys 
that are checked are K[51,K[7] .. K[35]. Any key is considered weak if it contains 
more than nine consecutive zeros or ones. 
For (i=5 to 35, i+2) 
j = least 2 bits of K[i) 
w = K[I), with least two bits set to one. 
M = bit mask of K[I), 
If M = 0 then K[I) • weak 
End if 
If M = I then K[I) =weak 
Else 
End For 
r= least five bits of K[i+31 
K[l) = w$«B[j)«r) OR M) 
If there are any ten consecutive zeros or ones in the value of w, the key is weak. 
To resolve this, whenever there are two or more consecutive zeros or ones in w, 
the last bit of the consecutive values are changed to zero. 
If w = 031 150 1201(superscript indicates the amount of consecutive ones or zeros), 
then M consider consecutive runs of zeros or ones a one, so 
where 1150 12 are considered by the mask as twenty seven ones. Now one must 
change the zeros to ones at the end of each consecutive list of ones or zeros. So M 
becomes 
One uses the Key elements K[i+3] to determine a data dependant rotation r. The 
array 8[] contains the elements in the S-8ox at position 265 .. 268. They have non -
repeating values in them, where no large consecutive zeros or ones exists and are 
well suited for the rotation by r . This is then ORed with M, and the result of this is 
XORed with w, resulting in the new K[i]. As the va lues in 8 are known the new 
values of K[I] will not be a weak key. 
Encryption Algorithm 
There are a number of arrays that are used. SE] is the S-80x that has five hundred 
and twelve 32bit words (So = first 256 elements, SI = second 256 elements). K[] is 
the key generated by the key schedu le algorithm, wh ich consists of forty 32bit 
words. D[] is the input array consisting of four 32bit words. 
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There are three phases in the encryption process, forward mixing, key 
transformation and backward mixing. 
Forward Mixing 
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The forward mixing performs pre-whitening. This starts with the first four elements 
of the key K being added to the plaintext elements in D[). 
For (i= 0 to 3) 
D[iJ = D[iJ + K[iJ 
Once this has been performed the mixing commences in an eight round feistal 
network process. 
For ( i = 0 to 7) 
D[lJ = D[lJ <J) So [ lowest byte of D[OJJ 
D[lJ = D[lJ + S,[Second byte of D[OJJ 
D[2J = D[2J + So[Third byte of D[OJJ 
D[3J = D[3J <J) S,[Highest byte of 0[0]] 
D[OJ = D[OJ »24 
If 1= 0 or 4 then D[OJ += D[3J 
If 1=1 or 5 then D[OJ += D[lJ 
(0[0], D[lL D[2J, D[3J) = (D[lJ, D[2J, 0[3], 0[0]) 
End ror 
This mixes the plaintext with the key and itself rotates the first plaintext element 
0[0] to the right by twenty four (Note: Word length = 32, therefore 24/32 = 3/4 ). 
The four plaintext elements are all moved one element to the left at the end of 
each round, and there are eight rounds, which means that each element will be 
modified twice by all operations in the round. 
This mixes the plaintext with the key and itself rotates the first plaintext element 
D[OJ to the left by twenty four (Note: Word length = 32, therefore 24/32 = '14). The 
four plaintext elements are all moved one element to the left at the end of each 
round, and there are eight rounds, which means that each element will be modified 
twice by all operations in the round. 
Key Transformation 
The keyed transformation is composed of a sixteen round Feistel network of 
operations. The function that transforms the values is known as the E-Function I it 
takes one plaintext element and returns three elements wh ich are mixed in with the 
rest of the plaintext elements. 
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Ol]j °l2j Oll] °lOj 
Kl3] Kl2j KlOj 
twice 
~ []I] H,]2 S-boxc, 
EB :Iddition !S»> right-rotation by R 
Fig 8.2.1 The Forward Mixing phase [C.Burwick,el 0,19981 
For (1=0 10 15) 
Oul[] = E-Funclion(O[O), K[2*i+4), K[2*I+s)) 
0[0) = 0[0) «13 
0[2) = 0[2) + Oul[2) 
If 1=8 Ihen 
Else 
End if 
0[1) = O[l)+Oul[l) 
0[3) = 0[3)<D Oul[3) 
0[3) = 0[3)+Oul[1) 
0[1) = 0[1) <D Oul[3) 
(0[0), 0[1), 0[2), 0[3)) = (0[1), 0[2), 0[3), 0[0) 
End for 
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Fig 8.2.2 The Keyed Transformation [C.Burwick,et a, 19981 
The E-Function accepts D[O] and two keys, it then generates three outputs which 
are p laced in Out[1..3J. These outputs are used in the addition and XORing of the 
D[l] .. D[3] plaintext elements. Once these operations have been performed all the 
va lues In D[] are moved one position to the left. This is done for every round and 
hence each plai ntext element will have four occasions in which it w ill occupy a 
certain pla intext fie ld. 
E-Function 
The E function accepts three values, D[O], K[2*i+4] and K[2* i+ 5], which will be 
denoted by d,k1 and k2 respective ly. Three temporary variables are used to 
manipulate this information A,B and C, which are returned as the output of the E-
Function 
A = d + kl 
B = (d«13) * k, 
i = lowest nine bits of A 
C = Sri] 
B = 8«5 
b = lowest five bits of B 
A = A « b 
B = B « 5 
C=C EIl B 
b = lowest five bits of B 
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c = C« b 
A,B and C are a mix of the two keys, the plaintext element and one S-Box element. 
The initial value of A is equal to the sum of the first key and the plalntext element. 
B is the value of the plaintext element rotated left thirteen places multipl ied by the 
second key. The nine lowest bits of A are used as the index to the S-Box, wh ich C 
takes the va lue of. B is then rotated left by five. A is rotated by the lowest five bits 
of b. The va lue of C Is the XORed with B, and then shifted to the left by the lowest 
Five bits of B. The important thing to realise here is that the inFormatIon Is being 
spread over as much of the ciphertext as possible, hiding all the possible statistical 
data available. 
Another important aspect is to realise that these operations have been 
implemented in such a Fashion that t hey are reversible, and hence decryption 
possible. When examining the decryption one wi ll see that va lues are XORed, 
shifted right instead of left and divided Instead of multiplied . 
- -






EH exclusivc-or rn 9 x 32 S·bo.x 
If] addit ion 11 <<'< leO· rotation by n 
r;] multirlic<lt ion <t< data-dcpendcnt roTatioll 
F'ig 8.2.3 The E·Function [C.Burwick,et a,1998J 
Backward Mixing 
The backward mixing also performs whitenIng and its types of operations are very 
similar to the forward mixing phase. 
For (I = 0 to 7) 
If 1=2 or 6 t hen 0 [0] -= 0[3] 
If 1=3 or 7 then 0[0] -= 0[1 ] 
0 [1] = 0[1] e So( lowest byte of 0(0]] 
0(2] = 0(2] - So(HIghest byte of 0(0]] 
0(3] = 0(3] - S,(Thlrd byte of 0(0]] 
0(3] = 0[3] e So(Second byte of D[Oll 
0(0] = 0(0] «24 
(0(0], 0(1], 0(2], 0(3]) = (0(1], 0(2], 0(3], 0(0]) 
End for 
For ( I =0 to 3) 
0(1 ] = D(I]-K(36+ I] 
End For 
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K[39] K[3 K] K[37] ~-IK[36] 
~ b subtraction (a-b) ~@] 8 x 32 S-boxes 
exclusive-or 8«< left-rotation by 8 
Fig 8.2.4 The Backward Mixing phase IC.8urwick,et a,1998J 
Each round one of the plaintext elements (0[0]) Is used as the source words to 
modify the three other plaintext elements. The following round the value of 0[1] is 
moved into 0[0], and hence it becomes the source word or the current round, each 
element Is the source word on two occasions. On the second and sixth round the 
source word subtracts the value of 0[3]. In the third and seventh rounds the source 
word subtracts the value of 0[1]. 
Finally a bit of whitening takes place when elements of the key are subtracted from 
all the plaintext elements. The values remaining in the 0[0] .. 0[4) are now the 
ciphertext elements. 
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The Decryption Algorithm 
The decryption of MARS Is simple to understand if the encryption was understood. 
As the encryption is made up of rotations, XOR's, additions, subtractions and 
multiplication's. All of which are reversible operations, it stands to reason that the 
decryption will be the opposite of the encryption. 
There are three different steps, the forward mixing, keyed transformation and 
backward mixing. 
Forward Mixing 
The forward mixing takes places first, and it uses the same variables that the 
encryption algorithm used . O[] is an array of four 32- blt words that conta in the 
ciphertext. The S[] array which contains the S-Box array of five hundred and twelve 
elements of 32-bit words. The key K[] array has forty elements. 
The forward mixing of the decryption reverses the process of the backward mixing 
in the encryptlon algorithm and one wil l notice how similar it is. Additions are 
replaced by subtractions. XORed values are XORed, and the ciphertext elements 
are sh ifted one element to the right in the swapping process. Rotations occur in the 
opposite direction with the same measurement of rotation. All operations are 
performed in reverse 
For (i=O to 3) 
o [iJ = D[iJ-K[36+ IJ 
End For 
For ( I = 7 downto 0) 
(O[OJ, O[lJ, 0[2J, 0[3]) = (0[3J, 0[0], 0[1], 0[2J) 
D[OJ = D[OJ »24 
D[3J = D[3J Ell s o[second byte of D[Oll 
D[3J = D[3J +s,[Thi rd byte of O[Oll 
D[2J = D[2J + s o[Hlghest byte of O[OJJ 
D[lJ = D[lJ Ell So [ lowest byte of D[OJJ 
If 1=2 or 6 then O[OJ += D[3J 
If i=3 or 7 then D[OJ += D[lJ 
End for 
The Keyed Transformation 
The same process takes place in the keyed transformation. It reverses exactly the 
operation performed by its encryption counterpart. The rounds start at fifteen and 
finish at zero. The values are first swapped to the left. The value of D[O] is rotated 
in the oppOSite direction by the same amount thirteen. Three values are generated 
again from the E-Function. As the value of 0[0] does not change, besides its 
rotation, its value wi ll be consistent with the encryption algori thm, the exact same 
E-Function may be used with 0[0] , and the same key values. This will result in the 
same values existing in Out[1] .. Out[3]. 
For (i=15 to 0) 
(D[OJ, 0[1], 0[2], 0[3]) = (0[3], 0[0], 0[1], 0[2]) 
D[OJ = D[OJ »13 
Out[] = E-Function(D[OJ, K[2*1+4], K[2* i+5J) 
D[2J = D[2J - Out[2J 
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0[1] = O[I]-Out[l] 
0[3] = 0[3]EIl Out[3] 
0[3] = 0[3] -Out[l] 
0[1] = 0[1] Ell Out[3] 
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As one can see, Instead on addition, subtraction is used thereby reversing the 
encryption operation by operation. 
Backward Mixing 
The backward mixing reverses the process performed by the forward mixing of the 
encryption algorithm . Once again all operations are performed in the reverse order, 
reversing the original operations performed on them. 
For (I = 7 to 0) 
End for 
(0[0], 0[1], 0[2], 0[3]) = (0[3],0[0], 0[1], 0[2]) 
If 1=0 or 4 then 0[0] -= 0[3] 
If 1=1 or 5 then 0[0]-= 0[1] 
0[0] = 0[0] < <24 
0[3] - 0[3] ID S,[Highest byte of O[Oll 
0[2] = 0[2] - So[Thlrd byte of 0[0]] 
0[1] = 0[1] - S,[Second byte of O[Oll 
0[1] = 0[1] El) So[lowest byte of O[Oll 
For (i= 0 to 3) 
O[i]= O[i] - K[i] 
The values in 0[0] .. 0[3J wil l contain the deciphered plaintext elements. 
An Example 
The key scheduling begins with a user key 
k = { 0, 1, 2, .. ,31} 
The initial mixing takes place resulting in the temporary array T[] , with the 
fol lowing elements, 
T[-7 .. 38] = {164676729, 684261344, -2069205959, -1649577337, 2113903587, -
735673503, -915562028, -323995194, 170718370, 1272489713, -1291699165,-
1574176379,775155458,1093196693, 184593213, 1529051314, 29780847, 
1241525645, 274897490, 848037223, -1656480989, -679515193, 740622749, -
1228274602,909075862, 1045363007, 706022039, 189071841, -62578810, 
538581743,1265025929, -1297483056, -1371025234, -823293138, 655918954,-
2041138099, 788724001, 1922672416, -230292849, -437142186, -497399764, 
474208460, 795471396, -1994711459, - 124494573, - 1041039443, -198107373, -
198107373} 
Once the temporary array T has been stirred and placed in the key array K[], one is 
left with, 
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K[0 .. 39J = {-1344297214, 875956763, -801971149, -1571757423, 179380674, 
195762001, -515924257, -2072789416, 1651641163, 1601951000, - 1259914813, 
1345696749, -1404700122, 949929765, -351704798,2088320838, -1281311071, 
-1037466454, -117857471, 1627198274, -677770879,1632128159, -
1702510644, -459911906, 1999764266, 1917876914, 162413934,212 157580, 
1571707305, - 1260684647,1227506311, -823164753, 276248922, -187899174, 
1917877738, -614471195, -1205950396, -1093647705, -954722349, 949280097} 
Now one must fix the weak keys, checking elements 5,7, ... ,35 in the key array K. 
K[5.7, . .35J = {195762001, -2072789416, 1601951000, 1345696749,949929765, 
2088320838, -1037466454, 1627198274, 1632128159, -459911906,1917876914, 
212157580, -1260684647, -823164753, -187899174, -614471195 
} 
One can see that there were no elements that are considered weak in the current 
key, and hence none were changed. 
The final key then is as stated above in K[O .. 39]. 
Encryption 
Now to encrypt the message "Hello World!", first one converts It to Integer values, 
this is done using the CryptLib method ConvertAnyString(Strlng), that converts the 
string to bytes and then to integers. 
Hello World! 
1819043144 1867980911 560229490 0 
When the values are passed into the encryption algorithm they are placed in the 
D[] array where, 
0[OJ=1819043144, 0[lJ=1867980911, 0[2J =560229490, 0[3J=0 
The first thing that is done is the addition of the keys O[iJ = O[IJ+K[IJ, i=0 .. 3 
O[O .. 3J = {474745930, -1551029622, -241741659, -1571757423} 
The forwa rd mixing takes place for eight rounds, 
Round 0 
0[0 .. 3J = {1646355905, -1656557383, 742058680, 2017932500} 
Round 1 




O[O .. 3J = {55044653, 88209549, 535438619, -267296678} 
Round 7 
0[0 .. 3)= {1572015899, 792603926, -1466545613, 1206529283} 
Now that the forward mixing is completed the Keyed transformation takes place 
over sixteen rou nds. 
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Round 0 
Out[1..3] ={167695470, 210115501, -776316752} 
0[0 .. 3] = {960299396, -1256430112, -1773111885, 1642294198} 
Round 1 
Out [1..3] ={605507730, 833079814, 161325982} 




Out [1..3] ={754136283, -1045599012, -73306089} 
O[O .. 3]={ -1637864550, -296466158, 1415363190, -965716442} 
Round 15 
Out[1..3] ={-1348234262, 711001132, -1970933296} 
O[O .. 3 ]={1691465922, 2126364322, 1981016592, 91444172} 
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The backward mixing takes place for eight rounds resulting in the following values 
in O[]. 
Round 0 
O[O . . 3]={89016844, 1373058604, 901405797, -1033580104} 
Round 1 




O[O .. 3]={266242868, 711977859, -937129531, -316107467} 
Round 7 
O[O .. 3]={ -1340437116, -2063161365, 1469176171, -1310364001} 
Once the final whitening has taken place, with O[i]=O[i] - K[36+i], i=0 .. 3 the final 
ciphertext is 
0[0 .. 3] = {-134486720, -969513660, - 1871068776, 2035323198} 
Oecryptlon 
The first thing that takes place is the forward mixing, this reverses the process of 
the backwards mixing in the encryption algorithm. The values of the D[] array is as 
follows 
0[0 .. 3] = {-134486720, -969513660, -187 1068776, 2035323198} 
The whitening then Is reversed, D[I]=O[I] + K[36+1], i=0 .. 3 
0[0 .. 3] = {-13404371 16, -2063161365, 1469176171, -1310364001} 
The forward mixing then proceeds for eight rounds 
Round 7 
0[0 .. 3] = {266242868, 711977859, -937129531, -316107467} 
Round 6 
0[0 . . 3] = {417439973, -1065722789, -1419324492, - 263427336} 
" 




0[0 .. 3J = {89016844, 1373058604,901405797, -1033580104} 
Round 0 
0[0 .. 3J = {1691465922, 2126364322, 1981016592, 91444172} 
The Keyed transformation then proceeds 
Round 15 
Out[1..3J = {-1348234262, 711001132, -1970933296} 
0[0 .. 3J = {-1637864550, -296466158, 1415363190, -965716442} 
Round 14 
Out [1..3J ={754136283, -1045599012, - 73306089} 




Out [1..3J ={605507730, 833079814, 161325982} 
0[0 .. 3J={-650922382, -940032071, 1753139240, - 1607432409} 
Round 0 
Out[1..3J ={ 167695470, 210115501, - 776316752} 
0[0 .. 3] = {960299396, -1256430112, -1773111885, 1642294198} 
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Once the transformation is complete the backward mixing takes place, which is 
exactly the reverse of the forward mixing of the encryption algorithm. There are 
eight rounds in the mixing, 
Round 7 
0[0 .. 3J ={ 55044653, 88209549, 535438619, -267296678} 
Round 6 




0[0 .. 3J = {1646355905, -1656557383, 742058680, 2017932500} 
Round 0 
0[0 .. 3J = {474745930, -1551029622, -241741659, -1571757423} 
The last operation that takes place is 0[1] = D[f]-K[i], i=0 .. 3, resu lting in the 
correct piaintext elements in O[] , which is 
0[0] = 1819043144, 0[1]=1867980911, 0[2]=560229490, 0[3]=0 
"Hello World!" 
8.3) MARS Implementation 
Due to the non-disclosure agreement that was signed with NIST, I cannot display 
any of the actual code for the algorithm. However I can diSCUSS pseudo code for the 
MARS algorithm. 
The Class MARSCrypt.Java has a number of predefined variables, these are the S-
Key array and the user key array. Al l of these are stored as arrays of integers. The 
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S-Box is a predefined set of data values and has been recommended, there are five 
hundred and twelve entries in the SE] array . 
The MARSCrypt initialise method performs the followi ng: 
IIRC6Crypt.Java RC6Crypt method 
CL = New CryptLib 
User_key[32] = 0 
5 = generate_Keys(User_key,32) 
A new object of the CryptLib class is created, as a few of the methods are used by 
the encryption and decryption functions. A default user key is created which is set 
to zero. This enables a defau lt S-key array to be created, when generate_Keys is 
called. There are two encryption and decryption functions, and the method for 
generating the keys. 
Generate_Keys(userKey, size) 
n = S;ze/4 
integer 8[4], T[47],K[40] 




The user key is converted from bytes to words and placed in K[]. The temporary 
array is then initiated with the first seven values of the S- Box. To makes things 
easier to control, the array index of T[] goes from 0 .. 46, instead of -7 .. 38, as it is 
easier to work with. 
For (/OOP=Oi/oop<40;/oop++) 
w = (T{loop] XOR T{loop +5]) ; 
T[/oop+7] = ((w»>29) OR (w«3)) XOR K[/oop mod n] XOR loop; 
End For 
T[46] = n; 
The initial mixing of the key and the temp array take place. One will notice that two 
rotations are executed instead of one, this is so one will have a data Independent 
rotation and no timing information can be obtained. 
For (rounds = 0 ;rounds <7;rounds++) { 
For (Joop=liIOOp<40;/oop++) { 
T[7+loop] = T[7+loop] + S[Low bits of T[7+loop-lJ]; 
T[7+loop] = (T[7+loop] «9)1 (T[7+loop] »23); 
End For 
T[7] = T[7]+S[low Bits ofT[46J]; 
T[7] = (T[7] « 9) OR (T[7] »23); 
End For 
The seven rounds of mixing or stirring then occur as the information of the S-Box is 
then used. Once again the same methodology Is used in the rotation operations. 
One wi ll notice that al l the index's have the va lue of seven added to them. This Is 
because t he array index starts at zero instead of negative seven and the same 
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algorithm is used for mixing so one needs to offset these indexes. (As opposed to 
working with negative indexed array elements) 
For (loop=O;loop < 40;foop++) { 
K[(7*loop) Mod 40] ~ T[loop+7]; 
End For 
Once the Key values have been set they are then checked for weak subkeys. 
For (loop ~ 5;loop<36;loop+~2) { 
K[loop] ~ fix_subkey(K[loop],K[loop+3]); 
} 
The function fix_subkey returns a corrected sub key, all it does is check for 
consecutive bits, If there are none, no changes take place, If there are refer back to 
the algorithm discussion to see what is performed. The value of K Is returned as the 
key of the algorithm with forty entries. 
MARSEncrypt(plalntext String, userKey[]) 
There are two versions of the encryption, one accepts a string and the other four 
integer va lues in an array. This occurrence deals with splitting up the strings into 
encryptable values. 
Tempint[] ~ CryptLib,ConvertAnyString(Plaintext) 
For (/oop=O;loop< Templnt. Length;/oop+4) 
BJockPJaintext[ 4] = Tempint[loop,loop+ l,loop+2,loop+3] 
BlockPlaintext[4] ~ MARSEncrypt(BlockPlaintext[],use key) 
Ciphertext + = B/ockP/aintext 
End for 
The current method accepts the plaintext, and converts it to an array of integers, 
which is of uniform length that is divisible by four. The ConvertAnyInteger pads the 
end with zeros if it Is not long enough, Then the code copies four elements of the 
plaintext integers into an array of four elements. These are the four elements that 
are then encrypted using the other MARSEncrypt method, passing the array of four 
plaintext integers and the user key. The result of this is then added to a string 
called ciphertext . The loop conti nues looping until all elements in the plaintext 
integer array Tempint have been encrypted. The ciphertext string is returned. 
MARSEncrvpt(plaintext [J , Kev[J) 
The algorithm takes the four plaintext words and places them in the array D[], and 




The forwa rd mixing then takes place, 
For (/oop=O;/oop<8;foop++) 
0[1] ~ 0[1] <ll SO[/ow byte of 0[0]] 
0[1] ~ 0{1] + Sl[Second byte of 0[0]] 
0[2] ~ 0[2] + SO[Third byte of 0[0]] 
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D[3} = D[3} Ell 51 {Highest byte of D{O}} 
D{O} = (D{O}»24) OR (D{O}«8) 
If loop = 0 or 4 then D[O}+=D[3} 
If loop = 1 or 5 then D{O} + =D{l} 
D{} = SwapValuesLeft(D) 
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The values are XORed, and added to one another, and once again the same 
rotation methodology is used to prevent timing attacks. The values in D are then 
shifted one position to the left in the array D when the SwapValuesLeft method is 
executed. The keyed transformation step now proceeds. 
For (loop=O;loop<15;loop++) 
Out = Efunction(D[O},K{2*loop+4,2*loop+5}) 
D{O}= (D{O}«13) or (D{O»>19) 
D{2}+=Out{I} 
If loop = 8 Then D{I}+=Out{O} , D{3} XOR=Out{2} 
Else D{3}+=Out[O} , D{l} XOR =Out{2} 
D{} = SwapValuesLeft(D) 
End For 
The final step which is backward mixing then takes place . 
For (loop=O;loop<8;loop++) 
If 100p=2 or 6 then D{O}-=D{3} 
If 100p=3 or 7 then D{O}-=D{l} 
D[l} = D{l} XOR Sl{low byte of O[O}} 
D[2} = D[2} - SO[Highest byte of D[O}} 
D[3} = D[3} - Sl[Third byte of D[O}} 
D[3} = D[3} XOR SO[Second byte of D[O}} 
D[O} = (D[O}»24) or (D[O}«8) 
D{} = SwapValuesLeft(D) 
For (loop =O;loop < 4;/oop++) 
D{loop}-= Key[36+loop} 
End For 
The values in D[] are returned as the ciphertext as an array of integers. 
EFunction( d,K1,K2) 
The E-Function transforms the values in using a Feistel network. 
M = d+Kl 
R = ((d«13) or (d»19)) * k2 
L = S[i = lowest 9 bits of M} 
R = (R« 5) or (R»27) 
M = (M«(lowest 5 bits of R)) or ((M»- l *(lowest 5 bits of R)) 
L = L XOR R 
R = (R«5) or (R»27) 
L =LXORR 
L = (L< «lowest 5 bits of R)) or ((L> >-I*(lowest 5 bits of R)) 
Return L,M,R 
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Oecrypt(cipherText String, key[]) 
The string Is converted to a uniform length integer array (Divisible by four). A loop 
is then executed taking four consecutive Integers at a time and calling the 
MARSDecrypt(Ciphertext[] integer, Key) method. The results are then appended to 
a string called plaintext. 
TempintU ~ CryptLib,ConvertAny5tring(CipherText) 
For (loop=O;loop<Templnt.Length;loop+4) 
BlockCipherText[4] ~ Tempint[loop,loop+ 1,loop+2,1oop+ 3} 
BlockCipherText [4} ~ MAR50ecrypt(BlockCipherText[],use key) 
Plaintext+ = BlockCipherText 
End for 
The results are then returned in the plalntext string variable. 
Oecrypt( cipherText(],key(]) 





The values of D[] are now ready for the forward mixing stage of the decryption 
algorithm. 
For (loop=7;loop>-1;loop--) 
DU ~ 5wapValuesRight(O) 
O[OJ ~ (0[0«24) or (0[0»8) 
0[3] ~ 0[3} XOR 50[5econd byte of O[Oll 
0{3] ~ 0[3} + 51 [Third byte of O[Oll 
0[2] ~ 0[2J + 50[Highest byte of O[OJ} 
O[lJ ~ O{lJ XOR 5l[/ow byte of O[Oll 
If loop~2 or 6 then 0[OJ+-~O[3] 
If loop~3 or 7 then 0[0]+-~0[11 
End For 
The forward mixing operat ions of the decryption algorithm reverses the process 
performed by the backward mixing operations in the encryption algorithm. The 
values of D(] are all moved one index position to the right, with wrap arou nd . This 
is done the function SwapValuesRightO. 
The keyed transformation operations now proceeds, 
For (loop=15;loop>-1;loop- - ) 
DU ~ 5wapValuesRight(O) 
O[O}~ (0[0»13) or (0[0]«19) 
Out ~ Efunction(0[0},K[2*loop+4,2*loop+5]) 
0[2]-~Out[1} 
If loop ~ 8 Then O[l]-~Out[O}, O[3} XOR~Out[2} 
Else 0[3}-~Out[OJ , O{lJ XOR~Out[2} 
End For 
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The keyed transformation reverses the operations performed by its counterpart in 
the encryption algorithm. The backward mixing then takes place, 
For (/00p=7;loop>-1;loop--) 
O[] = swapValuesRight(O) 
If loop = 0 or 4 then 0[OJ-=0[3J 
If loop = 1 or 5 then O[OJ-=O[lJ 
O[OJ = (0[OJ « 24) or (O[OJ> >8) 
0[3J = 0[3J XOR 51 [Highest byte of O[Oll 
0[2J = 0[2J - SO[Third byte of O[Oll 
O[lJ = O[1J - 51 [Second byte of O[Oll 
O[lJ = O[lJ XOR SO{low byte of O[Oll 
End For 




The plaintext elements are then returned In the integer array O[]. 
8 .4) MARS Usage 
The client and server applications have a copy of the MARSCrypt class. These are 
initialised on the initialisation of the CryptUb class. As has been mentioned before, 
the client generates the user-defined key . The client sends this key, first encrypting 
it with RSA to the server. The server then decrypts the RSA message and obtains 
the key. The key is specific to each client, and therefore the copy of the key is kept 
in each clienthandler class. Therefore each client has their own session key which 
will be different from any other client key. Once the key is received it is then given 
to the generate_Keys method which execute the key schedu ler and which will 
create the correct key for encryption and decryption algorithm. 
As the Cryptlib class executes the correct key scheduler method. It generates the 
key and places it in the S array . The client and the server perform this key schedule 
method and hence they will have the same key for the current client's session. 
Once the key has been generated, and there are no problems, the encryption then 
changes from RSA to the specified encryption algorithm (in this case its MARS). 
IIClientHandler.Java - send method 
If (encrypCmode>O) 
CurrentMesg = CL. Encrypt(CurrentMesg, Key) 
EndIf 
Thereafter whenever the SendMsg method is called by the client, and Send method 
by the server, the messages are first passed to the Cl. EncryptO method. This 
method passes the message to the MARSEncrypt(String,UserKey) method, which 
encrypts the message and returns a set of numbers in a string format. This is the 
dphertext, and it is the sent to the recipient of the message. 
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CurrentMesg = CL. Decrypt(CurrentMesg, Key) 
EndIf 
When the client or server receives a message, it is first passed to the CL.Decrypt 
method which passes it to the correct decryption method (MARSDecrypt (Stri ng, 
UserKey)), this decrypts the message, and then the message Is dealt with. If any 
errors occur while decrypting messages they are ignored, and the error is reported 
to the administrator. Both the MARS and RC6 algorithms have been implemented in 
such a way that they have the same methods and functions to maintain standard 
speci fi cations of the implementation. 
8.5) Timing 
Speed tables re used to compare the performance of the algorithm to other 
implementations. The performance shows MARS to be relatively quick, and it has 
been shown to be even more so in a hardware Implementation of t he algorithm. 
Language Scheme Blocks/Sec Mbits/Sec 
Auct ion MARS 
JOK 1. 2 Enqyption 20000 2.56 
lDK 1.2 Decryption 20000 2.56 
Fig 8 .5.1 EncryptlOn a nd Decrypl10n figure s o f MARS 
l anauaae Scheme Blocks/Sec Mbits/Sec 
Optlmised 
Imolementatlon 
JOK 1.1.6 Encrvotion ? 14.5 
lDK 1.1.6 Decrvotion ? 17.3 
Borla nd C++ Encrvotion ? 28 
Borland C++ Decrvotion ? 28 . . FIg 8.5.2 Encryplton and Dccryptlon figures of MARS IC. Bunvlck, et a~ 
The auction implementation of MARS was completed on an Intel PII 450Mhz chip 
with 196MB Ram, running MS Windows 98. A few optlmizations were implemented 
In the algorithm, but for readability 's sake it is as close to the pseudo code as 
possible. As it can be seen the MARS speeds, it is slightly faster than RC6. This is 
due mainly to the compilers and CPU 's used , as d iscussed in [B.Schneier, et at], 
and MARS is actually considered a slower algorithm as it requires more operations. 
It can be seen that the auction applications implementation is about fi ve times 
slower than the optimized version of the code . 
The figures shown here for the optimized implementations were obtained using an 
Intel Pentium Pro 200MHz chip with 64MB Ram, runn ing in MS Wi ndows 98. As it 
has been mentioned before, the Pentium Pro chlpset is better su ited for the 
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operations that are performed by the algorithms. This and the fact that the 
algorithms are optimized, result in the higher speeds, The main result of these 
figures is to show that the current implementation of the MARS algorithm is able to 
support a large number of simultaneous clients, 
As the algorithm is encrypting or decrypting over two and a half megabits a second, 
it equates to a large capacity of messages that may be handled . This is more than 
adequate for the auction application as it could deal with over a thousand clients a 
second. 
8.6) Attacks 
There are a number of attacks that the MARS algorithm may be susceptible to, but 
it is still a rather new algorithm and has shown good resistance to the classica l 
attacks. There are a few different roots of attacking the algorithm, and this includes 
the key schedu le, the S-Box, Timing attacks and linear and differential attacks. 
The S-Box attack 
As the S-Box is a known value and is not random, it means that it may be 
extensively examined. The developers of MARS, [C.Burwick, et al] relate this 
attack, based on the assumption there is a weakness in the S- Box. 
Assume that one of the S-Box halves So or SI , has two elements where 
" = 5, [iJ XOR 5, [j] = 0 in the highest bits 
This weakness will mean that the key and the encryption is at risk, as the hig h 
order bits in multiplication, addition and subtraction w ill have greater significance in 
these operations. This means that when one performs encryption the change in the 
elements wi ll not be as great as expected, and hence a part of the pla intext may be 
revealed during the encryption process. One may be able to determine this 
information with weaknesses in the $-Box, 
There are a few other attacks that could be mounted on an 5-Box, but the specified 
S-Box has been chosen such that the information is relatively random and al l 
elements differ by a number of bits. This is to prevent all the well -known attacks 
mounted on DES's S-Box. The inventors of the algorithm showed that there are 
characteristi cs that hold in the S-Box which occur w ith a probability of more than 2-
32 . This means it's an unlikely source of attack, as the S-Box is about as random as 
needs be, and that an attack on the S-Box wi ll probably be the easiest. 
The Key Schedule Attack 
Accord ing to the creators of MARS, there are no weak or equivalent keys, The keys 
used for multiplication's are checked for any form of weaknesses and are f ixed if 
any problems do arise. It is also suggested that the key sched ule or expansion is 
random enough to produce very expanded keys even tho ugh the user keys have 
similar characteristics. The expanded key has about 21248 effective bits. It has 
been shown that the pairs of original n bit keys mapped to the same expanded key 
are about 2 20 - 1249, a rather large value for the normal 128 bit key. 
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The reason that an attack on the key expansion is unlikely is because some of the 
operations are not easily reversiblei the most important one being the checking of 
the multiplication keys. This however is a problem as this method may actually 
cause a collision, in which the user key and expanded keys are the same. All this 
would require at least a searching of 232 different keys [M -J.O.Saarinen] for one to 
find the original key. This is assuming one is able to reverse the key fixing or 
checking step, and reverse all of the other steps. If one were to attempt this it 
would not take too long for a standard computer to search the 232 keys. The reason 
why it will not fail in the case of the auction application is that the expanded or user 
key is never seen, due to the fact that it is encrypted by RSA. If RSA failed the 
entire protocol would fail as one of Its primitives was flawed. 
Linear and Differential Attacks 
"In linear analysis one tries to find a subset of the bit positions in the plaintext, 
ciphertext and expanded keys, so that for a uniformly chosen plaintext and 
expanded key, the probability that the sum of the bits in these positions is equal to 
zero modulo two, will be bounded away from one half" [C.Surwick, et at]. The 
difference between the probability and one half is known as a bias. The bigger the 
bias the better as it requires less guessing of values, and hence less of a workload. 
To mount a linear attack the algorithm is broken down into its constituent 
operations, and each of these operations is given an approximation . All these 
approximations are combined together to find the global approximation of the 
complex operation or algorithm. Once this has been completed one can then 
attempt to approximate bits and bit values within the algorithm for each round. As 
the end result is known (the ciphertext) , one works backwards giving the 
approximations of bits for each round, until one can guess or approximate the 
plaintext. The problem however is that these approximations have shown that the 
linear approximation of the algorithm has a bias of 2 , 69, which is very small. This 
means that the complexity of the problem is of the order 2 128 , which is incredibly 
difficult to solve. 
Many aspects of the algorithm, such as the S- Box, and E-Functian which maintain 
the security of the algorithm have been designed to minimize linear attacks. For 
instance the E-Function which transforms the data has no operations or values 
totally dependant on one another, making it difficult to perform approximations. 
[Co Burwick, et at] have shown a number of features of differential cryptanalysis 
which would make breaking the algorithm very difficult. One is an examination af 
the Key transformation characteristics of the algorithm. To construct such 
characteristics using the expanded key and plaintext has a probability of 2 '2<10 . This 
is assuming one can obtain enough ciphertext, plaintext and keys ta perform this 
analysis (2 128 pairs, which is almost impossible to obtain), This is just for the keyed 
transformation and does not deal with any of the other operations, 
Once again it, as has been mentioned before it is not feasible in any terms to 
mount these attacks on the practical implementation of the auction application. The 
rewards are far to slim to make it anywhere near a profitable exercise. 
Timing Attack 
As the algorithm uses data dependent rotations, which have been shown to execute 
at different speeds depending on the rotational value, it is considered a weakness. 
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One could possibly time the rotations and then work out the important values In 
each round of the encryption, thereby giving away information of the plaintext. 
To resolve th is problem the same methodology that was used for RC6 has been 
used for MARS. This is t he inclusion of a second rotation in the opposite direction. 
The rotational value is the negative rotational value modulus the word length. This 
two rotations are then ORed together to get the final result. This double rotation 
results in a constant time for rotation and hence no timing information may be 
concluded . 
Brute Force Attack 
The brute force attack will attempt every set of keys unti l the correct plaintext is 
determined. As the length of the user key is unknown (128 - 1248 bits). The 
security of the algorithm grows quite extensively as the size of the key gets to 256 
bits. Once the size of the key goes over 300 bits one wi l l not essentially benefit 
from much more security . 
It has been suggested that the security of the algorithm is 2n, where n is the 
number of bits used in the key (with n<256). It is not even easier to guess the 
expanded key, as the S-Box would have played a role in the generation and it will 
conform to a whole lot of ru les. Using this as a general guideline once again brings 
us to the conclusion that this attack is just not feasible in fisca l and time 
constrai nts. 
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8.7) Conclusion 
The last three chapters have examined the encryption algorithms used in the 
auction applications protocol and they are the primitives of th is protocol. The 
protocol as a whole could not work without one other, both the symmetric and 
asymmetric systems need one another as has been explained, The algorithms 
known to be relatively secure, barring any new advances in technology or 
cryptanalysis, 
The reason that the overall protocol is considered re latively secure is really because 
of the way in which it is used, It has been stressed repeatedly that the even if the 
protocol is breakable the resources currently available (money, t ime, expertise and 
Information) would not be sufficient to meet the requirements of an attack, Even if 
they were, the rewards for breaking the system wou ld not be sufficient. The correct 
implementation of the algorithms has ensured the security of the overall project 
Secure Internet Auctioning System Page 149 
Conclusion 
9) Conclusion 
The auction ing application has the met criteria laid out at the beginning of the 
thesis in number of ways. 
The use of Java as the development language has had dual benefits. Java has 
enabled the creation of a system independent application, which does not require 
any specific operati ng system or hardware. Java's intrinsic security support has 
allowed the development of a relatively secure application that poses no threat for 
the cl ient or server. 
The auctioning application also had a dual purpose. The application was a vessel for 
the implementation and usage of secure communication. The auctioni ng application 
tu rned out to be viable, efficient, practical and even meets a certa in need in the 
industry. 
The Three algorithms RSA, RC6 and MARS handled secure communica tion. RSA is a 
proven publ ic key encryption algorithm that meets the requirements for secure key 
exchange between the client and the server. MARS and RC6 are re latively new 
algorithms that are based on sound theory which have shown to be more than 
adequate in meeting the requi rements of secure communication. The algorithms 
have been used in such a way that their weaknesses are not exposed. The protocol 
as a whole, proves to be relatively secure and currently is not susceptible to any 
feasible attacks. However this does not guarantee that the system will remain 
secu re as new attacks and weaknesses are devised very rapid ly. 
The application pulls together as a whole, using as little bandwidth as possible, 
thereby benefiting the clients, and minimizing server resource usage. The result is 
then: \lA Real Time, System Independent, Secure, Internet Based Auctioning 
System", 
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10) Installation and Usage 
The installation of the application is rather straightforward. The are a number of 
requirements though: 
Requirements 
• TCP/IP connection 
• Web Server with ASP (VBScript) for Win32 or CGI (PERL 5+) for Unix 
• Java 1.2 or above 
• 1MB Free Space 
The installation packages have been divided into two types Win32 and Unix. The 
files are named win32aucserv,zip and unixaucserv.tar, respective ly. The only 
reason that there are two different files is that the CGI scripting used to pass 
parameters from the HTML documents to the applet and vice versa is d ifferent for 
the two operating systems. On Win32 system, VBScript through ASP is used, and 
on the Unix system, PERL through CGI is used. The class files are exactly the same. 
Files Included 







The aucserv.jar file contains all the class files for the auction server. The HtmlHelp 
directory contains the Html Help pages for the Auction Server application. The Logs 
directory contains empty log files . The Images directory conta ins the image icons 
used by the Auction Server application. The Html directory contains a default Html 
site and a few required files. For a more comprehensive discussion see the "Auction 
Implementation" chapter. The Win32aucserv.zip file has a run.bat file used for 
executing the application. 
9.1) Installation & Setwup 
Extract the zip file by using a Zip utility, On Win32 systems use pkunzlp or Winzip, 
and in Unix use Tar. When unzipping be sure to include all directory structures and 
subdirectories. 
Win32 
pkunzip - d w;n32aucserv.zip 
Allow the html directory to be executable. 
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Unix 
tar -zvf unixaucserv.tar 
Set up a symbol ic link from the web root to t he htm l di rectory. 
Ln -s <Installed Directory> <Link name> 
The web si te wi ll then be available at http://hostname/< li nk name> 
le: In -5 /home/auction/public_html /httpd/html/auction 
http ://hostname/auction 
Page J5J 




Options ExecCGI I nclude 
</Directory> 
In the /etc/httpd/conf/srm.conf file add the following: 
AddHandler cg i_script .c9i 
Add Handler Server_parsed .htm 
Allow the files in the html di rectory to be executable 
chmod +x "'.* 
9 .2) Executing the Server 




Java -Jar aucserv.jar 
Unix 
Java -jar aucserv.jar 
9.3) Application Maintenance 
The sou rce is included in AucServersrc.zip and AucClientsrc.zip. Within each file is 
the source code for the specif ied application. All source files are included, except for 
the RC6Crypt and MARSCrypt source files as I cannot revea l the source code for the 
applicati ons due to the AES non-disclosure agreement. However the class files were 
included so that the appl ication may stil l execute. 
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9.4) Server Usage 
Once the application has started it does not automatically start the server, 
Note: Unavailable menu items (Greyed out) indicate that other options or features 
need to be addressed before one may proceed, 
Starting the Server 
To start the server, select the Server Menu I Start Server 
Selecting the Port number 
If the server fails because the port the server has attempted to start on (Default 
3002), one must change the port number, Once the port number has been changed 
one must then restart the server (see above), 
To change the port number, select Server Menu I Port Number, Type a port value 
between 1000 and 65000, and then click on OK . 
Exiting the Application 
To exit the application there are two options 
Select the close option on the Window. 
Or 
Select the Serve Menu I Exit. 
Once the server has been started the auctions may then be configured. 
Entering Item details 
To enter the item details: 
Select Auctions Menu I Item Details 
Select the amount of items to be auction and click OK. One is then asked to enter 
the item details one by one in the Auction Item Details frame. The frame tells one 
what the number in the auction list the item is, and it requests the following 
details: the auction item ID number, the minimum starting price and a brief 
description. Once all the details for the current item have been entered click OK. 
Repeat until all details for all items have been entered. If any errors are made the 
application will notify one about the errors. 
Note: If one wants a picture of the item to be sent to the client, during the auction, 
one must place the image in the Images directory off the html directory. The image 
must have the name (in lower case) of the item ID number, and it must be a GIF 
image . 
The details entered here are written to the file auchtm.inc file, which is included in 
an HTML file, so the clients may see what being auctioned, If one wants to enter 
more details about the items auctioned this will have to be done manually on the 
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web site. Once the details have been entered one can then set the stop tlme for the 
current auction. Auctions start with the first item entered and finishes with the last. 
Entering Stop Time 
When choosing the stop time it is for the current item auctioned on ly. To extend the 
current auction change the finish at any stage throughout the auction. All users will 
be notified about this cha nge. When the auction finishes for the current item one 
may then set the following items stop time. 
Select the Auctions Menu I Stop Time. Then choose the correct year, date and time 
to finish. 
If no finish time is entered and the auction is started it will finish immediately and 
proceed to the next auctioned item. 
Starting an Auction 
Once all the above sections have been dealt with the auction may be started. If any 
of the previous steps have been missed this menu option wi ll not be available . 
Select Auctions Menu I Start Auction 
Or 
Select the Play button on the Menu Bar. 
The auction wi ll start and all details pertaining to the auction wil l be displayed in 
the status bar and on the information panel. To see information about the users 
select the Users panel (See below). 
Stopping an Auction 
When one stops an auction, the clients will be notified and the next item will be 
prepared for auctioning. This will forcefully stop the auction at the present time. If 
the auction is left to its own devices it will only stop at t he pre-determined t ime. 
Select the Auction Menu I Stop Auction 
Or 
Click on the Stop button on the Menu Bar 
Demo Auction 
If one does not want to go through the entire rigmarole of setting up an auction 
one ca n run t he Demo auction . This auctions four items w ith random stop t imes 
and minimum values. 
Select Auction Menu I Demo Auction 
Or 
Click on the 0 in the Menu Bar 
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Se lecting Ke y Le ngth 
One may change the RSA key length from its defau lt (128 bit) to a number of 
d ifferen t values up to and including 4096 bit keys. However one shou ld be aware 
that large keys take longer to generate. 
Select Security Menu I Key Length 
This changes the key length but does not generate new keys, this need to be done 
manually. 
Regeneratin g Keys 
One may ma nually fo rce the application to generate new keys. 
Select the Security Menu I Generate Keys 
Selecting Symmetric Cryptosystem 
One has a choice of two symmetric key sys tems. This may be changed before and 
auction starts, and thereafter It will remain fixed until the auction has ended. Only 
once the auction has ended may one select another cryptosystem . 
Select Security Menu I Cryptosystem of choice (RC6 I MARS) 
Help 
To get onl ine help. 
Select the Help Menu I Help 
ThiS bri ngs up another f rame, which is a web browser. There are two buttons: the 
contents page, w hich wi ll return one to the default help page, and the close help 
bu t ton which will close the help page. The application will conti nue runni ng even 
though one may be perusing the help pages. 
Information 
There are va r ious bits of information that is displayed in the auction appl ication and 
it is displayed in two panels. The I nformation panel and the User panel. 
Information Panel 
The informa tion panel displays information pertaining to t he server, cu rrent auction 
and any problems. One may get Information about the current auction by cl icking 
on t he det ai ls menu bar button . If the screen becomes too cluttered one may click 
on t he Clear button, wh ich wi ll remove all information from the information panel. 
User Panel 
The user panel d isplays a list of the cu r ren t users con nected to the appl ication . By 
selecting a clien t it will display t heir details in the cl ient information box, The 
current top bid is d isplayed in the bottom left ha nd corner. 
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9.5) Client Usage 
The client selects the item to bid for from the web page. It will take one to the page 
containing the applet. The applet execute and asks the client to type thirty random 
characters. These are used as the key for the encryption process. 
Once this has been done the client needs to fu ll in all relevant data (Name, Email, 
etc) . Once this has been completed, click on the connect button to connect to the 
auction server. If there are no problems the applet displays the bidding page. 
The bidding page only has one action available. This is simply to bid . The client 
enters a bid value which must be greater that the minimum bid or current top bid 
and clicks on the submit button to send it. This page relates all the details to the 
client about the current auction. 
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MDS accepts a message M, which is made up of b number of bits. The following 
implementation is from [R.Rivest, 1992]. 
I.e M o .. Mb• 1 
Step 1 
The message is then padded so it has a length of 448 modulo 51 2. It length is then 
considered congruent to 448 modulo 512. The first bit added is one, thereafter all 
other bits are zero . As modulo 512 is applied to the value, one needs to add at 
most 512 bits or at least one bit. 
Step 2 
A sixty four-bit representation of the original value of b is then added to the result 
of step 1, which means it has an overall length of 512 bits. Where Mo to M,,-l is the 
32 bit words in the new value. The value of n is divisible by sixteen. 
Step 3 
Four word buffers (A, 6, C, D) are used as registers, which are initialized with the 
values 
A: 01 234567 
B: 89 ab cd ef 
C: fe dc ba 98 
D: 76 54 32 10 
Step 4 
Four functions are used that accept three thirty two bit words and output one thirty 
two bit word. 
F(X,Y,Z) ~ XY OR not(X) Z 
G(X,Y,Z) ~ XZ OR Y not(Z) 
H(X,Y,Z) ~ X '" Y '" Z 
I(X,Y,Z) ~ Y '" (X OR not(Z)) 
For (i~ 0;I<N/(16-1),I++) 
For (j=Oij< 1S,j++) 
Set X[jl to M[i*16+j]. 
End For 
End For 
AA = A, BB = 6, CC = C, DD = D 
ThiS following rounds uses a 64-element table T[1 ... 64]. This is made from the 
sine function. Let T(i] = 4294967296 * abs(sin(i)), (i is in radians). 
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Round One 
Let abed k s i denote 
a = b + «a + F(b,e,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< 5). 
Now apply it to the fo llowing operations, where ABCD Is the four register 32~bit 
registers A, 6, C, D in that order. 
[ABCD 0 7 1] [DABC 1 12 2] [CDAB 2 17 3] [BCDA 322 4J 
[ABCD 4 7 5] [DABC 5 12 6] [CDAB 617 7] [BCDA 722 8] 
[ABCD 8 7 9] [DABC 9 12 10] [CDAB 10 17 11] [BCDA 11 22 12] 
[ABCD 12 713] [DABC 13 12 14] [CDAB 14 17 15] [BCDA 15 22 16] 
Round Two 
Let [abed k 5 i] denote 
a = b + «a + G(b,e,d) + X[k] + T[i]) «< 5). 
Now apply it to the fol lowing operations: 
[ABCD 1 517] [DABC 6 918] [CDAB 1114 19] [BCDA 020 20J 
[ABCD 5 5 21] [DABC 10 922J [CDAB 15 14 23J [BCDA 420 24J 
[ABCD 9 525] [DABC 14 926] [CDAB 3 14 27] [BCDA 82028] 
[ABCD 13 529] [DABC 2 930] [CDAB 7 14 31] [BCDA 12 20 32] 
Round Three 
Let [abed k 5 t] denote 
a = b + «a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) «< 5). *f 
Now apply it to the following opera tions: 
[ABCD 5 433] [DABC 8 11 34] [CDAB 11 1635] [BCDA 14 23 36] 
[ABCD 1 4 37] [DABC 4 11 38] [CDAB 7 16 39] [BCDA 10 23 40] 
[ABCD 13 441] [DABC 0 11 42] [CDAB 3 1643] [BCDA 62344] 
[ABCD 9 445] [DABC 12 11 46] [CDAB 15 1647] [BCDA 22348] 
Round Four 
Let [abed k 5 t] denote 
a = b + «a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[iJ) «< 5). *f 
Now apply it to the following operations: 
[ABCD 0 6 49] [DABC 7 10 50] [CDAB 14 15 51] [BCDA 5 21 52] 
[ABCD 12 653] [DABC 3 10 54] [CDAB 10 15 55] [BCDA 1 21 56J 
[ABCD 8 6 57) [DABC 15 10 58] [CDAB 6 15 59] [BCDA 13 21 60] 
[ABCD 4 661] [DABC 1110 62] [CDAB 21563] [BCDA 921 64] 
Finally perform the following operations, and return the values in A, B, C, D as the 
result. A += AA, B+ = BB, e + = ec, D+ = DD 
